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Chapter XI
during the
spring and
summer of 1866 both
Grant and
Stanton were opposing their common superior, for both believed that superior was opposing the declared will of the people, to whom
Presidents are responsible.
Stanton remained in the
Cabinet for the express purpose of preventing
Johnson from carrying out his opposition to the law. His course was approved by the mass of those who had been friendly to the
Government during the war. It was approved by
Grant, with whom the fact that the people had spoken was paramount.
Even had he disapproved the law he would have felt it his duty to enforce it, and he was shocked as well as pained at the spectacle of the
President and nearly all his Cabinet devoting their energies and arts to plotting the obstruction and evasion of the law.
If he had felt some twinges of annoyance at
Stanton's brusque demeanor, he put away the remembrance now, and throughout this entire crisis the two were heartily in accord.
They concerted constantly how best to execute the intent of Congress in spite of him whom
Stanton at least deemed a guilty conspirator.
Stanton, indeed, being in the
Cabinet, probably knew even more than
Grant of the designs and machinations of the
President.
He had never relented from his original austerity toward rebellion, and
Grant, once so lenient, had been gradually brought to a frame of mind in which he was able to stand by the side of the
Secretary.
The situation was unprecedented in the history of the
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country.
A Cabinet Minister and the
General of the Army were doing their utmost to thwart the
President; the two men of all then living who had been foremost in the struggle against rebellion were opposing the successor of
Abraham Lincoln.
The President himself, and all but one of his legal advisers, were engaged in the effort to subvert or pervert the declared will of the people, and those who in ordinary times should and would have been his most faithful supporters, now deemed it their highest duty to watch him, to check him, to detect his plans, to disclose to each other his movements, to unmask his designs, to circumvent and restrain and baffle his schemes.
For they regarded the man who should have been the first servant of the
State as at this moment its most dangerous enemy.
They thought he was undoing all that they had achieved, bringing back the rule they had overturned, defying the decision of the faithful
North, installing sedition in the place of loyalty.
On the 7th of June
Grant wrote to
Sheridan as follows:
I was absent from here on my way to West Point when the correspondence commenced between you and the Secretary of War which culminated in the removal of Governor Wells.
I knew nothing of it, except what was published in the papers, until my return here yesterday.
The Secretary's dispatch was in obedience to an order from the President written on Saturday before starting South, but not delivered to the Secretary until Monday after I left my office.
I know Mr. Stanton is disposed to support you, not only in this last measure, but in every official act of yours thus far. He cannot say so because it is in Cabinet he has to do this, and there is no telling when he may not be overruled; and it is not in keeping with his position to announce beforehand that he intends to differ with his associate advisers.
In fact both
Grant and
Stanton were frequently compelled to issue orders the purpose of which they abhorred; orders which, though clearly designed to conflict with the intention of the law, were skillfully framed so as to be technically
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within its terms. . They then more than once discussed the means by which they too could apparently obey the directions of a superior and yet neutralize his intent and purpose.
This very letter to
Sheridan was written under peculiar circumstances, and to explain away the apparent disapproval of the
Secretary.
Grant had gone to
West Point, whither I accompanied him, but his visit was suddenly terminated, and he returned to
Washington because of a telegram from the
Assistant Adjutant-General at his own headquarters, containing only these words: ‘You are needed here.’
This was in consequence of an agreement he had made with
Stanton that he should be summoned in this way, if necessary.
Thus the telegram from a captain was in reality a message from the
Secretary of War.
It meant, and
Grant so understood it, that the
President of the
United States was plotting mischief, and that the
General of the Army was required to help frustrate the design.
Grant at once gave up his engagements and hurried back to
Washington.
In considering the behavior of both
Grant and
Stanton at this period it must be borne in mind that this was no ordinary political crisis.
It was not a struggle for office, or a contest about a tariff or a bankrupt law in which they were engaged, but a dispute that followed hard on a terrible civil war. It was the reconstruction of the
Union that was at issue.
The question was whether the States that had seceded and the population that had rebelled should be re-admitted to their former place with or without the stipulations and restrictions which the victors had decided to demand.
More than this, the hopes held out by
Johnson of easier terms had revived the ambition and disturbed the quiet of the
South.
