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Chapter 9:
- The victory of Manassas, a misfortune for the Confederates.
-- Relaxation in Richmond.
-- plotting among Confederate leaders for the Presidential succession.
-- Beauregard's political letter.
-- active and elastic spirit of the North.
-- resolution of the Federal Congress.
-- energy of the Washington Administration.
-- its immense preparations for the prosecution of the war.
-- the Missouri campaign.
-- the politics of Missouri.
-- Sterling Price and his party.
-- imprudence and violence of the Federal authorities in Missouri.
-- correspondence between Gens. Price and Harney.
-- Gov. Jackson's proclamation.
-- military condition of Missouri.
-- her heroic choice.
-- affair at Booneville.
-- composition of the patriot army of Missouri.
-- engagement at Carthage.
-- Confederate reinforcements under McCulloch.
-- Disagreement between Price and McCulloch.
-- noble conduct of Price.
-- the battle of Oak Hill.
-- McCulloch surprised.
-- a fierce fight.
-- death of Gen. Lyon.
-- the Federals defeated.
-- withdrawal of McCulloch's forces into Arkansas.
-- operations in Northern Missouri.
-- Fremont in command of the Federal forces in Missouri.
-- his proclamation emancipating the slaves.
-- its novelty and brutality.
-- repudiated at Washington.
-- the siege of Lexington.
-- its surrender to Price.
-- gallantry of Col. Mulligan.
-- critical position of Price.
-- his disappointment of Confederate succour.
-- his adroit retreat.
-- Missouri's ordinance of secession.
-- Fremont superseded.
-- three military messengers in pursuit of him.
-- excitement in his camp.
-- Price at Springfield.
-- close of the first campaign in Missouri.
-- the campaign, a chapter of wonders.
-- Missouri manhood.
-- the Western Virginia campaign.
-- resources and wealth of the Western section of Virginia.
-- Wise's command.
-- the enemy in the Kanawha Valley.
-- Wise's retreat to Lewisburg.
-- the Floyd brigade.
-- advance of the joint forces towards the Gauley.
-- the affair at cross Lanes.
-- movement of Rosecrans.
-- affair of Carnifax Ferry.
-- Floyd and Wise fall back towards Sewell Mountain.
-- an unfortunate quarrel of commanders.
-- operations of Gen. Lee in Northwestern Virginia.
-- his failure at Cheat Mountain.
-- Col. Rust's part in the affair.
-- movement of Lee to the line of Lewisburg.
-- how Rosecrans escaped from him.
-- engagement of the Greenbrier River.
-- Gen. H. R. Jackson's success.
-- failure of the Western Virginia campaign.
-- Gen. Lee's new command
The victory of
Manassas proved the greatest misfortune that could have befallen the
Confederacy.
It was taken by the
Southern public as the end of the war, or, at least, as its decisive event.
Nor was this merely a
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vulgar delusion.
President Davis, after the battle, assured his intimate friends that the recognition of the
Confederate States by the
European Powers was now certain.
The newspapers declared that the question of manhood between North and South was settled forever; and the phrase of “one Southerner equal to five Yankees” was adopted in all speeches about the war-although the origin or rule of the precise proportion was never clearly stated.
An elaborate article in “De bow's review” compared
Manassas with the decisive battles of the world, and considered that the war would now degenerate into mere desultory affairs, preliminary to a peace.
On the whole, the unfortunate victory of
Manassas was followed by a period of fancied security, and of relaxed exertions on the part of the
Southern people highly dangerous and inauspicious.
The best proof of this inactivity is to be found in the decrease of enlistments by volunteers.
There are to be found in the politics and literature of the
Confederacy at this time, some very singular indications of the exaggerated and foolish confidence which took place upon the event of
Manassas.
So certain, after this event, was supposed to be the term of Confederate existence, that politicians actually commenced plotting for the Presidential succession, more than six years distant.
Mr. Hunter of
Virginia about this time left
Mr. Davis' Cabinet, because it was said that he foresaw the errours and unpopularity of this Administration, and was unwilling by any identification with it to damage his chances as
Mr. Davis' successor in the
Presidential office.
Gen. Beauregard was already designated in some quarters as the next Confederate
President; and the popular nominee of an honour six years hence, wrote a weak and theatrical letter to the newspapers, dated “Within hearing of the enemy's guns,” and declaring: “I am not either a candidate, nor do I desire to be a candidate, for any civil office in the gift of the people or Executive.”
There was actually a controversy between different States as to the location of the capital of a Government, the existence of which they could not understand was yet imperilled by war. The controversy went so far that the city council of
Nashville, Tennessee, appropriated $750,000 for a residence for the
President of the Southern Confederacy, as an inducement to remove the capital there.
It is remarkable that the statesmen of
Richmond did not observe the singular temper of the authorities at
Washington, .on the news of their defeat at
Manassas.
On the very day that
Washington was crowded with fugitives from the routed army, the Federal Congress legislated calmly and patiently throughout; and the House of Representatives, passed unanimously the following resolution:
Resolved, That the maintenance of the Constitution, the preservation of the Union, and the enforcement of the laws, are sacred trusts which must be executed; that no disaster shall discourage us from the most ample performance of this high duty; and that
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we pledge to the country and the world the employment of every resource, national and individual, for the suppression, overthrow, and punishment of rebels in arms.
While the
South reposed on the laurels of
Manassas, the active and elastic spirit of the
North was at work to repair its fortunes.
It accomplished wonders.
It multiplied its armies; it built navies with infuriate energy; it recovered itself from financial straits which distant observers thought hopeless; a few weeks after the
battle of Manassas it negotiated a loan of one hundred and fifty millions of dollars, at a fraction above the legal interest of New York; in short, its universal mind and energy were consolidated in its war upon the
South.
There is no more remarkable phenomenon in the whole history of the war than the display of fully awakened Northern energy in it, alike wonderful in the ingenuity of its expedients and in the concentrated force of its action.
At every stage of the war the
North adopted the best means for securing specific results.
It used the popularity of
Fremont to bring an army into the field.
It combined with the science of
McClellan,
Buell, and
Halleck, such elements of popularity as could be found in the names of
Banks,
Butler, and
Baker.
It patronized the great ship-brokers and ship-owners of New York to create a navy.
The world was to be astonished soon to find the
North more united than ever in the prosecution of the contest, and the proportions of the war so swollen as to cover with its armies and its navies the frontiers of half a continent.
While these immense preparations were in progress in the
North, and while the
South indulged its dreams of confidence, there was a natural pause of large and active operations in the field.
The months of summer and early fall following the
battle of Manassas are barren of any great events in the history of the war. But within this period there occurred two campaigns, remarkable for other circumstances than decisive influence, taking place on widely separated theatres, and yet much alike in their features of discursive contest.
These were the campaigns in the distant
State of Missouri and in the mountainous regions of
Western Virginia.
The Missouri campaign.
The politics of
Missouri had always been strongly Southern.
