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[1246b]
[1]
And also if it is not possible from knowledge
to be ignorant, but only to make mistakes and do the same things as
one does from ignorance, a man will assuredly never act from justice
in the same way as he will act from injustice. But since wisdom is
knowledge and a form of truth, wisdom also will produce the same
effect as knowledge, that is, it would be possible from wisdom to act
unwisely and to make the same mistakes as the unwise man does; but if
the use of anything qua itself were
single,1 when so acting men would be acting
wisely. In the case of
the other forms of knowledge, therefore, another higher form causes
their diversion; but what knowledge causes the diversion of the
actually highest of all? Obviously there is no longer any knowledge or
any mind to do it. But moreover goodness does not cause it either; for
wisdom makes use of goodness, since the goodness of the ruling part
uses that of the ruled.
Who then is there in whom this occurs? or is it in the same way as the
vice of the irrational part of the spirit is termed lack of control,
and the uncontrolled man is in a manner
profligate—possessing reason, but ultimately if his appetite
is powerful it will turn him round, and he will draw the opposite
inference? Or is it manifest that also if there is goodness in the
irrational part but folly in the reason, goodness and folly are
transformed in another way? so that it will be possible to use justice
unjustly and badly, and wisdom unwisely; and therefore the opposite
uses also will be possible.
[20]
For it is strange if whereas when wickedness at any time arises in
the irrational part it will pervert the goodness in the rational and
cause it to be ignorant, yet goodness in the irrational part when
there is folly in the rational should not convert the folly and make
it form wise and proper judgements, and again wisdom in the rational
part should not make profligacy in the irrational act
temperately—which seems to be what self-control essentially
is. So that there will actually be wise action arising from folly.
But these
consequences are absurd, especially that of using wisdom wisely as a
result of folly; for that is a thing which we certainly do not see in
other cases—for instance profligacy perverts one's medical
knowledge or scholarship, but it does not pervert one's ignorance if
it be opposed to it, because it does not contain superiority, but
rather it is goodness in general that stands in this relation to
badness; for example, the just man is capable of all that the unjust
man is, and in general inability is contained in ability. So that it is clear that men
are wise and good simultaneously, and that the states of character
above described belong to a different person, and the Socratic dictum
'Nothing is mightier than wisdom,' is right. But in that by 'wisdom'
he meant 'knowledge,' he was wrong; for wisdom is a form of goodness,
and is not scientific knowledge but another kind of
cognition.But wisdom is not the only thing which
acting in accordance with goodness causes welfare,
1 As in 1 above it was shown not to be.
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