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Stonewall Jackson (search for this): chapter 25
dily as it can be done. The following was sent at 2.30 P. M.: Your despatch and that of the President received. Jackson is driving in my pickets, etc., on the other side of the Chickahominy. It is impossible to tell where reinforcements ouby land of Gen. McDowell's forces, deemed to be occupied in the defence of Washington, their inability to hold or defeat Jackson, disclosed an opportunity to the enemy, and a new danger to my right, and to the long line of supplies from the White Ho bridge and at Mechanicsville. The information in my possession soon after the close of this action convinced me that Jackson was really approaching in large force. The position on Beaver Dam creek, although so successfully defended, had its rigominy in the vicinity of Jones's bridge before we could reach Malvern Hill with our trains. I determined then to resist Jackson with the 5th corps, reinforced by all our disposable troops in the new position near the bridge-heads, in order to cover
De Joinville (search for this): chapter 25
ires work; after that you must exercise your own judgment. All these commands were obeyed. On the 26th orders were sent to all the corps commanders on the right bank of the Chickahominy to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare on the following day to the left bank of the river. Gen. Franklin received instructions to hold Gen. Slocum's division in readiness, by daybreak of the 27th, and, if heavy firing Gen. Morell. Col. Colburn. Gen. McClellan. Col. Sweitzer. Prince de Joinville. Comte de Paris. Gen. McClellan at Gen. Morell's headquarters, Minor's Hill, Va. should at that time be heard in the direction of Gen. Porter, to move at once to his assistance without further orders. At noon on the 26th the approach of the enemy, who had crossed above Meadow bridge, was discovered by the advanced pickets at that point, and at 12.30 P. M. they were attacked and driven in. All the pickets were now called in, and the regiment and battery at Mechanicsville withdrawn
Roger Jones (search for this): chapter 25
re its flanks would be reasonably secure and it would be within supporting distance of the main army. Gen. Porter carried out my orders to that effect. It was not advisable at that time, even had it been practicable, to withdraw the 5th corps to the right bank of the Chickahominy. Such a movement would have exposed the rear of the army, placed as between two fires, and enabled Jackson's fresh troops to interrupt the movement to James river by crossing the Chickahominy in the vicinity of Jones's bridge before we could reach Malvern Hill with our trains. I determined then to resist Jackson with the 5th corps, reinforced by all our disposable troops in the new position near the bridge-heads, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains and heavy guns, and to give time for the arrangements to secure the adoption of the James river as our line of supplies in lieu of the Pamunkey. The greater part of the heavy guns and wagons having been removed to the right bank of the Chickahom
Kauerhem (search for this): chapter 25
ht wing had now joined the main body of the army. The number of guns captured by the enemy at this battle was twenty-two, three of which were lost by being run off the bridge during the final withdrawal. Great credit is due for the efficiency and bravery with which this important arm of the service (the artillery) was fought, and it was not until the last successful charge of the enemy that the cannoneers were driven from their pieces or struck down and the guns captured. Dietrich's, Kauerhem's, and Grimm's batteries took position during the engagement in the front of Gen. Smith's line on the right bank of the stream, and, with a battery of siege-guns served by the 1st Conn, Artillery, helped to drive back the enemy in front of Gen. Porter. So threatening were the movements of the enemy on both banks of the Chickahominy that it was impossible to decide until the afternoon where the real attack would be made. Large forces of infantry were seen during the day near the Old Tave
Kearny (search for this): chapter 25
itions for twenty-four hours. Gen. Heintzelman replied: I think I can hold the entrenchments with four brigades for twenty-four hours. That would leave two brigades disposable for service on the other side of the river, but the men are so tired and worn out that I fear they would not be in a condition to fight after making a march of any distance. . . . Telegrams from Gen. Heintzelman on the 25th and 26th had indicated that the enemy was in large force in front of Gens. Hooker and Kearny, and on the Charles City road (Longstreet, Hill, and Huger), and Gen. Heintzelman expressed the opinion on the night of the 25th that he could not hold his advanced position without reinforcements. Gen. Keyes telegraphed: As to how many men will be able to hold this position for twenty-four hours, I must answer, All I have, if the enemy is as strong as ever in front, it having at all times appeared to me that our forces on this flank are small enough. On the morning of the 27th t