As early as 1848-9, when the
North was evidently intent upon excluding the
South from the territory obtained in the
Mexican war-acquired principally by the blood of Southern soldiers — the Legislature of Missouri passed resolutions affirming the rights of the States, as interpreted by
Calhoun, and pledging
Missouri to “co-operate with her sister States in any measure they might adopt” against Northern encroachments.
On opposition to
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these resolutions,
Mr. Benton was defeated for the United States Senate; and they remained on the statute-book of
Missouri unrepealed to the date of the war.
In the last Presidential campaign,
Missouri, under one of those apparent contradictions or delusions not uncommon in American politics, gave her vote for
Douglas.
This result was obtained chiefly through the influence of
Sterling Price, who had formerly been
Governour of the
State, had previously represented her in Congress, and was a man of commanding influence with his party.
Price and his party were strongly attached to the
Union, and hoped that it might be perpetuated with safety and honour to the
South.
Of the
Convention called in January, 1861, not a single member was yet ready to avow the policy of secession; and
Price himself, who had been returned as a Union man without opposition, was elected its president.
But the
Federal authorities in
Missouri did not show that prudence which the occasion called for; they did nothing to conciliate the disposition of the
Convention; and as events marched onward, the designs of the
Washington Government were too plainly unmasked, to leave any doubt with the people of
Missouri of the fate prepared for them.
In the city of
St. Louis there had been several collisions between the citizens and Federal soldiery; and those anxious to keep the peace of the
State had reason to fear that these riots would be the inaugurating scenes of revolution.
On the 10th of May, 18.61,
Capt. (afterwards General)
Lyon of the
Federal army, had compelled the unconditional surrender of a brigade of
Missouri militia, encamped under the
State law. This high-handed proceeding was attended by other outrages.
All the arms and ammunition in
St. Louis were seized; houses were searched; and a line of military posts extended around the city, gave evidence of a reign of terrour.
About this time,
Sterling Price, having been commissioned by
Gov. Jackson of
Missouri as major-general, proceeded to consult with
Gen. Harney, of the
Federal forces, as to the best mode of “restoring peace and good order to the people of the
State, in subordination to the laws of the
General and State Governments.”
In view of the riotous demonstrations at
St. Louis,
Price, having “full authority over the militia of the
State,” undertook, with the sanction of the Governour, to maintain order; and
Gen. Harney declared that he had no Intention of using the military at his command, to cause disturbance.
Both recommended the citizens to keep quiet, and attend to their ordinary occupations.
But soon after this,
Gen. Harney was removed by orders from
Washington.
Gen. Price continued to busy himself with the duties of his command, and on the 4th of June, issued an address, in which be declared that the people of
Missouri should exercise the right to choose their own position
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in any contest which might be forced upon them, unaided by any military force whatever.
He referred to a report of the intention of the
Federal authorities to disarm those of the citizens of
Missouri who did not agree in opinion with the Administration at
Washington, and put arms in the hands of those who in some localities of the
State were supposed to sympathize with the views of the
Federal Government; and he added: “The purpose of such a movement could not be misunderstood, and it would not only be a palpable violation of the agreement referred to, and an equally plain violation of our constitutional rights, but a gross indignity to the citizens of this State, which would be resisted to the last extremity.”
In the conclusion of his address he wrote: “The people of
Missouri cannot be forced, under the terrours of a military invasion, into a position not of their own free choice.
A million of such people as the citizens of
Missouri were never yet subjugated, and if attempted, let no apprehension be entertained of the result.”
On the 13th of June, 1861,
Gov. Jackson issued his proclamation calling for fifty thousand volunteers.
Price appointed nine
brigadier-generals.
These preparations were large on paper; but the brigadiers had no actual force at their command; and even, if men were not lacking, arms and ammunition were; and as for military training and discipline, there had been for years no military organization, and not even a militia muster in
Missouri.
It was thus poorly prepared for the contest that the
State of Missouri, separated from her confederates and alone, showed a heroism almost unexampled in history in spurning the plea of “helplessness,” and confronting the entire power of the
North, at a time indeed when Northern newspapers were declaring that she was but as a mouse under the lion's paw.
The first development of the campaign on the part of
Gen. Price was to issue orders to the several brigadiers just appointed, to organize their forces as rapidly as possible, and push them forward to
Booneville and
Lexington.
His ulterior design was, having collected at
Lexington volunteers from the whole region accessible to it, to march down to the extreme southwest part of the
State where subsistence was abundant; where opportunity might be had to organize his army; and where he expected to be joined by Confederate forces from
Arkansas under the command of
Brig.-Gen. McCulloch.
No serious thought was entertained of giving
battle at Booneville.
About eighteen hundred Missourians were assembled in camp near there; and not more than one-third of them were armed.
They had not a piece of artillery; and their small arms were generally of a very imperfect kind, including single-barrelled shot-guns and rifles.
On the 20th of June,
Gen. Lyon, with a well-appointed Federal force about three thousand strong, debarked near
Booneville.
The six hundred armed Missourians,
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wander command of
Col. Marmaduke, were posted in loose order in a wood along a wheat-field not far from the water's edge.
Seeing no reasonable hope of holding his position against a column of Federals advancing with eight pieces of artillery,
Col. Marmaduke ordered his little force to retreat.
The men refused to obey the order; and received the advancing enemy with a close volley, under which more than a hundred fell killed and wounded.
But the shock of the encounter, as the enemy came on, was too much for the thin and irregular line of these desperately brave men, and they were soon scattered in flight.
Their loss was inconsiderable-three men killed, and twenty-five or thirty wounded; and they had given to the enemy his first lesson of the courage and adventure of the “rebel militia” of
Missouri.
After the singular affair of
Booneville,
Gov. Jackson, who had taken the field, commenced to retire his small force towards
Warsaw; intending to effect a junction with
Price, and to continue with him the line of march to the southwestern angle of the
State.
This was effected on the night of the 3d of July; the column from
Lexington forming a junction with
Jackson's forces in
Cedar County.
The plan of campaign was now to get as far as possible from the line of the
Missouri River, which gave facilities for attack to the enemy, who could bring forward overwhelming numbers before
Gen. Price could possibly organize his forces in this vicinity and throw them in fighting posture.
The very night of the junction of the two columns, an order was issued for the report and organization of the entire force.
Two thousand men reported to
Brig.-Gen. Rains, six hundred to
Brig.-Gen. Slack, and about five hundred each to
Brig.-Gens. Clark and
Parsons; making an entire force of about thirty-six hundred men. This, then, was the
Patriot Army of Missouri.
It was a heterogeneous mixture of all human compounds, and represented every condition of Western life.
There were the old and the young, the rich and poor, the high and low, the grave and gay, the planter and labourer, the farmer and clerk, the hunter and boatman, the merchant and woodsman.
At least five hundred of these men were entirely unarmed.
Many had only the common rifle and shot-gun.
None were provided with cartridge-boxes or canteens.
