[
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When
General Lee began his campaign against
Pope I was in command of a division (of three brigades) which was not a part of either of the two corps of the Army of Northern Virginia.
I was left on the
James for the defense of
Richmond, but after the evacuation of
Harrison's Landing by
McClellan's army [August 14th to 20th], the
Confederate capital being no longer threatened, I was ordered by the
Secretary of War to leave one of my brigades at
Richmond and proceed with the other two to join
General Lee in the field.
Leaving
Daniel's brigade on the
James, I marched northward with my old brigade, the strongest and the one which had seen most service, at that time commanded by
Colonel Van H. Manning, and with the brigade of
General Robert Ransom.
It was our hope that we should overtake
General Lee in time to take part in the fight with
Pope; but when we reached the field of
Bull Run we found it strewn with the still unburied dead of
Pope's army, and learned that
Lee was pushing for the fords of the
Upper Potomac.
Following him rapidly, on the night of the 6th of September my division reached the vicinity of
Leesburg, and the next morning crossed the
Potomac at Cheek's Ford, at the mouth of the
Monocacy, and about three miles above
White's Ford, where
Stonewall Jackson had crossed.
At Cheek's Ford I overtook
G. B. Anderson's brigade of
D. H. Hill's division and crossed into
Maryland with it. The next day we reached the neighborhood of
Frederick.
I went at once to
General Lee, who was alone.
After listening to my report, he said that as I had a division which would often, perhaps, be ordered on detached service, an intelligent performance of my duty might require a knowledge of the ulterior purposes and objects of the campaign.
“Here,” said he, tracing with his finger on a large map,
is the line of our communications, from Rapidan Station to Manassas, thence to Frederick.
It is too near the Potomac, and is liable to be cut any day by the enemy's cavalry.
I have therefore given orders to move the line back into the Valley of Virginia, by way of Staunton, Harrisonburg, and Winchester, entering Maryland at Shepherdstown.
[See map, p. 553.]
I wish you to return to the mouth of the Monocacy and effectually destroy the aqueduct of the Chesapeake and Ohio canal.
By the time that is accomplished you will receive orders to cooperate in the capture of Harper's Ferry, and you will not return here, but, after the capture of Harper's Ferry, will rejoin us at Hagerstown, where the army will be concentrated.
My information is that there are between 10,000 and 12,000 men at Harper's Ferry, and 3000 at Martinsburg.
The latter may escape toward Cumberland, but I think the chances are that they will take refuge at Harper's Ferry and be captured.
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Besides the men and material of war which we shall capture at Harper's Ferry, the position is necessary to us, not to garrison and hold, but because in the hands of the enemy it would be a break in our new line of communications with Richmond.
A few days' rest at Hagerstown will be of great service to our men. Hundreds of them are barefooted, and nearly all of them are ragged.
I hope to get shoes and clothing for the most needy.
But the best of it will be that the short delay will enable us to get up our stragglers — not stragglers from a shirking disposition, but simply from inability to keep up with their commands.2 I believe there are not less than from eight to ten thousand of them between here and Rapidan Station.
Besides these we shall be able to get a large number of recruits who have been accumulating at Richmond for some weeks.
I have now requested that they be sent forward to join us. They ought to reach us at Hagerstown.
We shall then have a very good army, and,
he smilingly added, “one that I think will be able to give a good account of itself.”
“In ten days from now,” he continued, “if the military situation is then what I confidently expect it to be after the capture of
Harper's Ferry, I shall concentrate the army at
Hagerstown, effectually destroy the
Baltimore and
Ohio road, and march to this point,” placing his finger at
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. “That is the objective point of the campaign.
You remember, no doubt, the long bridge of the Pennsylvania railroad over the
Susquehanna, a few miles west of
Harrisburg.
Well, I wish effectually to destroy that bridge, which will disable the Pennsylvania railroad for a long time.
With the
Baltimore and
Ohio in our possession, and the Pennsylvania railroad broken up, there will remain to the enemy but one route of communication with the
West, and that very circuitous, by way of the
Lakes.
After that I can turn my attention to
Philadelphia,
Baltimore, or
Washington, as may seem best for our interests.”
I was very much astonished at this announcement, and I suppose he observed it, for he turned to me and said:
“You doubtless regard it hazardous to leave
McClellan practically on my line of communication, and to march into the heart of the enemy's country?”
I admitted that such a thought had occurred to me.
“Are you acquainted with
General McClellan?”
he inquired.
