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by Daniel H. Hill, Lieutenant-General, C. S. A.
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Woodbury's Bridge across the Chickahominy [see next page]. from a War-time photograph. |
Five of the six Confederate divisions north of the
Chickahominy at the close of the
battle of Gaines's Mill remained in bivouac all the next day (June 28th), it being deemed too hazardous to force the passage of the river.
Ewell was sent with his division to Dispatch Station on the York River Railroad.
He found the station and the railroad-bridge burnt.
J. E. B. Stuart, who followed the retreating Federal cavalry to
White House on the
Pamunkey, found ruins of stations and stores all along the line.
These things proved that
General McClellan did not intend to retreat by the short line of the York River Railroad; but it was possible he might take the
Williamsburg road.
General Lee, therefore, kept his troops on the north side of the river, that he might be ready to move on the
Federal flank, should that route be attempted.
New Bridge was repaired on Saturday (the 28th), and our troops were then ready to move in either direction.
The burnings and explosions in the
Federal camp Saturday afternoon and night showed that
General McClellan had determined to abandon his strong fortifications around
Richmond.
Ewell, who was watching him at Bottom's Bridge, and the cavalry, holding the crossings lower down, both reported that there was no attempt at the
Williamsburg route.
Longstreet and
A. P. Hill were sent across the river at
New Bridge early on Sunday morning to move down the
Darbytown road to the
Long Bridge road to intercept the retreat to the
James River.
This movement began before it was known that General
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Region of the Seven days fighting. |
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A Sample of the Chickahominy Swamp.
From a photograph of 1862. |
McClellan had evacuated his stronghold.
Lee gave here the first illustration of a quality for which he became noted — the remarkable discernment of his adversary's plans through the study of his character.
McClellan could have retreated to
Yorktown with as little loss as
Johnston sustained on his retreat from it. The roads from
Richmond to
Yorktown lead through a wooded and swampy country, on which strong rear-guards could have afforded perfect protection to a retreating column without bringing on a general engagement.
General Johnston, on his retreat from
Yorktown, did fight; at
Williamsburg, but it was a battle of his own choosing, and not forced upon him by the vigor of pursuit.
Lee had but little idea that
McClellan would return to
Yorktown, judging rightly that the military pride of his distinguished opponent would not permit him to march back a defeated column to the point
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from which he had started, a few months before, for the capture of the
Confederate capital, with his splendid army and magnificent outfit.
1 It is a proof of
Lee's sagacity that he predicated his orders for an advance upon the belief that
General McClellan was too proud a man to fall back by the same route by which the triumphal advance had been made.
A great commander must study the mental and moral characteristics of the opposing leader, and
Lee was specially endowed with an aptitude in that direction.
At the battle of Salzbach, Montecuculi, the Austrian commander, noticed the
French troops making a movement so different from the cautious style of his famous rival that he exclaimed, “Either
Turenne is dead or mortally wounded.”
So it proved to be; the
French marshal had been killed by a cannon-ball before the movement began.
In pursuance of
General Lee's plan,
Huger was directed (on the 29th) to take the
Charles City road to strike the retreating column below
White Oak Swamp.
Holmes was to take possession of
Malvern Hill, and
Magruder to follow the line of retreat, as soon as the works were abandoned.
The abandonment became known about sunrise on Sunday morning, but Grapevine Bridge was not completed till sunset.
Jackson then crossed his corps at that point, my division leading.
We bivouacked that night near Savage's Station, where
McLaws's division had had a severe fight a few hours before.
Just at dawn on Monday, the 30th, we were in motion, when I discovered what appeared to be a line of battle drawn up at the station, but which proved to be a line of sick and of hospital attendants, 2500 in number.
About half a mile from the station we saw what seemed to be an entire regiment of Federals cold in death, and learned that a Vermont regiment [the 5th] had been in the desperate charge upon the division of
McLaws, and had suffered great loss [killed, 31; wounded, 143]. From the time of crossing the river, we had evidence everywhere of the precipitate nature of the
Federal retreat.
2 Dabney, in his life of
Jackson, says:
The whole country was full of deserted plunder, army wagons, and pontoon-trains partially burned or crippled; mounds of grain and rice and hillocks of mess beef smoldering; tens of thousands of axes, picks, and shovels; camp kettles gashed with hatchets; medicine chests with their drugs stirred into a foul medley, and all the apparatus of a vast and lavish host; while the mire under foot was mixed with blankets lately new, and with overcoats torn from the waist up. For weeks afterward agents of our army were busy in gathering in the spoils.
