[147b] “If, then, in every way the one is one and the not one are not one, the one cannot be a part of the not one, nor a whole of which the not one are parts, nor are the not one parts of the one, nor a whole of which the one is a part.” “No.” “But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, are the same as one another.” “Yes, we did.” “Shall we say, then, that since the relations of the one and the not one are such as we have described, the two are the same as one another?” “Yes, let us say that.” “The one, then, is, it appears, other than all other things and than itself, and is also the same as other things and as itself.”
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