They had eight pieces of cannon, but no shells, and very few solid shot or rounds of grape and canister.
Rude and almost incredible devices were made to supply these wants: trace-chains, iron-rods, hard pebbles, and smooth stones were substituted for shot; and evidence of the effect of such rough missiles was to be given in the next encounter with the enemy.
On the 4th of July, with his motley, ill-provided, brave army,
Gen. Jackson, then in command, took up his line of march for the
Southwest, where he hoped to join
McCulloch.
In the mean time, however,
Gen. Sigel, with a column of Federals three thousand in number, had been sent
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out from
St. Louis on the southwestern branch of the Pacific Railroad to
Rolla, and had arrived at the town of
Carthage, immediately in
Jackson's front, thus threatening him with battle in the course of a few hours.
About ten o'clock in the morning of the 5th of July, the Missourians approached a creek within a mile and a half of the enemy, whose forces in three detachments were admirably posted upon the brow of a hill.
The first important encounter of arms in
Missouri was now to take place.
Gen. Jackson found great difficulty in forming his line of battle and in deploying his cavalry under the constant fire of
Sigel's batteries.
Gen. Sigel had assured his men that there would be no serious conflict; he had remarked that the Missourians were coming into line like a wormfence, and that a few grape and canister thrown into their midst would soon involve them in confusion and put them to flight.
But he was terribly undeceived.
When it was found impossible, on account of the rawness of their horses, to get the cavalry in position under fire, the order was given for the infantry to charge the enemy; the cavalry to come up at the same time in supporting distance.
They advanced at the double-quick with a shout.
The Federals retreated across
Bear Creek, a wide and deep stream, destroying the bridge over which they had crossed.
They still continued their retreat along the bank of the creek, for the distance of a mile or more, and formed behind a skirt of timber.
The
Missourians had to cross an open field; they were exposed to a raking fire before they could reach the enemy's cover.
A number of the cavalry dismounted, and acted with the infantry, so as to put in active use all the small arms brought upon the field.
They rushed towards the skirt of timber, and opened vigorously upon the enemy across the stream, who returned the fire with spirit.
For the space of an hour the fire on each side was incessant and fierce.
At last, the Missourians threw a quantity of dead timber into the stream, and commenced crossing in large numbers, when the enemy again abandoned his position, and started in the direction of
Carthage, eight miles distant. A running fight was kept up all the way to
Carthage.
Here the enemy again made a stand, forming ambuscades behind houses, wood-piles, and fences.
After a severe engagement there of some forty minutes, he retreated under cover of night in the direction of
Rolla; never halting until the next day, about forty miles from the field of battle, over twelve of which he had been pursued by men, whom
Gen. Sigel had expected to capture, almost without a fight.
The results of the day were greatly encouraging and gratifying to the Missourians.
These raw and poorly-armed men had driven a well-disciplined enemy from three different positions.
Their own loss was probably not more than fifty killed and one hundred and fifty wounded; that of the enemy, who had suffered greatly in his retreat, about three times as large.
No wonder that with this experience of the fighting qualities of
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the people against whom they had to contend, the
Federal commanders in
Missouri were awakened to a sense of the magnitude of the work before them.
The day succeeding this engagement,
Gen. Price, who had hitherto been detained from active command by a severe sickness, arrived at
Carthage, accompanied by
Brig.-Gen. McCulloch of the Confederate forces, and
Maj.-Gen. Pearce of the
Arkansas State troops, with a force of nearly two thousand men. These timely reinforcements were hailed with great joy; and the patriot army was alike animated by the appearance of their beloved commander, and the assurance, which
McCulloch's presence gave them, of the friendly feeling and intention of the Confederate Government.
The next day the forces at
Carthage, under their respective commands, took up their line of march for
Cowskin Prairie, near the boundary of the
Indian Nation.
Here they remained for several days, organizing and drilling;
Gen. Price still continued to receive reinforcements; and the whole numerical strength of the command was now rated about ten thousand.
With this force, although yet imperfectly armed, it was decided to venture on the offensive; and it having been ascertained that the
Federal commanders,
Lee,
Sturgis,
Sweeny, and
Sigel, were about to form a junction at
Springfield, it was determined by
Price,
McCulloch, and
Pearce, to march upon that place, and attack the enemy where he had taken his position in force.
When the army reached
Crane Creek., about thirty miles from
Springfield, a consultation was held as to their future course.
Gen. Price earnestly advocated an advance.
Gen. McCulloch doubted its prudence.
I-He looked with great concern on the large proportion of undisciplined men in
Price's command; he regarded the unarmed men as incumbrances; and lie concluded that the unorganized and undisciplined condition of both wings of the army suggested the wisdom of avoiding battle with the disciplined enemy upon his own ground and in greatly superiour numbers.
Gen. Price resented the idea of the nature of the materials under his command, and assured
McCulloch that when the time of battle came, these untaught and headstrong men would fight together and with a resolution which would spurn defeat.
He requested the
Confederate commander to loan a number of arms from his command.
for the use of such Misssouri soldiers as were unarmed, believing that, with the force at his command, he could whip the enemy.
This
McCulloch refused, and still declined the responsibility of ordering an advance of the whole command.
But in the midst of this hesitation
Gen. McCulloch received a
general order from
Gen. Polk, commander of the
Southwestern division of the Confederate army, to advance upon the enemy in
Missouri.
Another council was called.
McCulloch exhibited the order he had received, and offered to march at once upon
Springfield, upon condition that he should have the
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chief command of the army.
The question of rank was one of no little embarrassment.
Price was a
Major-General in the
State service.
McCulloch was a
Brigadier-General in the
Confederate service.
If the
State troops were merely militia, and
Price a General of Militia, the question was at once settled-McCulloch would have been entitled to precedence.
But the Missourians, with much show of reason, contended that their State had assumed an independent attitude, and by her laws, as a sovereign, had raised an army which was on a regular military footing, and therefore their
Major-General was entitled to command.
The question was solved by
Price in a noble and patriotic spirit.
He relinquished his post to
McCulloch, expressing himself in substance as follows: “I seek not distinction; I am not fighting for that; but in the defence of the liberties of my countrymen.
It matters little
what position I hold.
I am ready to surrender, not only the command, but my life as a sacrifice to the cause.”
That his services and his presence among the men should not be lost, he took a subordinate position in the forthcoming contest.
McCulloch assumed chief command, and
Price was a division general under him; and thus the army marched forward to meet the foe.
The battle of Oak Hill.
On the 7th of August,
McCulloch reached a camp three miles from
Wilson's Creek, and twelve miles from
Springfield.
His command was thus composed : the
Missouri forces numbered eight thousand, of whom only about six thousand were armed; the
Confederate troops were three thousand two hundred, coming from
Louisiana,
Texas, and
Arkansas; and there were eighteen hundred
Arkansas State troops under
General Pearce.