Great stores of fixed ammunition were saved, while more were destroyed.
In our march from Savage's Station my division picked up a thousand prisoners, stragglers from the retreating army, and gathered a large number of abandoned rifles.
I detached two regiments (the Fourth and Fifth North
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Union field-hospital at Savage's Station, after the battle of Gaines's Mill.
From a photograph taken before the Army withdrew, early on the morning of June 30th. |
Carolina) to take the prisoners and arms to
Richmond.
We reached
White Oak Swamp about noon, and there found another hospital camp, with about five hundred sick in it. Truly, the
Chickahominy swamps were fatal to the
Federal forces.
A high bluff was on our side of the little stream called
White Oak, and a large uncultivated field on the other side.
In this field could be seen a battery of artillery, supported by a brigade of infantry — artillerists and infantry lying down and apparently asleep.
Under cover of
Thomas T. Munford's 2d Virginia cavalry, thirty-one field-pieces were placed upon the bluff, and were ordered to open fire as soon as the cavalry mask was removed.
The battery fired its loaded guns in reply, and then galloped off, followed by its infantry supports and the long lines of infantry farther back in the field.
Munford crossed his regiment over the ford, and
Jackson and myself went with him to see what had become of the enemy.
We soon found out. The battery had taken up a position behind a point of woods, where it was perfectly sheltered from our guns, but could play upon the broken bridge and ford, and upon every part of the uncultivated field.
It opened with grape
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and canister upon us, and we retired rapidly.
Fast riding in the wrong direction is not military, but it is sometimes healthy.
We had taken one prisoner, a drunken Irishman, but he declined the honor of going back with us, and made fight with his naked fists.
A soldier asked me naively whether he should shoot the Irishman or let him go. I am glad that I told him to let the man go, to be a comfort to his family.
That Irishman must have had a charmed life.
He was under the shelter of his gum-cloth coat hung on a stick, near the ford, when a citizen fired at him four times, from a distance of about fifty paces; and the only recognition that I could see the man make was to raise his hand as if to brush off a fly.
3 One of the shells set the farn-house on fire.
We learned from the owner that
Franklin's corps was in front of us.
Our cavalry returned by the lower ford, and pronounced it perfectly practicable for infantry.
But
Jackson did not advance.
Why was this?
It was the critical day for both commanders, but especially for
McClellan.
With consummate skill he had crossed his vast train of five thousand wagons and his immense parks of artillery safely over
White Oak Swamp, but he was more exposed now than at any time in his flank march.
Three columns of attack were converging upon him, and a strong corps was pressing upon his rear.
Escape seemed impossible for him, but he
did escape, at the same time inflicting heavy damage upon his pursuers.
General Lee, through no fault in his plans, was to see his splendid prize slip through his hands.
Longstreet and
A. P. Hill struck the enemy at
Frayser's farm (or
Glendale) at 3 P. M. on the 30th, and, both being always ready for a fight, immediately attacked.
Magruder, who followed them down the
Darbytown road, was ordered to the assistance of
General Holmes on the
New Market road, who was not then engaged, and their two divisions took no part in the action.
Huger, on the
Charles City road, came upon
Franklin's left flank, but made no attack.
I sent my engineer officer,
Captain W. F. Lee, to him through the swamp, to ask him whether he could not engage
Franklin.
He replied that the road was obstructed by fallen timber.
So there were five divisions within sound of the firing, and within supporting distance, but not one of them moved.
Longstreet and
A. P. Hill made a desperate fight, contending against
Sumner's corps, and the divisions of
McCall,
Kearny, and
Hooker; but they failed to gain possession of the
Quaker road, upon which
McClellan was retreating.
That night
Franklin glided silently by them.
He had to pass within easy range of the artillery of
Longstreet and
Hill, but they did not know he was there.
It had been a gallant fight on their part.
General Lee reported: “Many prisoners, including a general of division,
McCall , were captured, and several batteries, with some thousands of small-arms, were taken.”
But as an obstruction to the
Federal retreat, the fight amounted to nothing.
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The artillery engagement at White Oak Bridge.
From a sketch made at the time.
The view is from Franklin's position south of the bridge, Jackson's and D. H. Hill's troops being seen in the distance. |
Major Dabney, in his life of
Jackson, thus comments on the inaction of that officer: “On this occasion it would appear, if the vast interests dependent upon
General Jackson's cooperation with the proposed attack upon the center were considered, that he came short of the efficiency in action for which he was everywhere else noted.”
