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Edwin V. Sumner (search for this): chapter 25
aches from Cold Harbor and Despatch Station to Sumner's bridge, and Seymour's in reserve to the secothe 27th the following despatch was sent to Gen. Sumner: Gen. Smith just reports that six or eight t of Gen. Sumner. At eleven o'clock A. M. Gen. Sumner telegraphed: The enemy threatens an attack Three regiments are reported to be moving from Sumner's to Smith's front. The arrangements are veryOur shells are bursting well, and Smith thinks Sumner will soon have a cross-fire upon them that wil. Subsequently the following was sent to Gens. Sumner and Franklin: Is there any sign of the enemke any more troops from here at present. Gen. Sumner replied: If the general desires to trust tho brigades? I have ordered eight regiments of Sumner's to support Porter; one brigade of Couch's to. It should follow the regiments ordered from Sumner. At 7.35 P. M. the following was sent to GGen. Sumner: If it is possible, send another brigade to reinforce Gen. Smith; it is said three heavy[4 more...]
E. D. Keyes (search for this): chapter 25
expressed the opinion on the night of the 25th that he could not hold his advanced position without reinforcements. Gen. Keyes telegraphed: As to how many men will be able to hold this position for twenty-four hours, I must answer, All I havr will soon have a cross-fire upon them that will silence them. Afterwards (at 5.50 P. M.) the following was sent to Gen. Keyes: Please send one brigade of Couch's division to these headquarters without a moment's delay. A staff officer will be hders at my headquarters, and informed them of the plan, its reasons, and my choice of route and method of execution. Gen. Keyes was directed to move his corps, with its artillery and baggage, across the White Oak Swamp bridge, and to seize strong night the corps of Sumner and Heintzelman and the division of Smith were ordered to an interior line, the left resting on Keyes's old entrenchments and curving to the right so as to cover Savage's Station. General Slocum's division, of Franklin's
De Paris (search for this): chapter 25
hat you must exercise your own judgment. All these commands were obeyed. On the 26th orders were sent to all the corps commanders on the right bank of the Chickahominy to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare on the following day to the left bank of the river. Gen. Franklin received instructions to hold Gen. Slocum's division in readiness, by daybreak of the 27th, and, if heavy firing Gen. Morell. Col. Colburn. Gen. McClellan. Col. Sweitzer. Prince de Joinville. Comte de Paris. Gen. McClellan at Gen. Morell's headquarters, Minor's Hill, Va. should at that time be heard in the direction of Gen. Porter, to move at once to his assistance without further orders. At noon on the 26th the approach of the enemy, who had crossed above Meadow bridge, was discovered by the advanced pickets at that point, and at 12.30 P. M. they were attacked and driven in. All the pickets were now called in, and the regiment and battery at Mechanicsville withdrawn. Meade's brigad
Gaines (search for this): chapter 25
d become so severe, and the enemy were so greatly superior in numbers, that the entire second line and reserves had been moved forward to sustain the first line against repeated and desperate assaults along the whole front. At 3.30 Slocum's division reached the field, and was immediately brought into action at the weak points of our line. On the left the contest was for the strip of woods running almost at right angles to the Chickahominy, in front of Adams's house, or between that and Gaines's house. The enemy several times charged up to this wood, but were each time driven back with heavy loss. The regulars of Sykes's division, on the right, also repulsed several strong attacks. But our own loss under the tremendous fire of such greatly superior numbers was very severe, and the troops, most of whom had been under arms more than two days, were rapidly becoming exhausted by the masses of fresh men constantly brought against them. When Gen. Slocum's division arrived on the
Kauerhem (search for this): chapter 25
ht wing had now joined the main body of the army. The number of guns captured by the enemy at this battle was twenty-two, three of which were lost by being run off the bridge during the final withdrawal. Great credit is due for the efficiency and bravery with which this important arm of the service (the artillery) was fought, and it was not until the last successful charge of the enemy that the cannoneers were driven from their pieces or struck down and the guns captured. Dietrich's, Kauerhem's, and Grimm's batteries took position during the engagement in the front of Gen. Smith's line on the right bank of the stream, and, with a battery of siege-guns served by the 1st Conn, Artillery, helped to drive back the enemy in front of Gen. Porter. So threatening were the movements of the enemy on both banks of the Chickahominy that it was impossible to decide until the afternoon where the real attack would be made. Large forces of infantry were seen during the day near the Old Tave
