Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865

[360] would not the aspect of affairs be entirely changed? Well, that is not beyond the range of possibility. Much depends on the check given to Sherman's career. Richmond may be lost to us, and Sherman may be overwhelmed. The defeat of Sherman would restore Richmond. To be rid of him would more than compensate for such temporary sacrifice.¹

We cannot understand, therefore, how General Beauregard incurred the disapproval of General Lee, for wishing to carry out a measure which General Lee's own better judgment seems to have approved,² but which failed of execution, because the General-in-chief bent before the will of those who would not abandon Richmond, even temporarily, and allowed, nay, proposed, General Beauregard's removal, although the latter was advocating the only plan which, at this dark hour, could have made success possible.

At the eleventh hour, and when delay, from whatever source it might arise, was so much to be dreaded, General Johnston, at the request of General Lee,³ was abruptly placed in command of our forces operating in the two Carolinas, and instructed to ‘beat back Sherman,’ but without being given the means wherewith alone such a result could be obtained.

The question which naturally arises now is, how did General Johnston carry out these instructions? We know that when the troops under him were assembled, in obedience to orders already issued by General Beauregard, he officially assumed command on the 25th of February, and published on that occasion an able and soldierly address to his troops. But what were his expectations, and what course was it then his intention to pursue? He thought the Southern cause, at that time, irretrievably lost, and so, evidently, did General Lee himself; and he resumed the duties of his military grade with no hope beyond that of contributing to obtain peace on such conditions as, under the circumstances,