[1221b]
[1]
but it is the man that goes too far in not being annoyed
even at the prosperity of the undeserving, and is easy going, as
gluttons are in regard to food, whereas his opposite is
difficult-tempered in respect of jealousy.— It is superfluous to state in
the definition that the specified relation to each thing must not be
accidental; no science whether theoretical or productive makes this
addition to the definition either in discourse or in practice, but
this addition is aimed against the logical quibbling of the sciences.
Let us then accept
these simple definitions, and let us make them more precise when we
are speaking about the opposite dispositions.1 But these modes of emotion
themselves are divided into species designated according to their
difference in respect of time or intensity or in regard to one of the
objects that cause the emotions. I mean for instance that a man is called
quick-tempered from feeling the emotion of anger sooner than he ought,
harsh and passionate from feeling it more than he ought, bitter from
having a tendency to cherish his anger, violent and abusive owing to
the acts of retaliation to which his anger gives rise. Men are called gourmands or
gluttons and drunkards from having an irrational liability to
indulgence in one or the other sort of nutriment.But it must not be ignored that some of the vices mentioned cannot
be classed under the heading of manner, if manner is taken to be
feeling the emotion to excess.
[20]
For example, a man is not an adulterer because he
exceeds in intercourse with married women, for 'excess' does not apply
here, but adultery merely in itself is a vice, since the term denoting
the passion implicitly denotes that the man is vicious2; and similarly with outrage. Hence men dispute the
charge, and admit intercourse but deny adultery on the ground of
having acted in ignorance or under compulsion, or admit striking a
blow but deny committing an outrage; and similarly in meeting the
other charges of the same kind.These points having been
taken, we must next say that since the spirit has two parts, and the
virtues are divided between them, one set being those of the rational
part, intellectual virtues, whose work is truth, whether about the
nature of a thing or about its mode of production, while the other set
belongs to the part that is irrational but possesses appetition
(for if the spirit
is divided into parts, not any and every part possesses appetition),
it therefore follows that the moral character is vicious or virtuous
by reason of pursuing or avoiding certain pleasures and pains. This is
clear from the classification3 of the emotions, faculties and states of
character. For the faculties and the states are concerned with the
modes of emotion, and the emotions are distinguished by pain and
pleasure; so that it
follows from these considerations as well as from the positions
already laid down that all moral goodness is concerned with pleasures
and pains. For our state
of character is related to and concerned with such things as have the
property of making every person's spirit worse and better.
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