After showing how the crossing of
White Oak might have been effected,
Dabney adds: “The list of casualties would have been larger than that presented on the 30th, of one cannoneer wounded; but how much shorter would have been the bloody list filled up the next day at
Malvern Hill?
This temporary eclipse of
Jackson's genius was probably to be explained by physical causes.
The labor of the previous days, the sleeplessness, the wear of gigantic cares, with the drenching of the comfortless night, had sunk the elasticity of his will and the quickness of his invention for the nonce below their wonted tension.
And which of the sons of man is so great as never to experience this?”
I think that an important factor in this inaction was
Jackson's pity for his own corps, worn out by long and exhausting marches, and reduced in numbers by its numerous sanguinary battles.
He thought that the garrison of
Richmond ought now to bear the brunt of the fighting.
None of us knew that the veterans of
Longstreet and
A. P. Hill were unsupported; nor did we even know that the firing that we heard was theirs.
Had all our troops been at
Frayser's farm, there would have been no
Malvern Hill.
Jackson's genius never shone when he was under the command of another.
It seemed then to be shrouded or paralyzed.
Compare his inertness on this occasion with the wonderful vigor shown a few weeks later at
Slaughter's [Cedar] Mountain in the stealthy march to
Pope's rear, and later still in the
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capture of
Harper's Ferry.
MacGregor on his native heath was not more different from
MacGregor in prison than was
Jackson his own master from
Jackson in a subordinate position.
He wrote once to
Richmond requesting that he might have “fewer orders and more men.”
That was the keynote to his whole character.
The hooded falcon cannot strike the quarry.
The gentleman who tried his “splendid rifle” on the drunken
Irishman was
the Rev. L. W. Allen.
Mr. Allen had been raised in that neighborhood, and knew
Malvern Hill well.
He spoke of its commanding height, the difficulties of approach to it, its amphitheatrical form and ample area, which would enable
McClellan to arrange his 350 field-guns tier above tier and sweep the plain in every direction.
I became satisfied that an attack upon the concentrated Federal army so splendidly posted, and with such vast superiority in artillery, could only be fatal to us. The anxious thought then was, Have
Holmes and
Magruder been able to keep
McClellan from
Malvern Hill?
General Holmes arrived at
Malvern at 10:30 A. M. on the 30th, with 5170 infantry, 4 batteries of artillery, and 130 improvised or irregular cavalry.
He did not attempt to occupy the hill, although only 1500 Federals had yet reached it. Our cavalry had passed over it on the afternoon of the 29th, and had had a sharp skirmish with the
Federal cavalry on the
Quaker road.
As
General Holmes marched down the river, his troops became visible to the gun-boats, which opened fire upon them, throwing those awe-inspiring shells familiarly called by our men “lamp-posts,” on account of their size and appearance.
Their explosion was very much like that of a small volcano, and had a very demoralizing effect upon new troops, one of whom expressed the general sentiment by saying: “The
Yankees throwed them lamp-posts about too careless like.”
The roaring, howling gun-boat shells were usually harmless to flesh, blood, and bones, but they had a wonderful effect upon the nervous system.
General Junius Daniel, a most gallant and accomplished officer, who had a brigade under
General Holmes, gave me an incident connected with the affair on the 30th, known as the “
Battle of Malvern Cliff.”
General Holmes, who was very deaf, had gone into a little house concealed from the boats by some intervening woods, and was engaged in some business when the bellowing of the “lamp-posts” began.
The irregular cavalry stampeded and made a brilliant charge to the rear.
The artillerists of two guns of Graham's Petersburg battery were also panic-struck, and cutting their horses loose mounted them, and, with dangling traces, tried to catch up with the fleet-footed cavaliers.
The infantry troops were inexperienced in the wicked ways of war, having never been under fire before.
The fright of the fleeing cavalry would have pervaded their ranks also with the same mischievous result but for the strenuous efforts of their officers, part of whom were veterans.
Some of the raw levies crouched behind little saplings to get protection from the shrieking, blustering shells.
At this juncture
General Holmes, who from his deafness, was totally unaware of the rumpus, came out of the hut, put his hand behind his right ear, and said: “I thought I heard firing.”
Some of the pale-faced infantry thought that they also had heard firing.
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Part of
Wise's brigade joined
Holmes on the 30th, with two batteries of artillery and two regiments of cavalry.
