[142d] If being is predicated of the one which exists and unity is predicated of being which is one, and being and the one are not the same, but belong to the existent one of our hypothesis, must not the existent one be a whole of which the one and being are parts?” “Inevitably.” “And shall we call each of these parts merely a part, or must it, in so far as it is a part, be called a part of the whole?” “A part of the whole.” “Whatever one, then, exists is a whole and has a part.” “Certainly.” “Well then, can either of these two parts of existent one—unity and being—abandon the other?
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