The total effective force was thus about eleven thousand, of whom nearly six thousand were mounted; and it had fifteen pieces of artillery.
General Lyon had assembled at
Springfield an effective army of nearly ten thousand men, consisting of his own and
Col. Totten's forces front
Booneville and
St. Louis, and the troops heretofore acting under
Gens. Sigel and
Sturgis and
Col. Sweeny.
About two thousand were “home guards,” of
Missouri, the rest were United States regulars and volunteers from the
Northwestern States.
Their artillery consisted of sixteen pieces --several batteries being of the regular service.
On the 9th of August
McCulloch moved up to
Wilson's Creek, intending to advance upon the enemy at
Springfield.
But
Lyon had anticipated him, and was already moving in three heavy columns.
The next morning before sunrise, the enemy had succeeded in obtaining the position he desired; and
McCulloch, who was quietly taking breakfast at the time,
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was surprised by his couriers announcing that the enemy were in sight and in great force, and had gained both sides of his camp.
On the right
Gen. Sigel had already opened a heavy fire.
By muffling the wheels of his cannon, he had succeeded, under cover of the night, in getting positions near
McCulloch's camp, and now poured into it a severe and destructive fire.
Gen. Lyon led the attack on the left.
Reinforcements were rapidly hurried in the direction of
Sigel's attack.
Gen. McCulloch sent forward
Col. Hebert's Louisiana Volunteers and
McIntosh's mounted Arkansians, who, loving to the left, gained a position along a fence enclosing a cornfield.
Here
McIntosh dismounted his men, and the two regiments rapidly advanced in the face of a galling fire.
A terrible conflict of small arms ensued.
Undismayed, breasting a deadly fire, the gallant men of these regiments leaped the fence, and drove the enemy before them back upon his main body.
But still
Sigel's artillery continued to play with damaging effect.
A battery, commanded by
Capt. Reid, was brought up to oppose it. Seizing the critical moment,
Gen. McCulloch placed himself at the head of two companies of a Louisiana regiment near him, and marching to the right, drew rapidly upon the adverse guns.
At the same time,
McIntosh and
Hebert, with their men, came up, and with a loud cheer, they rushed upon the enemy's cannoniers, driving them from their guns.
This gallant charge swept everything before it; five guns were taken; and nothing could now arrest the tide of success on the right.
Sigel fell back in confusion, and lost his last gull in a retreat which had now become irretrievable.
Having cleared their right and rear, it became necessary for the Confederate forces to direct all their attention to the centre, where
Gen. Lyon was pressing upon the Missourians with all his strength.
To this point
McIntosh's regiment,
Churchill's regiment on foot,
Gratiot's regiment, and
McRae's battalion were rapidly moved.
Along the whole line of the hill, upon which the enemy was posted, a terrible fire of musketry was now kept up. The roar of the battle was tremendous, bursting along two opposing lines which swept for miles over the rolling fields.
Masses of infantry fell back and again marched forward.
The summit of the hill was covered with the dead and wounded.
Totten's battery on the enemy's side did fearful execution.
With the loss of many men and horses, the
Federal battery, after a fierce engagement with
Woodruff's, was with difficulty withdrawn.
Part of it was again planted where it swept the front-part was masked to meet an advance.
At this moment, when the fortunes of the day yet hung in doubt, two regiments of
Gen. Pearce's command were ordered forward to support the centre.
Reid's battery was also brought up and the
Louisiana regiment was again called into action on the left of it. The enemy was now evidently giving way.
Gen. Lyon had marked the progress of the battle with deep anxiety.
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He saw that his men were unable to advance against the sheet of fire before them, and he marked with desperate concern the huge chasms in his lines where his torn regiments had given way. He had already been wounded in the leg, and a bullet had cut the scalp of his head.
His horse was shot under him. Bloody and haggard, he turned to one of his officers, and said: “I fear the day is lost — I will lead the charge.”
Remounting and riding rapidly to the front, he said simply to the nearest regiments, “Forward, men: I will lead you.”
He had advanced but a little way, when two small rifle-balls, or buckshot, pierced his breast.
He reeled in his saddle, and fell dead from his horse.
1
The Federal line pushed forward, but after a brief encounter was evidently staggered.
McCulloch and
Price threw forward nearly all their reserves.
Totten's dreadful battery at last fell back.
Missourians, Arkansians, Louisanians, and Texans pressed forward.
The Federal centre gave way; the wings were forced to the rear; and with one wild yell, the Southerners.broke upon their disordered ranks, pushing them back, and strewing the ground with their dead.
The order to retreat was given, and soon the enemy's infantry columns, artillery, and wagons, were seen in the distance among the hills, rapidly making their way towards
Springfield, defeated and driven from the field.
The Federal loss could not have been less than two thousand in killed and wounded; three hundred prisoners were taken, and six pieces of artillery.
Gen. McCulloch officially stated his loss as two hundred and sixty-five killed and eight hundred wounded. More than half of this loss was among the Missourians commanded by
Price.
After the brilliant victory of
Oak Hill — which for a time freed the whole of
Southwestern Missouri from Federal rule — it unfortunately fell out that
McCulloch and
Price could not agree upon a plan of campaign.
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The former therefore took the responsibility of withdrawing the Confederate forces, and retired with his army to the frontiers of
Arkansas.
Late in August,
Gen. Price, abandoned by the Confederate forces, took up his line of march for the
Missouri River, with an armed force of about five thousand men, and seven pieces of cannon.
He, however, continued to receive reinforcements from the north side of the
Missouri River.
On the 7th of September he encountered a force of irregular Federal troops under the notorious
Lane and
Montgomery, at a place called
Drywood, some fifteen miles east of
Fort Scott.
Defeating and brushing this force from his path,
Price threw a small garrison into
Fort Scott, and pressed on towards
Lexington, the main object of his movement.
In the meantime the active and adventurous demonstrations of
Brig.-Gen. Harris, in
Northern Missouri, had made an important diversion of the enemy in favour of
Gen. Price.
Although surrounded by enemies, and within their reach from many points,
Gen. Harris had secretly organized a force, and by the rapidity of his movements produced the impression that he was stronger than he really was; the result of which was that he had diverted several thousand men from the support of
Gen. Lyon, and held then north of the river until after the
battle of Oak Hill, thus making an important contribution to the issue of that contest.
On the 10th of September,
Gen. Harris crossed the
Missouri at Artien Creek.
Recruits in bodies of ten, fifty, and a hundred constantly joined him, and when he effected a junction with
Gen. Price, he added nearly three thousand effective men to a force already consisting of more than six thousand.
Some weeks previous,
Gen. Fremont had arrived to take chief command of the Western Department.
He had reached
St. Louis, and military preparations were immediately carried on with renewed vigour.
lie assumed his command with great ostentation; and his displays of garish splendour in his camp were such that some of the
Northern newspapers were provoked to say that he resembled more an Eastern satrap than an American commander.
But the most remarkable event with which lie inaugurated his authority was a proclamation, issued at
St. Louis, on the 30th of August.