His entire force then consisted of 5820 infantry, 6 batteries of artillery, and 2 regiments of cavalry.
He remained inactive until 4 P. M., when he was told that the
Federal army was passing over
Malvern Hill in a demoralized condition.
He then opened upon the supposed fugitives with six rifled guns, and was speedily undeceived in regard to the disorganization in the Army of the Potomac by a reply from thirty guns, which in a brief time silenced his own. The audacity of the
Federals and the large number of their guns (which had gone in advance of the main body of
Porter's corps) made
General Holmes believe that he was about to be attacked, and he called for assistance, and, by
Longstreet's order,
Magruder was sent to him. After a weary march,
Magruder was recalled to aid
Longstreet; but the day was spent in fruitless marching and countermarching, so that his fine body of troops took no part in what might have been a decisive battle at
Frayser's farm.
General Holmes was a veteran soldier of well-known personal courage, but he was deceived as to the strength and intentions of the enemy.
General Porter says that the force opposed to
General Holmes consisted of
Warren's brigade and the Eleventh U. S. Infantry; in all, 1500 infantry and 30 pieces of artillery.
Here was afforded an example of the proneness to overestimate the number of troops opposed to us. The Federals reported
Holmes to have 25,000 men, and he thought himself confronted by a large part of
McClellan's army.
That night he fell back to a stronger position,
4 thinking apparently that there would be an “on to
Richmond” movement by the
River road.
He lost 2 killed, 49 wounded, 2 pieces of artillery, and 6 caissons.
The guns and caissons,
General Porter states, were afterward abandoned by the
Federals.
General Holmes occupied the extreme Confederate right the next day, July 1st, but he took no part in the attack upon
Malvern Hill, believing, as he says in his official report, “that it was out of the question to attack the strong position of
Malvern Hill from that side with my inadequate force.”
Mahone's brigade had some skirmishing with
Slocum's Federal division on the 30th, but nothing else was done on that day by
Huger's division.
Thus it happened that
Longstreet and
A. P. Hill, with the fragments of their divisions which had been engaged at
Gaines's Mill, were struggling alone, while
Jackson's whole corps and the divisions of
Huger,
Magruder,
Holmes,
McLaws, and my own were near by.
Jackson moved over the swamp early on the first of July,
Whiting's division leading.
Our march was much delayed by the crossing of troops and trains.
At Willis's Church I met
General Lee.
He bore grandly his terrible disappointment of the day before, and made no allusion to it. I gave him
Mr. Allen's description of
Malvern Hill, and presumed to say, “If
General McClellan is there in force, we had better let him alone.”
Longstreet laughed and said, “Don't get seared, now that we have got him whipped.”
It was this belief in the demoralization of the
Federal army that made our leader risk the attack.
It was near noon when
Jackson reached the immediate neighborhood
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of
Malvern Hill.
Some time was spent in reconnoitering, and in making tentative efforts with our few batteries to ascertain the strength and position of the enemy.
I saw
Jackson helping with his own hands to push
Reilly's North Carolina battery farther forward.
It was soon disabled, the woods around us being filled with shrieking and exploding shells.
I noticed an artilleryman seated comfortably behind a very large tree, and apparently feeling very secure.
A moment later a shell passed through the huge tree and took off the man's head.
This gives an idea of the great power of the
Federal rifled artillery.
Whiting's division was ordered to the left of the
Quaker road, and mine to the right;
Ewell's was in reserve.
Jackson's own division had been halted at Willis's Church.
The divisions of
Magruder,
Huger, and
McLaws were still farther over to my right.
Those of
Longstreet and
A. P. Hill were in reserve on the right and were not engaged.
At length we were ordered to advance.
The brigade of
General George B. Anderson first encountered the enemy, and its commander was wounded and borne from the field.
His troops, however, crossed the creek and took position in the woods, commanded by
Colonel C. C. Tew, a skillful and gallant
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Sketch map of the vicinity of Malvern Hill (July 1, 1862).
The Union troops reached the field by the so-called Quaker road (more properly the Church road); the Confederates chiefly by this and the Long Bridge road.
The general lines were approximately as indicated above.
The Confederates on the River road are the troops of General Holmes, who had been repulsed at Turkey Island Bridge the day before by Warren's brigade, with the aid of the gun-boats.
The main fighting was in the space between the words “Confederate” and “Union,” together with one or two assaults upon the west side of the Crew Hill from the meadow.
