Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 2.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

The retention of many thousands of prisoners of war in this city caused the consumption of our reserve of flour, deficient transportation preventing their entire subsistence on corn from the South as had been intended

The supply of the Army of Northern Virginia requires special consideration, for the ravages of the enemy in the country in which it operates have left not a full supply even for the non-combatants. Hence its bases of supply are very remote, and that supply must be contingent on the means of collecting in those remote localities an excess over the wants of the troops there operating.

This army is also sustained by various contrivances to draw supplies from beyond our lines by barter, and by secret arrangement, with the enemy turning on their anxiety to get cotton. For both these purposes funds and credit are both necessary, hence it is obvious that the subsistence of the army rests on a most precarious foundation.

The instant passage of the amendment to the Tythe Bill, and its active execution, the exercise of authority to impress teams along the line of roads to bring supplies forward, the furnishing of some coin, and sufficient funds to purchase articles of barter, and to pay for 4,000 bales of cotton immediately, and to purchase supplies throughout the land, are all indispensable at this juncture.

It is also necessary that the management of the Danville and Piedmont Railroad shall be rendered efficient, and that we shall hold the southwestern counties of Virginia, and those in North Carolina lying adjacent. In that section of country arrangements have been instituted by Major Shelby, to send forward supplies to this army. This is especially important since the loss of East Tennessee, where operations had been set on foot of a most pomising character.

I make no suggestions here as to the alternation of impressment and uniformity of prices on the one hand, or, on the other, of taxation so heavy as to compel the sale of supplies and prevent hoarding either by agriculturists or dealers. I have, under existing laws, given my judgment on these points to the Secretaries of War and the Treasury heretofore. I suppose these matters are now well matured in the minds of those whose business it is to deal with them. I, however, present my circular of 5th September, 1864, which could not be made effective by me.

The arrangements and organization of this bureau are believed to be complete, at least I cannot devise any more effective to glean the whole country. I would here suggest that officers of the “tax in kind” be directed to report no district “impracticable” until after conference with the Chief Quartermaster and Chief Commissary of the State in which it lies.

The only substitute for the system of this bureau is the contract system,which is impracticable, when the only competition existing is one between buyers anxious to convert depreciating currency into appreciating commodities. Moreover, contractors, having no certainty