Naturally, after a great and disastrous convulsion there were many perturbed spirits, some perhaps ready to seize any opportunity to recover what they had lost; there was a population of millions recently set free, living among their former
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masters; there were the Unionists of the
South in the midst of the unsuccessful Confederates; there was every cause for anxiety, every passion and sentiment to be appeased and allayed and controlled.
All these seething elements of disorder were stirred up by
Johnson's obstinacy.
The Southerners would have submitted to the inevitable, but he encouraged and incited them to hold out still.
If the decision of the
North was accepted by the
South, there would be an end of the trouble, but by the stimulating conduct of the
President, by his incessant public and private provocations and persuasions and exhortations, he prolonged the struggle and made worse things probable.
It was the apprehension of still further confusion and re-awakened strife that made the situation so critical, and justified
Grant and
Stanton to themselves in their anomalous and extraordinary course.
They believed that by steadily carrying out the will of Congress and of the people in spite of the
President they would put an end to the chaos, and bring back peace and the
Union on the only terms which the victorious
North would tolerate.
This feeling of his subordinates was of course known to the
President, and it was no secret that he wished to rid himself of his War
Secretary.
But the friends of Congress,
Grant among them, counseled
Stanton not to resign.
It was feared, however, that
Johnson would peremptorily dismiss the
Cabinet Minister, who was no longer in his confidence, and Congress took extraordinary means to prevent this action.
The well-known Tenure of Office bill was devised in order to make it impossible for
Johnson to remove subordinates who were not in harmony with his views.
The President naturally desired to have only his own supporters in office at such a crisis, while Congress was determined that those whom
Lincoln had appointed should not be displaced by the successor who had certainly betrayed his party, and who they thought was ready to betray his country.
So
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the law was passed, against the protestations and over the veto of the
President, prohibiting him, without the approval of the Senate, from removing officers whose confirmation required the Senate's approval.
The rule was extended, with certain restrictions, to members of the
Cabinet; and the
President was not allowed to dismiss a Minister until the end of his term.
He was at liberty, however, during the recess of Congress, to suspend any officer for cause, but must report the case to the Senate when it re-assembled.
If, then, the Senate concurred, the officer was dismissed; if not, he was restored.
This law, it was matter of notoriety, had especial reference to the
Secretary of War.
It was passed in March, and Congress adjourned on the 20th of July.
Eleven days afterward,
Mr. Johnson sent for
Grant and informed him that he intended to suspend
Stanton, and at the same time remove
Sheridan from New Orleans.
He also stated that he meant to appoint
Grant himself
Secretary of War ad interim. There could be no possible doubt of the purpose of this move.
It was intended to nullify as far as possible the action of Congress, to punish men for striving to execute the law, to hinder the Reconstruction policy.
Johnson could hardly have hoped to accomplish much by putting
Grant in
Stanton's place.
Still the soldier was less unbending in manner than the
Secretary, less uncompromising in the appearance of hostility; and his military habit of subordination may even yet have misled the
President.
He certainly was less skilled in the arts of political chicanery, and
Johnson may have thought it possible still to inveigle or overreach him. But the especial object doubtless was, not so much to manage
Grant as to affect the people, to produce the impression on the country that
Grant was in accord with the Administration, and that by entering the
Cabinet at this crisis he was offering proof of his sympathy with the
President.
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There was also doubtless a personal reason why
Johnson wished to foster this idea.
It was plain by this time that
Grant's popularity was likely to make him a Presidential candidate, and the belief that he sustained
Johnson would destroy his hold upon the Republicans.
Grant had indeed so successfully concealed his opposition to the
President from the public knowledge that the mass of the people could easily be led to suppose he was
Johnson's adherent.
This would naturally antagonize the Republicans, while, with the
President's party, the
President himself of course was chief.
Johnson probably feared no rival but
Grant.
He flattered himself he could defeat any other candidate of the Republicans, so that by making
Grant impossible he would secure his own success.
Thus the Administration undoubtedly hoped to enjoy the benefit of
Grant's popularity at the very moment they were seeking to undermine it; a bit of craft worthy of
Machiavelli, or of
Seward.
But
Grant protested earnestly against the entire proposition.
He not only did this promptly in conversation, when
Johnson announced the design, but on his return to his own headquarters he wrote the famous letter marked ‘
Private,’ which has already been given to the world.
I quote the portion referring to
Stanton:
[Private.]