E. D. Keyes (search for this): chapter 25
expressed the opinion on the night of the 25th that he could not hold his advanced position without reinforcements. Gen. Keyes telegraphed: As to how many men will be able to hold this position for twenty-four hours, I must answer, All I havr will soon have a cross-fire upon them that will silence them. Afterwards (at 5.50 P. M.) the following was sent to Gen. Keyes: Please send one brigade of Couch's division to these headquarters without a moment's delay. A staff officer will be hders at my headquarters, and informed them of the plan, its reasons, and my choice of route and method of execution. Gen. Keyes was directed to move his corps, with its artillery and baggage, across the White Oak Swamp bridge, and to seize strong night the corps of Sumner and Heintzelman and the division of Smith were ordered to an interior line, the left resting on Keyes's old entrenchments and curving to the right so as to cover Savage's Station. General Slocum's division, of Franklin's
King (search for this): chapter 25
othing will be spared to sustain you, and I have undoubting faith in your success. Keep me advised fully of your condition. 11.20 P. M. Your telegram of 6.15 has just been received. The circumstances that have hitherto rendered it impossible for the government to send you any more reinforcements than has been done, have been so distinctly stated to you by the President that it is needless for me to repeat them. Every effort has been made by the President and myself to strengthen you. King's division has reached Falmouth; Shields's division and Ricketts's division are at Manassas. The President designs to send a part of that force to aid you as speedily as it can be done. The following was sent at 2.30 P. M.: Your despatch and that of the President received. Jackson is driving in my pickets, etc., on the other side of the Chickahominy. It is impossible to tell where reinforcements ought to go, as I am yet unable to predict result of approaching battle. It will proba
J. Longstreet (search for this): chapter 25
intzelman replied: I think I can hold the entrenchments with four brigades for twenty-four hours. That would leave two brigades disposable for service on the other side of the river, but the men are so tired and worn out that I fear they would not be in a condition to fight after making a march of any distance. . . . Telegrams from Gen. Heintzelman on the 25th and 26th had indicated that the enemy was in large force in front of Gens. Hooker and Kearny, and on the Charles City road (Longstreet, Hill, and Huger), and Gen. Heintzelman expressed the opinion on the night of the 25th that he could not hold his advanced position without reinforcements. Gen. Keyes telegraphed: As to how many men will be able to hold this position for twenty-four hours, I must answer, All I have, if the enemy is as strong as ever in front, it having at all times appeared to me that our forces on this flank are small enough. On the morning of the 27th the following despatch was sent to Gen. S
Martindale (search for this): chapter 25
that point, and at 12.30 P. M. they were attacked and driven in. All the pickets were now called in, and the regiment and battery at Mechanicsville withdrawn. Meade's brigade was ordered up as a reserve in rear of the line, and shortly after Martindale's and Griffin's brigades, of Morell's division, were moved forward and deployed on the right of McCall's division, towards Shady Grove church, to cover that flank. Neither of these three brigades, however, were warmly engaged, though two of Gr left flank on the descent to the Chickahominy, which was swept by our artillery on both sides of the river, and extending into open ground on the right towards New Cold Harbor. In this line Gen. Butterfield's brigade held the extreme left; Gen. Martindale's joined his right, and Gen. Griffin, still further to the right, joined the left of Gen. Sykes's division, which, partly in woods and partly in open ground, extended in rear of Cold Harbor. Each brigade had in reserve two of its own regi
George A. McCall (search for this): chapter 25
up as a reserve in rear of the line, and shortly after Martindale's and Griffin's brigades, of Morell's division, were moved forward and deployed on the right of McCall's division, towards Shady Grove church, to cover that flank. Neither of these three brigades, however, were warmly engaged, though two of Griffin's regiments relGen. Sykes's division, which, partly in woods and partly in open ground, extended in rear of Cold Harbor. Each brigade had in reserve two of its own regiments; McCall's division, having been engaged on the day before, was formed in a second line in rear of the first; Meade's brigade on the left, near the Chickahominy; Reynolds'as moved across White Oak Swamp during the day and night, and took up positions covering the roads leading from Richmond towards White Oak Swamp and Long bridge. McCall's division was ordered, on the night of the 28th, to move across the swamp and take a proper position to assist in covering the remaining troops and trains. Du
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