I replied that we had served together in the
Mexican war, under
General Scott, but that I had seen but little of him since that time.
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“He is an able general but a very cautious one.
His enemies among his own people think him too much so. His army is in a very demoralized and chaotic condition, and will not be prepared for offensive operations — or he will not think it so — for three or four weeks. Before that time I hope to be on the
Susquehanna.”
Our conversation was interrupted at this point by the arrival of
Stonewall Jackson, and after a few minutes
Lee and
Jackson turned to the subject of the capture of
Harper's Ferry.
Iremember Jackson seemed in high spirits, and even indulged in a little mild pleasantry about his long neglect of his friends in “the
Valley,”
General Lee replying that
Jackson had “some friends” in that region who would not, he feared, be delighted to see him.
The arrival of a party of ladies from
Frederick and vicinity, to pay their respects to
Lee and
Jackson, put an end to the conversation, and soon after I took my departure.
Retracing our steps toward the
Potomac, at 10 P. M. of the 9th my division arrived at the aqueduct which conveys the waters of the
Chesapeake and Ohio canal across the
Monocacy.
The attempted work of destruction began, but so admirably was the aqueduct constructed and cemented that it was found to be virtually a solid mass of granite.
Not a seam or crevice could be discovered in which to insert the point of a crow-bar, and the only resource was in blasting.
But the drills furnished to my engineer were too dull and the granite too hard, and after several hours of zealous but ineffectual effort the attempt had to be abandoned.
Dynamite had not then been invented, so we were foiled in our purpose, and about 3 o'clock A. M. of the 10th went into bivouac about two miles and a half west of the
Monocacy.
Late in the afternoon a courier from
General Lee delivered me a copy of his famous “Special orders no. 191,9” directing me to cooperate with
Jackson and
McLaws in the capture of
Harpers Ferry.
That order contained the most precise and detailed information respecting the position, at its date, of every
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portion of the Confederate army,--where it would be during the next five or six days at least,--and inferentially revealed the ulterior designs of the
Confederate commander.
Possessed of the information it contained, the
Federal general would be enabled to throw the weight of his whole force on that small portion of the Confederate army then with
Lee, before
Jackson,
McLaws, and
Walker could effect the capture of
Harper's Ferry and go to its assistance.
General McClellan did get possession, on the 13th of September, of a copy of this order, addressed to
General D. H. Hill.
In what manner this happened is not positively known.
General Bradley T. Johnson says that there is a tradition in
Frederick that
General Hill was seen to drop a paper in the streets of that town, which was supposed to be the order in question.
The
Comte de Paris says it was found in a house in
Frederick which had been occupied by
General Hill.
But
General Hill informed me, two years after the war, that he never received the order, and never knew of its existence until he read it in
McClellan's report.
3
To whatever circumstance
General McClellan owed its possession, it certainly enabled him to thwart
General Lee's designs for the invasion of
Pennsylvania, or a movement upon
Washington.
But that he obtained all the advantages he might have done will hardly be contended for by
General McClellan.s warmest admirer.
By the exercise of greater energy he might easily have crushed
Lee on the afternoon of the 15th or early on the 16th, before the arrival of
Jackson from
Harper's Ferry.
On receiving my copy of the order I was so impressed with the disastrous consequence which might result from its loss that I pinned it securely in an inside pocket.
In speaking with
General Longstreet on this subject afterward, he remarked that the same thought had occurred to him, and that, as an absolutely sure precaution, he memorized the order and then “chewed it up.”
Informed of the presence of a superior Federal force at Cheek's Ford, where I was ordered to pass the
Potomac, and learning that the crossing at the
Point of Rocks was practicable, I moved my division to that place and succeeded in landing everything safe on the
Virginia shore by daylight of the 11th.
About the same time a heavy rain set in, and as the men were much exhausted by their night march, I put them into bivouac.
I would here remark that the Army of Northern Virginia had long since discarded their tents, capacious trunks,
carpet-bags,
bowie-knives, mill-saw swords, and six-shooters, and had reduced their “kits” to the simplest elements and smallest dimensions.
Resuming our march on the morning of the 12th, we reached
Hillsboro' and halted for the night.
During the night I was sent for from the village inn by a woman who claimed my attendance on the ground that she was just from
Washington, and had very important information to give me. Answering the call, I found seated in the hotel parlor a young woman of perhaps twenty-five, of rather prepossessing appearance, who claimed to have left
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Washington the morning before, with important information from “our friends” in the
Federal capital which she could communicate only to
General Lee himself, and wished to know from me where he could be found.