In this remarkable fulmination of authority he declared that, in his judgment, the public safety and the success of the
Federal army required “unity of purpose without let or hindrance to the prompt administration of affairs;” therefore he proclaimed martial law through the whole
State of Missouri, and asserted that the lines of his army of occupation extended from
Leavenworth, by way of the posts of
Jefferson City,
Rolla, and
Ironton, to
Cape Girardeau on the
Mississippi; all persons within these lines, taken with arms in their hands, were to be tried by court-martial, and shot if found guilty; he furthermore proclaimed, that the property, real and personal, of persons who took up arms against the
United States, or who should be proved to have taken part with their
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enemies in the field, should be confiscated, and
their slave should be freemen.
This proclamation was vastly pleasing to a large and rapidly-growing party in the
North, who recognized the extinction of negro slavery in the
South as an essential object of the war. It was an ingenious idea, too, to make of slavery a party-coloured crime-sinful in the “rebel,” but blameless in the
Union man. The brutality of the proclamation, too, was refreshing; for there were already many in the
North who believed that their fellow-countrymen should be shot, and this in the name of the
Union, for the simple crime that as citizens of the
State of Missouri they obeyed the orders of the lawful authority of their State.
But the
Government at
Washington was not yet prepared for these lengths of the war; and it is a curious commentary on the future of
Mr. Lincoln's policy with respect to the extinction of slavery, that
Fremont's proclamation was distinctly disavowed and instantly overruled by him.
But while
Fremont was thus indulging his political fanaticism, he was strangely inattentive to the course of military events in
Missouri.
Lexington, upon which
Gen. Price was now directing his march, was feebly defended.
It was only when it was seriously threatened that
Col. Mulligan moved up from
Jefferson City with his Irish brigade, and found himself with an insufficient garrison, and but little time to strengthen his works, confronted and encompassed by an army of more than ten thousand men.
On the 12th of September,
Gen. Price approached
Lexington.
In the midst of the straggling town there was a large brick building known as the
College Building.
Col. Mulligan had planned an earthwork ten feet high, with a ditch eight feet wide, enclosing the
College, with a large area capable of holding a garrison of ten thousand men. As
Price approached the town a sharp affair occurred with the enemy's outposts, and at one time a general engagement was threatened.
Taking advantage of the smoke,
Gen. Rains prepared to lead a column to the assault of the breastworks at an angle which was apparently weakly defended.
But the movement was discovered by the enemy, who rallied in force to the threatened point.
Kneeling down to shelter themselves, with levelled muskets and fingers upon the triggers, the
Federals were silent as death.
The
Missourians advanced at a rapid run. When within a hundred yards of the breastworks, the smoke lifted, a line of fire flashed along the entrenchments, and five hundred muskets launched their bullets against the advancing ranks.
But with a presence of mind inspired by their
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habits, the Missourians dropped at the flash, and, instantly rising, again rushed forward.
Again they met a fire which was more destructive.
Finding that a surprise was hopeless, and that the
Federals were assembling a large part of their artillery at the threatened point, the column of attack was withdrawn.
Discovering, at the close of the day, that his ammunition, the most of which had been left behind in the march from
Springfield, was nearly exhausted, and that his men, most of whom had not eaten anything in thirty-six hours, required rest and food,
General Price withdrew from the town and encamped.
His ammunition wagons having been at last brought up, and large reinforcements having come in, he again moved into the town on the 18th, and commenced the final attack upon the enemy's works.
Col. Mulligan bore himself with the bravery characteristic of an Irishman, and worthy of a better cause.
When summoned to surrender, he replied: “If you want us, you must take us.”
The garrison had not sufficient supplies of water within their entrenchments, and were compelled to resort to the river, nearly half a mile distant, under the constant fire of skirmishers.
Large bodies had to fight their way to the water, and bloody conflicts ensued.
As a detachment of the
Missouri troops, under command of
Col. Rives, were passing down the bank of the river to capture a steamboat lying under the enemy's guns, a fire was opened upon him from a building known as Anderson's House, standing on t11h summit of the bluff, and designated as a hospital by the white flag over it. There were in the building at the time twenty-four sick; but it contained also a large body of armed soldiers.
Indignant at the perfidy which directed this attack, several companies from
Gen. Harris' and the fourth division rushed up the bank, leaped over every barrier, and speedily overpowered the garrison.
The important position thus secured was within one hundred and twenty-five yards of the enemy's entrenchments.
Early in the morning of the 19th September, the roar of cannon and rattle of musketry again resounded through the hills around the beleaguered camp.
The garrison suffered much from thirst.
The pressure of the assault was incessant and bloody.
Cannon surrounded them on three sides, and, occupying positions of command, poured out constant torrents of shot, shell, stones, fragments of iron,--every missile that could be found and used for battering and death.
On the 20th,
Gen. Price caused a number of bales of hemp to be transported to the river heights, where movable breastworks were speedily constructed out of them.
The demonstrations of the artillery, and particularly the continued advance of the hempen breastworks, attracted the attention and excited the alarm of the enemy.
Several daring attempts were made to drive back the assailants.
At one time, in extreme desperation,
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a cavalry assault was made by the
Illinois mounted men upon one of the
Missouri batteries; but the assailants were terribly cut up with grape and buckshot, and retreated in confusion to the entrenchments.
Col. Mulligan had received two painful wounds.
After having once ordered down a white flag which some of the “home guards,” had displayed, he, at last, convinced of the hopelessness of his situation, determined on a surrender.
He did so, only after fifty-two hours of continuous fighting.
Immediately
Gen. Price issued an order, that the forces under
Col. Mulligan, having stacked their arms, “were not to be insulted by word or act, for they had fought like brave men.”
Mulligan, having given up his sword, had it immediately returned to him by
Gen. Price, who said he “could not see a man of his valour without his sword.”
The brave captive was afterwards treated with true chivalric courtesy by
Gen. Price, who induced him and his wife to become his guests, and entertained them with all the hospitality at his command.
The entire loss of the Missourians in this series of engagements was but twenty-five killed and seventy-two wounded. The enemy's loss was considerably larger, and, though never officially reported, was estimated by their own narratives as amounting to five hundred in killed and wounded.
The visible fruits of the victory were considerable.
The Missourians captured five colonels, a hundred and nineteen other commissioned officers, and thirty-five hundred non-commissioned officers and privates, five cannon, two mortars, over three thousand muskets, rifles and carbines, about seven hundred and fifty horses, a quantity of ammunition, and more than one hundred thousand dollars worth of commissary stores.
There was also recovered about $900,000 of coin of which the
Lexington Bank had been robbed, in accordance with
Fremont's instructions, which
Gen. Price ordered to be immediately restored to its owners.
The capture of
Lexington and the bold and brilliant movements of the
Missouri patriots in other parts of the State-among them the operations in
Southeastern Missouri of the partisan
Jeff. Thompson and his “Swamp
Fox brigade” --excited rage and alarm in the
Washington administration.
