“
[
681]
Herald” of November 20th, 1861, contains a diagram in accord with the above statement, and was probably taken from the official one.
There was another point in the instructions given by the
flag-officer to officers commanding vessels in the flanking line that is not mentioned in his report.
He said in substance, if not 4n words, that, in passing in, the flanking line was to deliver its fire against the fort on
Bay Point, and then to guard the fleet of transports within the bar from any attempts of
Tattnall; that he knew him well; that he had courage and power to plan, and in the heat of action might try to run out to destroy the transports which it was the special duty of the flanking squadron to protect; and that when
Tattnall was disposed of, the vessels would take an enfilading position somewhere to the northward of the
Hilton Head fort.
After receiving our instructions, the officers
 |
|
Ten-inch shell gun which threw the opening shot from the flag-ship “Wabash.”
from a war-time sketch. |
commanding vessels returned without delay to their commands, and made preparations for immediate movement.
Soon after, the flag-ship made signal and got under way, as did all of the men-of-war.
The
Wabash stood in toward the forts, and got aground.
“In our anxiety to get the outline of the forts before dark,” the flag-officer reported, “we stood in too near to Fishing Rip Shoal, and the vessel grounded.
By the time she was gotten off it was too late, in my judgment, to proceed, and I made signal for the squadron to anchor out of gunshot of the enemy.”
The shoal where the
Wabash grounded was a little short of three miles from the forts.
The vessels anchored in convenient positions for the formation of the lines when signaled, and were sufficiently inside of the transports to be unembarrassed by them in forming.
The following day [November 7th] we had a heavy westerly wind.
The report of
General Thomas F. Drayton, the
Confederate commander, states: “On the 6th, the fleet and transports, which had increased to about forty-five sail, would probably have attacked us had not the weather been very boisterous.”
This conjecture was quite right.
The
flag-officer was impatiently awaiting the abatement of the wind, and about noon was almost on the point of going in, but wisely deferred the attack until we could make it without disadvantage.
Drayton's picturesque report of the engagement continues: “At last the memorable 7th dawned upon us, bright and serene; not a ripple upon the broad expanse of water to disturb the accuracy of fire from the broad decks of that magnificent armada about advancing, in battle array, to vomit forth its iron hail, with all the spiteful energy of long-suppressed rage and conscious strength.”
