[358c]
the argument
of Thrasymachus and will first state what men say is the nature and origin
of justice; secondly, that all who practise it do so reluctantly, regarding
it as something necessary1 and not as a good; and thirdly, that they have plausible grounds
for thus acting, since forsooth the life of the unjust man is far better
than that of the just man—as they say; though I, Socrates, don't
believe it. Yet I am disconcerted when my ears are dinned by the arguments
of Thrasymachus and innumerable others.2 But
the case for justice,
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