previous next

[305] by what they had accomplished. It is, therefore, totally false, as rumor had it after the battle, that “Sigel's men” gave themselves up to plundering the camp, became scattered, and were for this reason surprised by the “returning enemy.”

When we had taken our position on the plateau near Sharp's, a cannonade was opened by me against a part of the enemy's troops, evidently forming the left of their line, confronting Lyon, as we could observe from the struggle going on in that direction. The firing lasted about 30 minutes.1

Suddenly the firing on the enemy's side ceased, and it seemed as if we had directed our own fire against Lyon's forces. I therefore ordered the pieces to cease firing. Just at this time — it was between 9 and 10 o'clock--there was a lull in the fight on the north side, and not a gun was heard, while squads of the enemy's troops, unarmed, came streaming up the road from Skegg's Branch toward us and were captured. Meanwhile a part of McCulloch's force was advancing against us at Sharp's farm, while Reid's battery moved into position on the hill east of Wilson's Creek, and opposite our right flank, followed by some cavalry.

All these circumstances — the cessation of the firing in Lyon's front, the appearance of the enemy's deserters, and the movement of Reid's artillery and the cavalry toward the south — led us into the belief that the enemy's forces were retreating, and this opinion became stronger by the report of Dr. Melcher, who was in advance on the road to Skegg's Branch, that “Lyon's troops” were coming up the road and that we must not fire. So uncertain was I in regard to the character of the approaching troops, now only a few rods distant, that I did not trust to my own eyes, but sent Corporal Tod, of the 3d Missouri, forward to challenge them. He challenged as ordered, but was immediately shot and killed. I instantly ordered the artillery and infantry to fire. But it was too late — the artillery fired one or two shots, but the infantry, as though paralyzed, did not fire; the 3d Louisiana, which we had mistaken for the gray-clad 1st Iowa, rushed up to the plateau, while Bledsoe's battery in front and Reid's from the heights on our right flank opened with canister at point-blank against us. As a matter of precaution I had during the last moment brought four of our pieces into battery on the right against the troops on the hill and Reid's battery; but after answering Reid's fire for a few minutes, the horses and drivers of three guns suddenly left their position, and with their caissons galloped down the Fayetteville road, in their tumultuous flight carrying panic into the ranks of the infantry, which turned back in disorder, and at the same time received the fire of the attacking line.

On our retreat the right wing, consisting mostly of the 3d Missouri Infantry and one piece of artillery, followed the road we came, while the left wing, consisting of the 5th Missouri Infantry and another piece, went down the Fayetteville road, then, turning to the right (north-west), made its way toward Little York and Springfield; on its way the latter column was joined by Lieutenant Farrand's cavalry company. Colonel Salomon was also with this column, consisting in all of about 450 men, with 1 piece and caisson. I remained with the right wing, the 3d Missouri, which was considerably scattered. I re-formed the men during their retreat into 4 companies, in all about 2 5 0 men, and, turning to the left, into the Fayetteville road, was joined by Captain Carr's company of cavalry. After considering that,by following the left wing toward Little York, we might be cut off from Springfield and not be able to join General Lyon's forces, we followed the Fayetteville road until we reached a road leading north-east toward Springfield. This road we followed. Captain Carr, with his cavalry, was leading; he was instructed to remain in advance, keep his flankers out, and report what might occur in front. One company of the 3d Missouri was at the head of our little column of infantry, followed by the piece of artillery and two caissons, behind them the remainder of the infantry, the whole flanked on each side by skirmishers. So we marched, or rather dragged along as fast as the exhausted men could go, until we reached the ford at James Fork of the White River. Carr had already crossed, but his cavalry was not in sight; it had hastened along without waiting for us; 2 a part of the infantry had also passed the creek; the piece and caissons were just crossing, when the rattling of musketry announced the presence of hostile forces on both sides of the creek. They were detachments of Missouri and Texas cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Major, Captains Mabry and Russell, that lay in ambush, and now pounced upon our jaded and extended column. It was in vain that Lieutenant-Colonel Albert and myself tried to rally at least a part of them; they left the road to seek protection, or make good their escape in the woods, and were followed and hunted down by their pursuers. In this chase the greater part of our men were killed, wounded, or made prisoners, among the latter Lieutenant-Colonel Albert and my orderly, who were with me in the last moment of the affray. I was not taken, probably because I wore a blue woolen blanket over my uniform and a yellowish slouch-hat, giving me the appearance of a Texas Ranger. I halted on horseback, prepared for defense, in a small strip of corn-field on the west side of the creek, while the hostile cavalrymen swarmed around and several times passed close by me. When we had resumed our way toward the north-east, we were immediately recognized as enemies, and pursued by a few horsemen, whose number increased rapidly. It was a pretty lively race for about six miles, when our pursuers gave up the chase. We reached

1 Colonel Graves, commanding the First Brigade, Mo. State Guards, says in his report: “Colonel Rosser, commanding the 1st Regiment and Fourth Battalion, with Captain Bledsoe's artillery, being stationed on the extreme left, was attacked by Colonel Sigel's battery, and his men exposed to a deadly fire for thirty minutes.”--F. S.

2 Colonel Carr says in his official report: “It is a subject of regret with me to have left him [Sigel] behind, but I supposed all the time that he was close behind me till I got to the creek, and it would have done no good for my company to have been cut to pieces also.”--editors.

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.

An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.

hide People (automatically extracted)
hide Display Preferences
Greek Display:
Arabic Display:
View by Default:
Browse Bar: