Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 2.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

His habitual reliance on sheer weight of numbers,

“Your two remaining corps, with the Eighteenth, make you relatively stronger against the enemy at Petersburg than we have been since the first day.” ¹ But the cautious Meade replied that he could not advise an assault in the absence of the Second corps,² while the rough treatment experienced by Sheridan indicated that the Confederate capital was secure against surprise.

But although the movement north of the James was not, as commonly represented, a skilful feint which deceived Lee, but a real attempt to surprise Richmond,³ which he thwarted by concentrating heavily on his left, yet to parry the stroke the Confederate commander had been compelled so to denude the Petersburg front that there was left for its defence but four brigades of Bushrod Johnson's division and the divisions of Hoke and Mahone, which together with the artillery made up a force of little over 13,000 effective men.⁴

The conjuncture was still bright with success to the Federals, and it being now decided to spring the mine before daylight of the 30th, Hancock's movement was treated as a feint, and that officer [281] was directed on the night of the 29th to return with all secresy and dispatch to take part in the assault, while Sheridan was to pass in rear of the army, and with whole cavalry corps operate towards Petersburg from the south and west.⁵

On the evening of the 29th,