[333] In a strategical and tactical point of view, the battle of Pea Ridge forms a counterpart to the battle of Wilson's Creek. In the latter battle we were the outflanking party, approaching the camp of McCulloch and Price, by a night march, completely surprising and attacking their forces in the morning, but making our attack in front and rear, without being able to communicate with and assist each other. My own brigade of 1118 men, which had gained the enemy's rear, was beaten first, and then the forces of General Lyon, 4282 men, after a heroic resistance were compelled to leave the field. The enemy held the “interior lines,” and could throw readily his forces from one point to the other. At Pea Ridge the same advantage was with our army, although the enemy had better facilities of communication between his left and right wing, by the road leading from Bentonville to Elkhorn Tavern, than we had had at Wilson's Creek. There we had had to meet substantially the same troops we encountered at Pea Ridge, with the exception of the Indian Brigade under Pike. From the result of the battles of Wilson's Creek and Pea Ridge, it will be seen that the manoeuvre of outflanking and “marching into the enemy's rear” is not always successful. It was not so at Wilson's Creek, when we had approached, unobserved,within cannon-shot of the enemy's lines; however, we were only 5400 against about 11,000, while at Pea Ridge the enemy had 16,202 men in action against our 10,500. In a manoeuvre of that kind, the venture of a smaller army to surprise and “bag” an enemy, whose forces are concentrated and
Brigadier-General stand Watie, C. S. A., of the Indian forces. From a photograph. |