Roger Jones (search for this): chapter 25
re its flanks would be reasonably secure and it would be within supporting distance of the main army. Gen. Porter carried out my orders to that effect. It was not advisable at that time, even had it been practicable, to withdraw the 5th corps to the right bank of the Chickahominy. Such a movement would have exposed the rear of the army, placed as between two fires, and enabled Jackson's fresh troops to interrupt the movement to James river by crossing the Chickahominy in the vicinity of Jones's bridge before we could reach Malvern Hill with our trains. I determined then to resist Jackson with the 5th corps, reinforced by all our disposable troops in the new position near the bridge-heads, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains and heavy guns, and to give time for the arrangements to secure the adoption of the James river as our line of supplies in lieu of the Pamunkey. The greater part of the heavy guns and wagons having been removed to the right bank of the Chickahom
Rufus Ingalls (search for this): chapter 25
ries of battles now inevitable, whether retreating from victories or marching through defeats; and, in short, I had no doubt whatever of its ability, even against superior numbers, to fight its way through to the James, and get a position whence a successful advance upon Richmond would be again possible. Their superb conduct through the next seven days justified my faith. On the same day (26th) Gen. Van Vliet, chief-quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, by my orders telegraphed to Col. Ingalls, quartermaster at the White House, as follows: Run the cars to the last moment, and load them with provisions and ammunition. Load every wagon you have with subsistence, and send them to Savage's Station by way of Bottom's bridge. If you are obliged to abandon White House burn everything that you cannot get off. You must throw all our supplies up the James river as soon as possible, and accompany them yourself with all your force. It will be of vast importance to establish our depo
Tidball (search for this): chapter 25
ps from Beaver Dam creek was commenced shortly before daylight and successfully executed. Meade's and Griffin's brigades were the first to leave the ground. Seymour's brigade covered the rear, with the horse-batteries of Capts. Robertson and Tidball; but the withdrawal was so skilful and gradual, and the repulse of the preceding day so complete, that, although the enemy followed the retreat closely and some skirmishing occurred, he did not appear in front of the new line in force till aboutnk and defending the slope to the river. The troops were all in position by noon, with the artillery on the commanding ground, and in the intervals between the divisions and brigades. Besides the division batteries there were Robertson's and Tidball's horse-batteries from the artillery reserve; the latter posted on the right of Sykes's division, and the former on the extreme left of the line, in the valley of the Chickahominy. Shortly after noon the enemy was discovered approaching in fo
Dietrich (search for this): chapter 25
and the right wing had now joined the main body of the army. The number of guns captured by the enemy at this battle was twenty-two, three of which were lost by being run off the bridge during the final withdrawal. Great credit is due for the efficiency and bravery with which this important arm of the service (the artillery) was fought, and it was not until the last successful charge of the enemy that the cannoneers were driven from their pieces or struck down and the guns captured. Dietrich's, Kauerhem's, and Grimm's batteries took position during the engagement in the front of Gen. Smith's line on the right bank of the stream, and, with a battery of siege-guns served by the 1st Conn, Artillery, helped to drive back the enemy in front of Gen. Porter. So threatening were the movements of the enemy on both banks of the Chickahominy that it was impossible to decide until the afternoon where the real attack would be made. Large forces of infantry were seen during the day near
Kearny (search for this): chapter 25
itions for twenty-four hours. Gen. Heintzelman replied: I think I can hold the entrenchments with four brigades for twenty-four hours. That would leave two brigades disposable for service on the other side of the river, but the men are so tired and worn out that I fear they would not be in a condition to fight after making a march of any distance. . . . Telegrams from Gen. Heintzelman on the 25th and 26th had indicated that the enemy was in large force in front of Gens. Hooker and Kearny, and on the Charles City road (Longstreet, Hill, and Huger), and Gen. Heintzelman expressed the opinion on the night of the 25th that he could not hold his advanced position without reinforcements. Gen. Keyes telegraphed: As to how many men will be able to hold this position for twenty-four hours, I must answer, All I have, if the enemy is as strong as ever in front, it having at all times appeared to me that our forces on this flank are small enough. On the morning of the 27th t
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