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Strasburg, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 13
unction, and, if possible, as far out as the Rappahannock; the country to be thoroughly scouted by cavalry, the railway from Washington to Manassas and thence to Strasburg to be at once repaired and put in running order, all the bridges to be protected by block-houses; as soon as the railway was in operation a brigade of infantry wd by a strong, force well entrenched, and able to fall back upon the city if overpowered; while if the enemy advanced down the Shenandoah the force entrenched at Strasburg would be able to hold him in check until assistance could reach them by rail from Manassas. If these measures had been carried into effect Jackson's subsequent his aid at least 10,000 men from Abercrombie's command, or, in the reverse case, could hare gone to the latter's assistance with at least 30,000 men, leaving his Strasburg entrenchments well guarded. Had I remained in command I would have seen to it that the entrenchments referred to were promptly executed. To say that the forc
Tennessee (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 13
ailant. This movement, if successful, gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the rebels; Norfolk would fall; all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours; all Virginia would be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Carolina. The alternative presented to the enemy would be, to beat us in a position selected by ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath the Caudine Forks. Should we be beaten in a battle we have a perfectly secure retreat down the Peppose us in front. We bring our fleet into full play. After a successful battle our position would be — Burnside forming our left; Norfolk held securely: our centre connecting Burnside with Buell, both by Raleigh and Lynchburg; Buell in Eastern Tennessee and North Alabama; Halleck at Nashvilie and Memphis. The next movement would be to connect with Sherman on the left by reducing Wilmington and Charleston; to advance our centre into South Carolina and Georgia; to push Buell either toward
Cumberland Gap (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 13
lley of the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland rivers, and of coast expeditions, I always held the eastern line to be the true theatre of decisive operations. If I had been retained in chief command, untrammelled as to time and means, I should, in the early spring of 1862, have pushed with all energy the operations against Wilmington, Charleston, and New Orleans, as well as in the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland valleys, and against the Knoxville and Lynchburg Railroad, via Cumberland Gap, and early in May have thrown the Army of the Potomac to the James river with a strength of over 150,000 for duty. I intended to transport by water to Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock, four divisions of infantry with their batteries, the regular infantry, one bridge-train, a few squadrons of cavalry, and a small number of wagons; with them to push by a forced march to the vicinity of West Point, and then cross the Mattapony and Pamunkey rivers, thus compelling the evacuation of Yorktow
Jackson (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 13
ent well entrenched; two regiments of cavalry to be added to this brigade to scour the valley thoroughly. Under this arrangement the immediate approaches to Washington would be covered by a strong, force well entrenched, and able to fall back upon the city if overpowered; while if the enemy advanced down the Shenandoah the force entrenched at Strasburg would be able to hold him in check until assistance could reach them by rail from Manassas. If these measures had been carried into effect Jackson's subsequent advance down the Shenandoah would have been impracticable; but, unfortunately, as soon as I started for the Peninsula this region was withdrawn from my command, and my instructions were wholly disregarded. Again, with Manassas entrenched as I directed, Pope would have had a secure base of operations from which to manoeuvre, and the result of his campaign might have been very different. Certainly, if I had resumed command at Manassas instead of within the defences of Washing
Norfolk (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 13
three weeks earlier. A movement in force on that line obliges the enemy to abandon his entrenched position at Manassas, in order to hasten to cover Richmond and Norfolk. He must do this; for should he permit us to occupy Richmond his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle in which he must be the assailant. This movement, if successful, gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the rebels; Norfolk would fall; all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours; all Virginia would be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Carolina. The alternative presented to the enemy would be, to beat ch us in time; he can only oppose us in front. We bring our fleet into full play. After a successful battle our position would be — Burnside forming our left; Norfolk held securely: our centre connecting Burnside with Buell, both by Raleigh and Lynchburg; Buell in Eastern Tennessee and North Alabama; Halleck at Nashvilie and Me
Warrenton (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 13
The instructions I gave on the 16th of March were to the effect that Manassas Junction should be strongly entrenched, using the enemy's works as far as possible, and that Gen. Banks should put the mass of his forces there, with grand guards at Warrenton or Warrenton Junction, and, if possible, as far out as the Rappahannock; the country to be thoroughly scouted by cavalry, the railway from Washington to Manassas and thence to Strasburg to be at once repaired and put in running order, all the bgton, Lee would not have ventured to cross the Potomac. On the 1st of April, in view of what had occurred meanwhile, I temporarily changed the arrangements to the extent of leaving Banks in the Shenandoah. I placed Abercrombie in command at Warrenton and Manassas, under Banks's general orders, with 7,780 men at the former and 10,859 men at the latter place, and 18,000 men in Washington so that if Abercrombie was obliged to retire upon Washington there would be concentrated there 36,639 men,
Lynchburg (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 13
tly secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe, with our flanks perfectly covered by the fleet. During the whole movement our left flank is covered by the water. Our right is secure, for the reason that the enemy is too distant to reach us in time; he can only oppose us in front. We bring our fleet into full play. After a successful battle our position would be — Burnside forming our left; Norfolk held securely: our centre connecting Burnside with Buell, both by Raleigh and Lynchburg; Buell in Eastern Tennessee and North Alabama; Halleck at Nashvilie and Memphis. The next movement would be to connect with Sherman on the left by reducing Wilmington and Charleston; to advance our centre into South Carolina and Georgia; to push Buell either towards Montgomery or to unite with the main army in Georgia; to throw Halleck southward to meet the naval expedition from New Orleans. We should then be in a condition to reduce at our leisure all the Southern seaports; to occup
Harper's Ferry (West Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 13
ward, partly with the hope that I might be able to take advantage of some accident and bring Johnston to battle under favorable circumstances, but also to break up the camps, give the troops a little experience in marching and bivouac before finally leaving the old base of supplies, to test the transportation arrangements and get rid of impedimenta, and thus prepare things for the movement to the Peninsula. It also seemed probable that this advance, in connection with the recent move on Harper's Ferry and Charleston, would tend to make Johnston more uncertain as to my real intentions. In the course of the evening I telegraphed to the Secretary of War: In the arrangements for the advance of to-morrow it is impossible to carry into effect the arrangements for the formation of army corps. I am obliged to take groups as I find them, and to move them by divisions. I respectfully ask a suspension of the order directing it until the present movement be over. To this the secretary
Centreville (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 13
strike at the heart. Two bases of operations seem to present themselves for the advance of the Army of the Potomac: 1st. That of Washington — its present position — involving a direct attack upon the entrenched positions of the enemy at Centreville, Manassas, etc., or else a movement to turn one or both flanks of those positions, or a combination of the two plans. The relative force of the two armies will not justify an attack on both flanks; an attack on his left flank alone involves every direction, and a strong line of defence enabling him to remain on the defensive, with a small force on one flank, while he concentrates everything on the other for a decisive action. Should we place a portion of our force in front of Centreville, while the rest crosses the Occoquan, we commit the error of dividing our army by a very difficult obstacle, and by a distance too great to enable the two parts to support each other, should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy while
Louisiana (Louisiana, United States) (search for this): chapter 13
an on the left by reducing Wilmington and Charleston; to advance our centre into South Carolina and Georgia; to push Buell either towards Montgomery or to unite with the main army in Georgia; to throw Halleck southward to meet the naval expedition from New Orleans. We should then be in a condition to reduce at our leisure all the Southern seaports; to occupy all the avenues of communication; to use the great outlet of the Mississippi; to re-establish our government and arms in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas; to force the slaves to labor for our subsistence instead of that of the rebels; to bid defiance to all foreign interference. Such is the object I have ever had in view; this is the general plan which I hope to accomplish. For many long months I have labored to prepare the Army of the Potomac to play its part in the programme; from the day when I was placed in command of all our armies I have exerted myself to place all the other armies in such a condition that they, too, co
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