Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
H. Rackham, Ed.

But the following considerations will show that these arguments are not conclusive to prove （1） that pleasure is not a good at all, nor （3） that it is not the Supreme Good.

（1） （a） In the first place （i.） ‘the good’ has two meanings: it means both that which is good absolutely, and that which is good for somebody, or relatively. Consequently the term ‘good’ has the same double meaning when applied to men's natures and dispositions; and therefore also when applied to movements and to processes. Also those processes which are thought to be bad will in some cases, though bad absolutely, be not bad relatively, but in fact desirable for a particular person, or in other cases, though not even desirable generally for the particular person, nevertheless desirable for him in particular circumstances and for a short time, although not really desirable. And some such processes¹ are not really pleasures at all, but only seem to be so: I mean the painful processes that are undergone for their curative effects, for instance, treatment applied to the sick.