The reports of other commanders of brigades of McLaws
' and Hood
's divisions, when published, may throw light upon this interesting point.
These various extracts indicate clearly that it was the purpose of General Lee
to renew the attack early the next morning, and while none assert positively that orders were given, yet many, especially those familiar with his character, believe that they were.
By midnight of the 1st General Lee
had all of his infantry present, save Pickett
's three brigades.
Of the eight divisions present, one-half had not been engaged.
His infantry that could be used in the second day's fight was double that which had fought with such brilliant results on the 1st.
To have renewed the battle at the earliest psssible hour the next day was what as a military man he should have done.
It was in the natural order of things, and the earlier the better.
Our troops were in good spirits, and the reverse of this was probably the case in the Union
Without personal knowledge in the matter, I am constrained to believe that as it was General Lee
's purpose to renew the battle early the next morning, he did issue orders to that effect.
We learn through General Longstreet
that when he overtook General Lee
at 5 o'clock on the 1st, he informed him it was his purpose to attack the enemy upon the heights the next day, and that although not aware, so far as we are advised, of the full measure of success we had already gained, suggested that this course was at variance with the plan of campaign agreed upon.
He might have added that the battle already fought and won was also a violation of it, according to his understanding.
In fact, under no circumstances, according to General Longstreet
, should General Lee
went to General Lee
's headquarters at daylight on the 2d, and renewed his objections to attacking, but without success.
, however, owing, as has been suggested to the unwillingness of Longstreet
to attack, directed a reconnoissance to be made in Ewell
's front, with the view of renewing the assault in that direction, but the report being unfavorable, it was determined to make the attack on the right and with Longstreet
It was fully 11 o'clock, as General Longstreet
states, when he was ordered to move to the right and attack the extreme left of the enemy.
The order was for him to “move with so much of his command as was up;” but he, of his own volition, delayed the movement until one brigade — Law
's — that had been on picket, should rejoin.
In his official report he says: “As soon after Law
's arrival as we could make our preparations, the movement began.”