[140]
charge.
In the absence of any official report from General Jenkins, I cannot explain why he did not intercept a portion, at least, of the enemy's force.
It seems, however, clear that before the close of the day, the General made a fierce attack upon a detachment of cavalry and infantry at Bunker Hill, losing several men in a gallant attack upon a party of the latter, who had thrown themselves into two stone houses, well provided for defence, with loop-holes and barricades fixed for that purpose.
He captured here about seventy-five or one hundred prisoners, and drove the balance towards Martinsburg.
These facts I learned on the next day.
On the morning of the 14th it was apparent that during the night the enemy had continued his march to Winchester, whither I ordered the only force of cavalry I could then communicate with — Sweeny's battalion — to follow and annoy him. Not having heard anything from Winchester, though I had dispatched several couriers to the Lieutenant-General commanding, I hesitated for a few moments between proceeding towards Martinsburg, in accordance with my general instructions, and turning towards Winchester.
The reflection that should my division be needed there, I would that day receive orders to turn back, determined me to push on to Martinsburg as rapidly as possible, which I did, reaching that place late in the afternoon, after a very fatiguing march of nineteen miles.
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