Morell's and Couch's divisions formed the first Union line, and General Porter's batteries extended from the Crew house to the West house. |
man.
Rodes being sick, his brigade was commanded by that peerless soldier,
Colonel J. B. Gordon.
Ripley,
Garland, and
Colquitt also got over without serious loss.
My five brigade commanders and myself now made an examination of the enemy's position.
He was found to be strongly posted on a commanding hill, all the approaches to which could be swept by his artillery and were guarded by swarms of infantry, securely sheltered by fences, ditches, and ravines.
Armistead was immediately on my right.
We remained a long while awaiting orders, when I received the following:
July 1st, 1862.
General D. H. Hill: Batteries have been established to act upon the enemy's line.
If it is broken, as is probable,
Armistead, who can witness the effect of the fire, has been ordered to charge with a yell.
Do the same.
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A similar order was sent to each division commander.
However, only one battery of our artillery came up at a time, and each successive one, as it took position, had fifty pieces turned upon it, and was crushed in a minute.
Not knowing what to do under the circumstances, I wrote to
General Jackson that the condition upon which the order was predicated was not fulfilled, and that I wanted instructions.
He replied to advance when I heard the shouting.
We did advance at the signal, and after an unassisted struggle for an hour and a half, and after meeting with some success, we were compelled to fall back under cover of the woods.
Magruder advanced at the same signal, having portions of the divisions of
Huger and
McLaws, comprising the brigades of
Mahone,
Wright,
Barksdale,
Ransom,
Cobb,
Semmes,
Kershaw,
Armistead, and
G. T. Anderson; but he met with some delay, and did not get in motion till he received a second order from
General Lee, and we were then beaten.
The
Comte de Paris, who was on
McClellan's staff, gives this account of the charge of my gallant division:
“
Hill advanced alone against the Federal positions. . . . He had therefore before him Morell's right, Couch's division, reenforced by Caldwells brigade, . . and finally the left of Kearny.
The woods skirting the foot of Malvern Hill had hitherto protected the Confederates,  |
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Willis's Church, on the Quaker road, near Glendale.
Used as a Confederate hospital after the battle of Malvern Hill. |
but as soon as they passed beyond the edge of the forest, they were received by a fire from all the batteries at once, some posted on the hill, others ranged midway, close to the Federal infantry.
The latter joined its musketry fire to the cannonade when Hill's first line had come within range, and threw it back in disorder on the reserves.
While it was reforming, new [Confederate] battalions marched up to the assault in their turn.
The remembrance of Cold Harbor doubles the energy of Hill's soldiers.
They try to pierce the line, sometimes at one point, sometimes at another, charging Kearny's left first, and Couch's right, . . . and afterward throwing themselves upon the left of Couch's division, But, here also, after nearly reaching the Federal positions, they are repulsed.
The conflict is carried on with great fierceness on both sides, and, for a moment, it seems as if the Confederates are at last about to penetrate the very center of their adversaries and of the formidable artillery, which but now was dealing destruction in their ranks.
But Sumner, who commands on the right, detaches Sickles's and Meagher's brigades successively to Couch's assistance.
During this time, Whiting on the left, and Huger on the right, suffer Hill's soldiers to become exhausted without supporting them.
Neither Lee nor Jackson has sent the slightest order, and the din of the battle which is going on in their immediate vicinity has not sufficed to make them march against the enemy. ... At seven o'clock Hill reorganized the debris of his troops in the woods; . . . his tenacity and the courage of his soldiers have only had the effect of causing him to sustain heavy losses.” (Pp. 141, 142, Vol.
II.)
Truly, the courage of the soldiers was sublime!
Battery after battery was in their hands for a few moments, only to be wrested away by fresh troops of
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the enemy.
If one division could effect this much, what might have been done had the other nine cooperated with it!
General Lee says:
D. H. Hill pressed forward across the open field and engaged the enemy gallantly, breaking and driving back his first line; but a simultaneous advance of the other troops not taking place, he found himself unable to maintain the ground he had gained against the overwhelming numbers and the numerous batteries of the enemy.
Jackson sent to his support his own division, and that part of Ewell's which was in reserve; but owing to the increasing darkness, and the intricacy of the forest and swamp, they did not arrive in time to render the desired assistance.
Hill was therefore compelled to abandon part of the ground that he had gained, after suffering severe loss and inflicting heavy damage upon the enemy.
I never saw anything more grandly heroic than the advance after sunset of the nine brigades under
Magruder's orders.