I saw at once that I had to do with a Federal spy; but as I did not wish to be encumbered with a woman prisoner, I professed ignorance of
General Lee's whereabouts and advised her to remain quietly at the hotel, as I should, no doubt, have some information for her the next morning.
Before resuming our march the next day I sent her under guard to
Leesburg, directing the
provost marshal at that place to hold her for three or four days and then release her.
Resuming the march at daylight on the 13th, we reached the foot of
Loudoun Heights about 10 o'clock. Here I was joined by a detachment of signal men and
Captain White's company of
Maryland cavalry.
I detached two regiments,--the 27th North Carolina and 30th Virginia,--under
Colonel J. R. Cooke, directing him to ascend Loudoun Mountain and take possession of the heights, but, in case he found no enemy, not to reveal his presence to the garrison of
Harper's Ferry.
I sent with him the men of the Signal Corps, with orders to open communication if possible with
Jackson, whose force ought to be in the neighborhood, coming from the west.
I then disposed of the remainder of the division around the point of the mountain, where it abuts on the
Potomac.
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About 2 P. M.
Colonel Cooke reported that he had taken unopposed possession of
Loudoun Heights, but that he had seen nothing of
Jackson, yet from the movements of the
Federals he thought he was close at hand.
By 8 o'clock the next morning five long-range Parrott rifles were on the top of the mountain in a masked position, but ready to open fire.
About half-past 10 o'clock my signal party succeeded in informing
Jackson of my position and my readiness to attack.
At a reunion of the Association of the Army of Northern Virginia held at
Richmond on October 23d, 1884, in an address delivered by
General Bradley T. Johnson, occurs this passage:
McLaws, having constructed a road up Maryland Heights and placed his artillery in position during the 14th, while fighting was going on at Crampton's Gap and Turner's Gap, signaled to Jackson that he was ready; whereupon Jackson signaled the order both to McLaws and Walker--“Fire at such positions of the enemy as will be most effective.”
I am, of course, ignorant of what
Jackson may have signaled
McLaws, but it is certain that I received no such order.
On the contrary, as soon as he was informed that
McLaws was in possession of
Maryland Heights,
Jackson signaled me substantially the following dispatch: “
Harper's Ferry is now completely invested.
I shall summon its commander to surrender.
Should he refuse I shall give him twenty-four hours to remove the non-combatants, and then carry the place by assault.
Do not fire unless forced too.”
4
Jackson at this time had, of course, no reason to suspect that
McClellan was advancing in force, and doubtless supposed, as we all did, that we should have abundant leisure to rejoin
General Lee at
Hagerstown.
But about noon I signaled to
Jackson that an action seemed to be in progress at Crampton's Gap, that the enemy had made his appearance in
Pleasant Valley in rear of
McLaws, and that I had no doubt
McClellan was advancing in force.
To this message
Jackson replied that it was, he thought, no more than a cavalry affair between
Stuart and
Pleasonton.
It was now about half-past 12 and every minute the sound of artillery in the direction of
South Mountain was growing louder, which left no doubt on my mind of the advance of the whole Federal army.
If this were the case, it was certain that
General Lee would be in fearful peril should the capture of
Harper's Ferry be much longer delayed.
I thereupon asked permission to open fire, but receiving no reply, I determined to be “forced.”
For this purpose I placed the two North Carolina regiments under
Colonel (afterward
Major-General, and now
U. S. Senator)
M. W. Ransom, which had relieved those under
Cooke, in line of battle in full view of the
Federal batteries on Bolivar Heights.
As I expected, they at once opened a heavy, but harmless, fire upon my regiments, which afforded me the wished — for pretext.
Withdrawing the infantry to the safe side of the mountain, I directed my batteries to reply.
It is possible that some of my military readers may question the propriety of my course, and allege that it amounted virtually to disobedience of orders.
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This I freely admit, but plead the dire urgency of the case.
Had
Jackson compromised himself by agreeing to allow the
Federal commander twenty-four hours, as he proposed,
General Lee would undoubtedly have been driven into the
Potomac before any portion of the
Confederate force around
Harper's Ferry could have reinforced him. The trouble was that
Jackson could not be made to believe that
McClellan's whole army was in movement.
I never knew whether or not
Jackson actually made a formal demand for the surrender of the
Federal garrison, but I had his own word for it that he intended to do so. Besides, such a course was in harmony with the humanity of his generous nature, and with his constant practice of doing as little harm as possible to non-combatants.
