Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 3.
Henry Coppee , LL.D., Ed.

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[689] they gave him the most devoted support. If success, however, covered the faults committed by Meade, which may be palliated on account of his recent appointment, that is no reason why we should ignore them. On the 1st of July he should have gone to Gettysburg himself, instead of sending Hancock there: the concentration of the army would have been effected with more speed; on the morning of the 2d he indicated in too vague terms the position which Sickles was to occupy, and on finding that this general considered that position bad he should have gone to examine it in person, without waiting to be summoned there by the combat; at a later period he should not have deprived the right wing of Geary and his two brigades; on the 3d, when he saw Pickett advancing, he had a quarter of an hour's time to prepare for his reception: he does not appear to have had the slightest idea of the point where his line would be attacked, and consequently came very near having it pierced; finally, if in the evening, instead of throwing a single brigade forward, he had launched three divisions against Longstreet's right, as he could have done, his victory would have been more decisive.

The strength of the two armies has given rise to lively discussions. The returns, used at the North and South in similar forms, have been increased by some and reduced by others at their own pleasure. These returns were under three heads: the first represented the total number of officers and soldiers inscribed on the rolls, whether absent or present; the second represented those present on active duty, comprising all men who were in the field-hospitals, under arrest, or detached on special service; the third contained the real number of combatants present under arms. The first head was therefore quite fictitious; the second mentioned the number of men to be fed in the army, including non-combatants; the third, the effective force that could be brought on the battlefield. The latter number is evidently the most important to know, but, as we have observed, it varied greatly, for a long march in a week of bad weather was sufficient to fill the hospitals. In ordinary times it was from twelve to eighteen per cent. less than under the second head. It did not even always represent exactly the precise number of combatants: in fact, when, after a long march, the stragglers did not answer