Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 6.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

[12] have received individual accessions between the 1st and the 20th of June. At the latter date the sick present were 343. It cannot be supposed that when General Early started he dragged his sick men behind the division; therefore these 243 must have become sick during the march, and, as this number is superior to the whole reduction, it will be admitted that the division had been somehow recruited after the 1st of June; but for the sake of simplicity, I shall take in the whole, both of the possible increase by the draft and the return of sick and wounded soldiers, and of the reduction by sickness, straggling and desertion, and consider only the difference between the two. That difference I have shown to be for Early's division 293, or less than four per cent. The proportion for the whole army could not be quite as large, and therefore should not be reckoned at more than 2,600. In that case the reduction by the three above mentioned causes would be 7,500; the increase by addition of three brigades, 6,500, and therefore the net decrease, 1,000, leaving the effective force under Lee in Pennsylvania and Maryland the 1st of July at 73,500 men. If we deduct the cavalry on both sides, we can say that the Southern general fought with 62,000 or 63,000 men and 190 guns the 80,000 or 82,000 men and 300 guns with whom Meade encountered him at Gettysburg.

Excuse the length of this, and believe me, dear sir, yours truly,

P. S.--Here is the calculation to which I allude in the last sentence: Effective force of Stuart, May 31st, 10,292+Jenkins' and Imboden's cavalry, 2,200==12,500; minus losses in fights, 1,200, and other losses, 200; remains 11,100. 73,500-11,100==62,400. To be deducted also 16 guns with Stuart on one side, and 27 with Pleasonton on the other.