Sir,—I take the liberty of addressing you privately on the subject of the conversation we had this morning, feeling as I do the great danger to the welfare of the country should you carry out the designs then expressed.
First, on the subject of the displacement of the
Secretary of War.
His removal cannot be effected against his will without the consent of the Senate.
It is but a short time since the United States Senate was in session and why not then have asked for
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this removal if it was desired?
It certainly was the intention of the
Legislative branch of the
Government to place
Cabinet Ministers beyond the power of Executive removal, and it is pretty well understood that, so far as
Cabinet Ministers are affected by the Tenure of Office bill, it was intended specially to protect the
Secretary of War, whom the country felt great confidence in. The meaning of the law may be explained away by an astute lawyer but common sense and the views of loyal people will give to it the effect intended by its framers. . . .
In conclusion, allow me to say as a friend, desiring peace and quiet, the welfare of the whole country North and South, that it is in my opinion more than the loyal people of this country (I mean those who supported the
Government during the great Rebellion) will quietly submit to, to see the very men of all others who they have expressed confidence in, removed.
I would not have taken the liberty of addressing the
Executive of the
United States thus, but for the conversation on the subject alluded to in this letter, and from a sense of duty, feeling that I know I am right in this matter.
With great respect, your ob't serv't,
There were several interviews within the next few days at which the subordinate strove to change the determination of his superior, but
Johnson remained immovable.
Grant had at once made known the
President's purpose to
Stanton and
Sheridan, as well as to others in his confidence.
These last were few, for Congress was not in session, and the principal people whom he might have consulted were absent.
He discussed, however, with
Stanton the course he should pursue in case the
President persisted.
It was agreed that
Grant's duty in that event was to accept the position proffered, and as far as possible prevent further mischief.
He could take up
Stanton's course when
Stanton was no longer in the
Cabinet, and thus mitigate some of the evils of his removal.
The protests of
Grant delayed
Johnson's action just five
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days.
Then, on the 5th of August, in a formal letter, the
President requested
Stanton's resignation.
The same day
Stanton answered, also in writing, that ‘public considerations of a high character constrained him from resigning before the next meeting of Congress.’
Again
Johnson hesitated for a week; but on the 12th of August he issued an order in strict accordance with the provisions of the Tenure of Office act, suspending
Stanton and appointing
Grant Secretary of War ad interim.
Grant thereupon addressed the following letter to
Stanton, of which I preserved the original draft, with the lines struck out by
Grant's own hand:
Sir,—Enclosed herewith I have the honor to transmit to you a copy of a letter just received from the
President of the
United States, notifying me of my assignment as
Acting Secretary of War, and directing me to assume those duties at once.
In notifying you of my acceptance, I cannot let the opportunity pass without expressing to you my appreciation of the zeal, patriotism, firmness, and ability with which you have ever discharged the duties of
Secretary of War.
With great respect, your ob't serv't,
To this
Stanton replied as follows:
General,—Your note of this date, accompanied by a copy of a letter addressed to you, August 12th, by the
President, appointing you
Secretary of War ad interim, and informing me of your acceptance of the appointment, has been received.
Under a sense of public duty I am compelled to deny the
President's right, under the
Constitution and laws of the
United
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States, to suspend me from office as
Secretary of War, or to authorize any other person to enter upon the discharge of the duties of that office, or to require me to transfer to you or any other person the records, books, papers, and other property in my official custody and charge as
Secretary of War.
But inasmuch as the
President has assumed to suspend me from the office as
Secretary of War, and you have notified me of your acceptance of the appointment of
Secretary of War ad interim, I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to the superior force of the
President.
You will please accept my acknowledgment of the kind terms in which you have notified me of your acceptance of the
President's appointment, and my cordial reciprocation of the sentiments expressed.
I am, with sincere regard, truly yours,
Grant was not quite pleased with this letter, which seemed to imply that he was in accord with the
President, or at least that he should not have accepted the post, but
Stanton could hardly have been in an amiable mood when he was dispossessed, even toward the unwilling instrument of his removal.
But the annoyance that
Grant felt made no difference in his action.
The crisis was too momentous for any personal feeling to be allowed to interfere.
He had been thoroughly loyal to
Stanton and to the country, and he became
Secretary of War with the intention to do his utmost to carry out the policy which
Stanton was removed for persisting to execute.