Gen. Fremont, who was severely censured for not having reinforced
Mulligan, hoped to recover his position by activity and success; he put himself at the head of the army, and advanced towards
Jefferson City, sending back the promise that he would overwhelm
Price.
It was at this period that
Gen. Price found his position one of the greatest emergency.
He had received intelligence that the Confederate forces, under
Gens. Pillow and
Hardee, had been withdrawn from the southeastern portion of the
State.
Gen. McCulloch had retired to
Arkansas.
Gen. Price was left with the only forces in
Missouri to confront an enemy sixty thousand strong; he was almost entirely without ammunition: and he was beset with other difficulties and embarrassments.
A large number of his men
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had volunteered in haste, and hied to the camps with hardly a change of clothing.
Many were naturally anxious to return to their homes.
The difficulty of maintaining a wagon train sufficient to support so large an army was seriously felt.
Thus surrounded by circumstances of the most painful and unlooked — for misfortune,
Gen. Price was compelled not only to make a retrograde movement, but, also, to disband a considerable portion of his forces.
With his army thus diminished,
Gen. Price commenced his retreat about the 27th of September.
With
Sturgis on the north side of the river,
Lane on the west, and himself on the east,
Fremont expected to cut off and capture the entire force of the Missourians.
This
Price adroitly prevented by sending out cavalry as if intending to attack each of the enemy separately, and so covering his retreat.
This retreat was executed in a most admirable manner, and amidst numerous obstacles.
The
Osage river was crossed in two flat-bottomed boats, constructed for the occasion by the
Missouri soldiers; and then
Price moved to
Neosho, on the
Indian frontier of the
State.
Here the Legislature had assembled, and here
Price again formed a junction with
McCulloch, at the head of 5,000 men. It was at this time the State Legislature at length passed the Ordinance of Secession, and
Gen. Price had the satisfaction of firing a hundred guns to celebrate the event.
From
Neosho Price and
McCulloch fell back to
Cassville and
Pineville, on the southern borders of the
State.
At
Pineville,
Price made preparation to receive
Fremont, determined not; to abandon
Missouri without a battle.
But just at this juncture news came that
Fremont had been superseded as commander of the
Federal forces.
His course had given great offence at
Washington; and
Attorney-General Bates had declared that it would be “a crime” to keep him in command.
It was said that his vanity had become so insolent that he paid no regard whatever to acts of Congress, the orders of his superiours, the usages of the service, or the rights of individuals; and that he was surrounded by a band of contractors, and, in partnership with them, plundered the public funds without mercy.
On such persistent representations the order at
Washington was at last given for his removal and the appointment of
Gen. Hunter in his place.
Fremont had obtained intimation that such an order was on the way from
Washington.
He took singular pains to prevent it from reaching him. He had two body-guards, one of whites and one of
Indians.
He gave strict orders that no one should be admitted through the inner lines surrounding his headquarters, except by his direct orders.
Notwithstanding his precautions, one of the three military messengers sent from
St. Louis, by address and stratagem succeeded in gaining admission, and, making his way to
Fremont's presence on the night of the 7th of November, delivered to him the fatal missive which concluded his career.
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This event had tie effect of demoralizing the
Federal forces to such an extent that an immediate retreat was thought advisable by the
acting officers in command.
The degraded General showed symptoms of rebellion.
The
Dutch were greatly attached to him; signs of mutiny were shown by these adherents; for a time open revolt was threatened; but
Fremont's subordinates,
Sigel and
Asboth, positively refused to sustain him, and the army was ordered to retreat from
Springfield.
The Federals accordingly left that town in the direction of
Rolla, and were pursued by
Gen. Price to
Osceola.
From
Osceola,
Gen. Price fell back to
Springfield, to forage his army and obtain supplies.
Both armies having thus drawn off, we may leave here for the present the history of the
Missouri campaign.
Notwithstanding the adverse termination of this campaign with respect to the occupation of
Missouri, it had already accomplished much; it had given an exhibition of spirit and resource without a parallel in equal circumstances; and it constitutes the most remarkable and brilliant episode of the war. It was a chapter of wonders.
Price's army of ragged heroes, had marched over eight hundred miles; it had scarcely passed a week without an engagement of some sort; it was tied down to no particular line of operations, but fought the enemy wherever he could be found; and it had provided itself with ordnance and equipments almost entirely from the prodigal stores of the
Federals.
The hero of
Missouri started on his campaign without a dollar, without a wagon or team, without a cartridge, without a bayonet-gun.
When he commenced his retreat, he had about eight thousand bayonet-guns, fifty pieces of cannon, four hundred tents, and many other articles needful in an army, for which his men were almost exclusively indebted to their own strong arms in battle.
This campaign was little less than a puzzle to military critics.
Price managed to subsist an army without governmental resources.
He seldom complained of want of transportation.
His men were never demoralized by hunger.
They would go into the cornfield, shuck the corn, shell it, take it to the mill, and bring it into camp, ground into meal.
Or, if they had no flour, they took the wheat from the stack, threshed it themselves, and asked the aid of the nearest miller to reduce it to flour.
Price proved that such an army could go where they pleased in an agricultural country.
His men were always cheerful.
They frequently, on the eve of an engagement, danced around their camp-fires with bare feet and in rag costumes, of which it was declared “
Billy Barlow's dress at a circus would be decent in comparison.”
Price himself wore nothing on his shoulders but a brown-linen duster; and this and his white hair streaming on the battle-field made him a singular figure.
Despite the exposure and hardship of this campaign, the most remarkable fact remains to be recorded: that in its entire course not more than fifty men died from disease.
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Such a record of courage, of expedient and of endurance, has no known parallel in the war. It settled forever the question of
Missouri manhood.
It did more than this: it proved that the spirit of the native and true population of
Missouri was strongly Southern, and that it needed nothing but organization and opportunity for its triumph.
The Western Virginia campaign.
The campaign in
Western Virginia, which was mostly contemporary with that of
Missouri, and very similar to it in its discursive character, unfortunately did not partake of its brilliancy.
With but little compensation, either in the prestige of arms, or in the fruits of single victories, it surrendered to the enemy a country of more capacity and grandeur than perhaps any other of equal limits on the
American continent; abounding in immense forests, possessed of almost fabulous mineral resources, offering to the manufacturer the vastest water-power in the world, and presenting in its deposits of coal and salt, fields of inexhaustible enterprise and wealth.
In the month of June,
Brigadier-General Wise of
Virginia was sent into the
Kanawha Valley; it being supposed that by his rare and characteristic enthusiasm he would be able to rally the people of this region to the support of the
State.
He established his headquarters at
Charleston, and succeeded in raising a brigade of twenty-five hundred infantry, seven hundred cavalry and three batteries of artillery.
With subsequent reinforcements his command amounted to four thousand men. It was obvious enough that with this small force, his situation was extremely critical.