About an hour after my batteries opened fire those of
A. P. Hill and
Lawton followed suit, and about 3 o'clock those of
McLaws.
But the range from
Maryland Heights being too great, the fire of
McLaws's guns was ineffective, the shells bursting in mid-air without reaching the enemy.
From my position on
Loudoun Heights my guns had a plunging fire on the
Federal batteries a thousand feet below and did great execution.
By 5 o'clock our combined fire had silenced all the opposing batteries except one or two guns east of Bolivar Heights, which kept up a plucky but feeble response until night put a stop to the combat.
During the night of the 14th-15th,
Major (afterward
Brigadier-General)
R. Lindsay Walker,
chief of artillery of
A. P. Hill's division, succeeded in crossing the
Shenandoah with several batteries, and placing them in such a position on the slope of Loudoun Mountain, far below me, as to command the enemy's works.
McLaws got his batteries into position nearer the enemy, and at daylight of the 15th the batteries of our five divisions were pouring their fire on the doomed garrison.
The fire of my batteries, however, was at random, as the enemy's position was entirely concealed by a dense fog clinging to the sides of the mountain far below.
But my artillerists trained their guns by the previous day's experience and delivered their fire through the fog.
The Federal batteries replied promptly, and for more than an hour maintained a spirited fire; but after that time it grew more and more feeble until about 8 o'clock, when it ceased altogether, and the garrison surrendered.
Owing to the fog I was ignorant of what had taken place, but surmising it, I soon ordered my batteries to cease firing.
Those of
Lawton, however, continued some minutes later.
This happened unfortunately, as
Colonel Dixon S. Miles, the
Federal commander, was at this time mortally wounded by a fragment of shell while waving a white flag in token of surrender.
It was pleasing to us, perched upon the top of the mountain, to know that more than twelve thousand “boys in blue” below us were stacking arms.
Such a situation has its pathetic side too, for after the first feeling of exultation has passed there comes one of sympathy for the humiliation of the brave men, who are no longer enemies, but unfortunate fellow-soldiers.
Some hours later, accompanied by two of my staff, I rode into
Harper's Ferry, and we were interested in seeing our tattered Confederates fraternizing
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in the most cordial manner with their well-dressed prisoners.
I was introduced by
General A. P. Hill to Federal
Brigadier-General White.
He explained to me that although of superior rank to
Colonel Miles he had declined to assume command of the garrison, since he was at
Harper's Ferry by accident--“an unfortunate accident too,” he added.
I am of the opinion that it would Shave been practicable for
Colonel Miles to have escaped with the infantry of his garrison during the night of the 14th-15th, as did a body of thirteen hundred cavalry under
Colonel “
Grimes”
Davis.
5 This enterprising young officer crossed his cavalry to the
Maryland side of the
Potomac over the pontoon bridge, and followed the road on the berme side of the
Chesapeake and Ohio canal, leading north to
Sharpsburg.
Mention of this very meritorious action is made in neither Federal nor Confederate accounts of the capture of
Harper's Ferry that have fallen under my notice.
6 There is a strong probability that the infantry of the garrison could have done the same.
It should be stated that
Davis not only escaped capture, but that he passed through
Sharpsburg at daylight of the 15th,
7 and in crossing the
Hagerstown and
Williamsport road he destroyed the greater part of
Longstreet's reserve ordnance trains.
8 This escape of
Davis from
Harper's Ferry and
Forrest's escape from
Fort Donelson under very similar circumstances show what a bold subordinate may achieve after his superior has lost heart.
No sooner had the surrender of
Harper's Ferry been assured than my division took up its line of march to join
General Lee.
At 2 A. M. of the 16th my advance overtook the rear of
Jackson's force, and about 8 o'clock in the morning [of the day of the battle], after seeing our commands safe across the river at the ford below
Shepherdstown,
Jackson and myself went forward together toward
Sharpsburg.
As we rode along I mentioned my
ruse in opening fire on
Harper's Ferry.
Knowing the strictness of
Jackson's ideas in regard to military obedience, I felt a little doubtful as to what he would say. When I had finished my confession he was silent for some minutes, and then remarked: “It was just as well as it was; but I could not believe that the fire you reported indicated the advance of
McClellan in force.
It seemed.
more likely to be merely a cavalry affair.”
Then after an interval of silence, as if to himself, he continued: “I thought I knew
McClellan” (they were classmates at
West Point), “but this movement of his puzzles me.”
