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Lest communication should be lost, I telegraph to say that
General Beauregard proposes, after
General Walker shall join him, which will be ordered to commence forthwith, to unite with you at the
Yadkin, in front of
Salisbury.
And this seems to me to be the most easy method, if pursued, of effecting the proposed junction.
Despatch of 1.30 P. M. received.
Secretary of War has not arrived.
To save time and have all information it is probably better that you come here.
In that event you will give the needful instructions to your second in command, and, if circumstances warrant, suspend the movement suggested in despatch of 3.30 P. M. for a time, which will enable you to communicate from here with that officer, or to indicate that the line has been broken by the enemy, so as to interrupt communication.
The movements of the enemy in
Eastern North Carolina indicate the necessity for prompt movement on your part to make a junction here with
General Beauregard, and then with
General Johnston, on the
Yadkin, in front of
Salisbury.
You will keep in communication with
General Beauregard, on whose information the supposed necessity for your immediate action is based.
I have no official report, but scouts, said to be reliable, and whose statements were circumstantial and corroborative, represent the disaster as extreme.
I have not heard from
General Lee since the 6th instant, and have little or no hope from his army as an organized body.
I expected to visit you at
Raleigh, but am accidentally prevented from executing that design, and would be very glad to see you here, if you can come at once, or to meet you elsewhere in
North Carolina at a future time.
We must redouble our efforts to meet present disaster.
An army holding its position with determination to fight on, and manifest ability to maintain the struggle, will attract all the scattered soldiers and daily rapidly gather strength.
Moral influence is wanting, and I am sure you can do much now to revive the spirit and hope of the people.