The enemy had already landed considerable forces at
Parkersburg and
Point Pleasant on the
Ohio River, and was rapidly using his superiour facilities for raising troops in the populous States of
Ohio and
Indiana, and his ample means of transportation by railroad through those States and by the navigation of the
Ohio and
Kanawha Rivers, to concentrate a large force in the lower part of the
Kanawha Valley.
After some desultory movements, and a brilliant affair on
Scary Creek, in Putnam County, where
Col. Patton with a small force repulsed three Federal regiments,
Gen. Wise prepared to give battle to the
Federal forces, which, under the command of
Gen. Cox, had been largely increased, and which were steadily advancing up the
Valley, both by land and water.
But the conflict was not to occur.
A more formidable danger, from a different direction, menaced the
Confederates.
The disaster at
Rich Mountain — the surrender of
Pegram's force, and the retreat northward of
Garnett's army, had withdrawn all support from the right flank, and, indeed, from the rear of
Gen. Wise.
He was in danger of being cut off in the rear by several roads from the northwest, striking the
Kanawha road
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at various points between
Lewisburg and
Gauley Bridge.
The danger seemed to him so pressing, that he fell back immediately with his entire force, first to
Gauley Bridge and thence to
Lewisburg, reaching the latter place about the 1st of August, and after a retreat which was necessarily much disordered, on account of his meagre means of transportation.
Within a few weeks after
Gen. Wise fell back to
Lewisburg, the
Confederate cause in
Western Virginia received the aid of a very effective body of men.
John B. Floyd, who had been at one time Governor of
Virginia, and afterwards
Secretary of War under
President Buchanan, was commissioned a brigadier-general in the Confederate army, and had succeeded in raising a command of three regiments of infantry and a battalion of cavalry.
This force was intended for service in
Western Virginia, and
Gen. Floyd soon decided, with the approval of the War Department, that the defence of the
Kanawha Valley was the object of first importance.
He accordingly advanced to the
White Sulphur Springs, nine miles east of
Lewisburg, and held conferences with
Gen. Wise.
An advance towards the
Gauley was promptly determined on, but the two bodies, under their commanders, moved at different times, and with perfectly distinct organizations, though within supporting distance.
Gen. Floyd moved first, and for some days skirmished vigorously with
Cox's troops, which were in force at
Gauley Bridge and in the neighbourhood of the “
Hawk's Nest,” a picturesque and majestic monument of wooded rocks, rising a thousand feet from the river road, at a point ten miles below the mouth of the
Gauley.
Gen. Wise having come up, the joint Confederate forces now approached nearer the enemy, skirmishing with various success.
But while thus occupied, it was ascertained that another foe threatened their flank.
Col. Tyler, commanding the Seventh Ohio Regiment, of nearly thirteen hundred men, was approaching the
Gauley River at Carnifax Ferry, about five miles south of
Summerville, in
Nicholas County, and twenty-four miles above
Gauley Bridge.
His movement was therefore on the right flank of the
Confederates, and had he succeeded in crossing the river and reaching their rear, he would have cut their communications with
Lewisburg.
Gen. Floyd at once determined to cross the river at Carnifax Ferry and encounter this movement of the enemy.
He at once put his brigade in motion, taking with him a part of
Wise's cavalry; that commander remaining with the larger body of his troops at Pickett's Mills in
Fayette County, so as to hold the turnpike, and guard against any aggressive movement of
Cox, which might have embarrassed that against
Tyler.
The enterprise of
Gen. Floyd was thoroughly successful.
Having crossed the
Gauley, he, on the morning of the 26th of August, fell upon
Tyler at a place called
Cross Lanes; defeated and dispersed his force; and
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inflicted upon him a loss of about two hundred in killed, wounded, and prisoners.
After the affair of
Cross Lanes,
Gen. Floyd proceeded to strengthen his position on the
Gauley.
Owing to an unfortunate want of concert between
Wise and himself, these two Confederate forces in
Western Virginia were separated by a deep and rapid river; and
Floyd himself was unable to attempt a movement against
Cox. Hie was far from his depot of provisions in
Lewisburg, and being unprovided with adequate transportation, it would have been rash to have ventured forward on the north of the river.
Knowledge of this situation of affairs was not lost upon the enemy.
Gen. Rosecrans--a name which was hereafter to become familiar on more important theatres of the war-commanded the
Federal forces between
Buckhannon and
Cheat Mountain.
He at once conceived the idea of overwhelming the
Confederates on both sides of the
Gauley, and accordingly moved rapidly down the road leading from
Weston to
Summerville, with at least nine thousand men and several heavy batteries of artillery.
Gen. Floyd was in a bend of
Gauley River, very near Carnifax Ferry.
On the 10th of September,
Rosecrans, by a rapid march of sixteen miles, threw his entire force about
Floyd's entrenchments, and commenced a vigorous attack.
The force of
Floyd's command did not exceed seventeen hundred and fifty men. But his flanks were well protected by precipices or cliffs heavily wooded ; and from three o'clock until nightfall his centre, protected by an imperfect earthwork, sustained an assault from an enemy five times his numbers, made with small arms, grape, and round-shot, from howitzers and rifled cannon.
As the sun was sinking,
Rosecrans ordered a final and desperate charge.
His troops pressed rapidly forward to short musket range; the
Southern lines were wrapped in fire; a thousand bullets darted into the adverse ranks, and for a few moments the carnage was appalling.
The Federals fell back, and returned no more to the assault.
The ground was covered with hundreds of their dead and wounded.
The Confederates had not lost a man killed and not more than twenty wounded.
During the night,
Gen. Floyd crossed the river by means of two ferryboats and a hastily constructed bridge of logs.
He had accomplished a brilliant success in the check and lesson he had already given the enemy; and knowing
Rosecrans' superiority of numbers, and fearing for his own communications in his rear, he determined to withdraw to
Wise's camp, and unite the two commands.
It appears that when
Floyd had first learned of
Rosecrans' advance, he had despatched orders to
Gen. Wise for reinforcements, and that lie failed to procure them.
He wrote to the War Department at
Richmond that he could have beaten the enemy, if these reinforcements had come up when ordered; that if he could have commanded the services of five thousand men, instead of eighteen hundred, which he had, he could have opened
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the road directly into the
Valley of the Kanawha.
He indicated the urgent necessity of shaping the command in that region of country so as to ensure unity of action,--the condition of success in all military operations.
In a few days
Rosecrans crossed the
Gauley with his army, and as the force opposing them was superiour in numbers,
Floyd and
Wise fell back deliberately towards Sewell's Mountain.
New differences now developed themselves between these two leaders, which disturbed that unity of action so much desired.
After reaching Sewell's Mountain,
Gen. Floyd held a council of his officers, and determined to fall back still further, to
Meadow Bluff, eighteen miles west of
Lewisburg.
Gov. Wise followed him only as far as the eastern slope of the mountain, where he proceeded to strengthen his position, which he named Camp “Defiance.”