5 Unfortunately, they did not move together, and were beaten in detail.
As each brigade emerged from the woods, from fifty to one hundred guns opened upon it, tearing great gaps in its ranks; but the heroes reeled on and were shot down by the reserves at the guns, which a few squads reached.
Most of them had an open field half a mile wide to cross, under the fire of field-artillery in front, and the fire of the heavy ordnance of the gun-boats in their rear.
It was not war — it was murder.
Our loss was double that of the
Federals at
Malvern Hill.
Not only did the fourteen brigades which were engaged suffer, but also the inactive troops and those brought up as reserves too late to be of any use met many casualties from the fearful artillery fire which reached all parts of the woods.
Hence, more than half the casualties were from field-pieces — an unprecedented thing in warfare.
The artillery practice was kept up till nine o'clock at night, and the darkness added to the glory of the pyrotechnics.
It was quite late when I had posted for the night the last of the reenforcements that had come up when the battle was over.
A half-hour before, an incident occurred which is thus related by
General Trimble:
I proposed to General D. H. Hill to ride forward and reconnoiter the enemy's position.
We approached within one hundred steps of the enemy's batteries, and could hear plainly the ordinary tone of conversation.
The guns were then firing on the woods to our left, where the last attack had been made, at right angles to that part of the field we were then in. I suggested to General Hill the advantage of making an attack on this battery, and that it must be successful, as the enemy would not expect one from our position, and under cover of the darkness we could approach them undiscovered.
General Hill did not seem inclined to make the movement.
The chivalrous
Trimble proposed to make the attack with his own brigade, but there were many troops now in the woods, and I thought that the attack would but expose them to a more intense artillery fire.
We saw men going about with lanterns, looking up and carrying off the dead and wounded.
There were no pickets out, and the rumbling of wheels in the distance seemed to indicate that the retreat had begun.
The morning revealed the bare plateau stripped of its terrible batteries.
The
battle of Malvern Hill was a disaster to the
Confederates, and the fourteen brigades that had been so badly repulsed were much demoralized.
But there were six divisons intact, and they could have made a formidable fight on the 2d.
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Possibly owing to the belief that
Longstreet and
A. P. Hill were making a march between
Malvern and
Harrison's Landing, the retreat was the most disorderly that took place.
Wagons and ambulances were abandoned; knapsacks, cartridge-boxes, clothing, and rifles by the thousand were thrown away by the
Federals.
Colonel James D. Nance, of the 3d South Carolina regiment, gathered 925 rifles in fine condition that had been thrown away in the wheat-field at
Shirley, a farm between
Malvern and
Haxall's. The fruits of the Seven Days Fighting were the relief of
Richmond, the capture of 9000 prisoners [including 3000 in hospitals], 52 pieces of artillery, and 35,000 stand of arms, and the destruction or capture of many military stores.
I crossed the
Chickahominy with 10,000 effective men. Of these 3907 were killed or wounded and 48 were reported missing, either captives or fugitives from the field.
With the infantry and artillery detached, and the losses before
Malvern Hill, I estimate that my division in that battle was 6500 strong, and that the loss was 2000.
Magruder puts his force at between 26,000 and 28,000 (I think a high estimate), and states his loss as 2900.
Throughout this campaign we attacked just when and where the enemy wished us to attack.
This was owing to our ignorance of the country and
 |
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George W. Randolph, Secretary of War of the Confederacy from March 17, 1862, until November 17, 1862.
from a photograph. |
lack of reconnoissance of the successive battle-fields.
Porter's weak point at
Gaines's Mill was his right flank.
A thorough examination of the ground would have disclosed that; and had
Jackson's command gone in on the left of the road running by the
McGehee house,
Porter's whole position would have been turned and the line of retreat cut off. An armed reconnoissance at
Malvern would have shown the immense preponderance of the Federal artillery, and that a contest with it must be hopeless.
The battle, with all its melancholy results, proved, however, that the Confederate infantry and Federal artillery, side by side on the same field, need fear no foe on earth.
Both commanders had shown great ability.
McClellan, if not always great in the advance, was masterly in retreat, and was unquestionably the greatest of
Americans as an organizer of an army.
Lee's plans were perfect; and had not his dispositions for a decisive battle at
Frayser's farm miscarried, through no fault of his own, he would have won a most complete victory.
It was not the least part of his greatness that he did not complain of his disappointment, and that he at no time sought a scape-goat upon which to lay a failure.
As reunited
Americans, we have reason to be proud of both commanders.
