[104]
Further every kind of case will contain a cause, a
point for the decision of the judge, and a central argument.1
For nothing can be said which does not contain a
reason, something to which the decision of the judge
is directed, and finally something which, more than
aught else, contains the substance of the matter at
issue. But as these vary in different cases and are as
a rule explained by writers on judicial causes, I will
postpone them to the appropriate portion of my work.
For the present I shall follow the order which I
prescribed by my division2 of causes into three classes.
[p. 465]
VII. I will begin with the class of causes which are
concerned with praise and blame. This class appears
to have been entirely divorced by Aristotle,3 and
following him by Theophrastus, from the practical
side of oratory (which they call πραγματικῇ,) and to
have been reserved solely for the delectation of
audiences, which indeed is shown to be its peculiar
function by its name, which implies display.4
1 For discussion of these technical terms see chap. xi.
2 Chaps. iii. and iv.
3 Rhet. 1358 b. 2.
4 sc. ἐπιδεικτική.
Quintilian. With an English Translation. Harold Edgeworth Butler. Cambridge. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann, Ltd. 1920.
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