At this pause in military operations in the
Kanawha Valley, it will be convenient to note the events which had occurred further north in this Western region of
Virginia, and to observe the movements of the Confederate army there under the command of a man whose star was to be singularly obscured before it mounted the zenith of fame-
Gen. Robert E. Lee.
After the retreat of
Gen. Garnett from
Rich Mountain, and the death of that officer,
Gen. Lee was appointed to succeed him, and, with as little delay as possible, repaired to the scene of operations.
He took with him reinforcements, making his whole force, in conjunction with the remnant of
Gen. Garnett's army, about sixteen thousand men. The roads in this part of the country were deep in mud and horrible with precipices.
By patience and skill,
Gen. Lee advanced with his army across the
Alleghany range, and deliberately approached the enemy in
Randolph County.
Rosecrans was then the ranking officer of the
Federal troops in
Northwestern Virginia; but
Gen. Reynolds held the approaches to
Beverly with a force estimated at from ten to twelve thousand men. The larger part of these were strongly entrenched at a point at the junction of
Tygart's Valley River and
Elk Run, which post was called by the
Federals “Elk water.”
The remainder held the pass at the second summit of
Cheat Mountain, on the best road from
Staunton to
Parkersburg.
The mountain had three well-defined summits.
The second presented the greatest advantages for fortification, and here the enemy had built a powerful fort or block-house in the elbow of the road, flanked by entrenchments of earth and logs, protected by dense abattis on every side, and rendered inaccessible, in two directions, by the steep and rugged walls of the mountain.
Having approached the enemy,
Gen. Lee directed careful reconnoissances to be made of all his positions.
Col. Rust, of the 3d Arkansas Regiment, made what afterwards proved to be a very imperfect reconnoissance of the enemy's position on
Cheat Mountain, and reported that it was perfectly practicable to turn it and carry it by storm.
Gen. Lee at once issued his
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orders for a united movement upon the forces of the enemy, both at Elk Water and on
Cheat Mountain.
After great labour and the endurance of severe hardships on the mountain spurs, where the weather was very cold,
Gen. Lee succeeded in getting below the enemy at Elk Water, placing other portions of his forces on the spurs of the mountain immediately east and west of the enemy, and marching another portion of his troops down the river close to the enemy.
The forces were thus arranged in position for making an attack upon the enemy at Elk Water, and remained there for some hours, waiting the signal from
Col. Rust's attack on
Cheat Mountain.
That officer, with fifteen hundred troops, chiefly his
Arkansas men, had turned the
Cheat Summit Fort, and was now in its rear.
But he saw at once that his former reconnoissance had been deceptive.
The fortified post was literally unapproachable, by reason of thick abattis of felled trees, with branches and undergrowth densely interlaced, extending from the block-house nearly half a mile down the rugged sides of the mountain.
Col. Rust gave no signal for the advance, awaited by the forces at Elk Water; he thought his enterprise hopeless, and withdrew his troops.
Gen. Lee, informed of the miscarriage of this part of his plan, abandoned the whole of it, and retired his command without any results whatever.
The failure to dislodge the enemy from
Cheat Mountain, and thus relieve
Northwestern Virginia, was a disappointment to the
Southern public, whose expectations had been greatly raised by vague rumours of
Lee's strategy and plans.
It was thought, too, that this distinguished commander might have realized some results of his well-matured plan, if, despite of the disconcert of
Rust, he had risked an attack upon the enemy's position at Elk Water, which a portion of his forces had surrounded.
But regrets were unavailing now; danger was imminent in another quarter.
Learning by couriers of the union of
Rosecrans and
Cox, and of their advance upon
Wise and
Floyd,
Gen. Lee decided at once to reinforce the
Southern armies on the line of
Lewisburg.
He reached
Gen. Floyd's camp at
Meadow Bluff, on the 20th of September, and after conferring with him for two days, joined
Gen. Wise at
Sewell Mountain, on the 22d.
The experienced eye of
Lee saw at once that
Wise's position was very strong, and capable of arresting a very heavy hostile force.
He accordingly ordered forward his troops to the spot, and extended the defensive works already planned.
Meanwhile
Gen. Rosecrans, with fifteen thousand men, advanced, and took possession of the top of
Big Sewell Mountain, skirmishing with the forward troops of the Wise brigade.
Gen..
Lee daily expected an attack, and was prepared for it. His force was now quite equal to that of the enemy.
He was within sight of him; each apparently awaiting an attack from the other.
But the opportunity of a decisive battle in
Western Virginia
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was again to be lost.
On the night of the 6th of October,
Rosecrans' troops moved to the rear in the dark, and the next morning, when the
Confederates looked out from their camp, the whole of the threatening host that had confronted them for twelve days before, was gone.
Gen. Lee made no attempt to pursue them.
It was said that the mud, the swollen streams, and the reduced condition of his artillery horses made pursuit impracticable.
But one incident of success was to occur in a campaign of so many disappointments.
When
Gen. Lee withdrew from the
Cheat Mountain region, he left Gen. II.
R. Jackson with twenty-five hundred men to hold his position on the
Greenbrier River.
On the 3d of October, the enemy, about four thousand strong, attacked
Jackson's position.
A severe artillery engagement occurred, in which
Jackson could not bring more than five pieces in action to return the fire of the enemy's eight.
Masses of infantry were then thrown forward on
Jackson's right and front, marching up the wooded sides of a hill that rose from the river.
The location of the hill was such that they could not fire effectively until they crossed the river; and as they attempted to form and deploy, in order to a charge, the 12th Georgia Regiment fired several rapid volleys of musketry into them, which instantly checked their advance.
At the same time,
Shumaker's guns were directed to the point in the woods in which they were known to be crowded, and completed their discomfiture by playing upon them with destructive effect.
The regiments on the hill-side retreated rapidly, and soon the whole force of the enemy's infantry, artillery, and cavalry was moving in a confused mass to the rear.
His loss in the engagement in killed and wounded was estimated at from two hundred and fifty to three hundred.
The loss of the
Confederates was officially reported as six killed and thirty-one wounded.
The approaching rigours of winter terminated the campaign in
Western Virginia; or it may be said to have been virtually abandoned by the
Richmond authorities.
Gen. Lee, who had shed such little blood in the campaign, and obtained such indifferent reputation in mountain warfare, was appointed to take charge of the coast defences of
South Carolina and
Georgia.
Gen. Wise was ordered to report to
Richmond, and was subsequently assigned to important duty in
North Carolina.
Gen. Floyd lingered in the mountains; had some desultory affairs with the enemy; subsequently retired to
Southwestern Virginia; and from there was transferred by the
Government to the now imposing theatre of war in
Tennessee and
Kentucky.
Thus ended the effort of the
Confederate authorities to reclaim the larger portion of
Western Virginia.
We have put in a brief space its narrative of military events; for, after all, it was a mere series of local adventures, compared with other operations of the war.
