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The battle of Fredericksburg. [from the Richmond, Va., Dispatch, November 26, 1899 ]


Details of the mighty conflict. Interesting paper by Hon. John Lamb read before the sons of Confederate Veterans.

Scouting in the enemy's Lines—Underground mail route described.


A valuable paper on the battle of Fredericksburg was read by the Honorable John Lamb at a recent meeting of R. E. Lee Camp, No. 1, Sons of Confederate Veterans, in pursuance of a custom now in vogue in the camp of having some battle of the war between the States discussed by one or more of its members each Monday night. The paper elicited much praise from those present, among whom were several of the delegates to the United Daughters of the Confederacy, and Mr. Lamb was, by a unanimous vote, requested to present the Ms. to the camp, and allow it to be published. The text of Mr. Lamb's discussion of this famous battle was as follows:


Description of the battle.

The battle of Sharpsburg of the 16th and 17th of September, 1862, was over; the Army of Northern Virginia had recrossed the Potomac, and was camping upon its native soil in the Shenandoah Valley, where the commander-in-chief was trying to recuperate his forces. On the 25th of September, General Lee suggested to President Davis that the best move for his army to make was to advance upon Hagerstown and fall upon McClellan from that direction, saying: ‘I would not hesitate to make it even with our diminished forces did the army show its former temper and disposition.’ [232]

Lee had hoped that McClellan would cross the Potomac and offer battle in the lower Shenandoah, but this overcautious commander was unwilling to try a third issue with the bold Confederate leader.


Stuart got the horses.

In order to engage McClellan's attention and gather a supply of fresh horses from the farmers of Pennsylvania, on the 10th of October Lee dispatched the gallant and raid-loving Stuart, with 1,800 horsemen, across the Potomac into Pennsylvania, and by noon of the 12th of October he again recrossed the Potomac, not only with a fresh supply of much-needed horses, but with full information as to McClellan's movements. This bold and daring ride so irritated and excited the Federal Government that it peremptorily ordered McClellan to choose a line of attack and move against Lee in Virginia. This meant the second cry, ‘On to Richmond!’

The experiences of the Federal forces in the great Valley, both in Virginia and Maryland, did not give them confidence to undertake a new campaign in that already famous region, and McClellan determined to draw Lee from the Valley by crossing to the east of the Blue Ridge and then following along its eastern foot. Crossing the Potomac on October 23d, McClellan successfully occupied, with detachments, the gaps of the Blue Ridge, and made demonstrations towards the Shenandoah, thus guarding his flanks as his army marched southward.


General Lee's plans.

Lee at once comprehended this plan, and immediately sent Longstreet with the First corps to check the front of McClellan's advance. Jackson, with the Second corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, was left in the Shenandoah Valley to remain so long as he thought prudent. With his usual boldness, Lee did not hesitate to post the two wings of his army sixty miles apart in a straight line.

McClellan now occupied Pope's former position behind the Rappahannock, with fully 125,000 men—100,000 men holding the defences of Washington and 25,000 watching the Shenandoah in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. Lee had less than 75,000 in the two corps of the Army of Northern Virginia and in his cavalry corps under Stuart, and, with this disparity of numbers, he was again to meet the great Army of the Potomac. [233]

Not satisfied with the leadership of McClellan, Lincoln placed Burnside in command at Warrenton, and he at once hastened to execute an ‘on to Richmond,’ by way of Fredericksburg, thinking that by taking advantage of a shorter route he could reach the capital of the Confederacy without being intercepted by Lee; but when he attempted to force his advance towards Fredericksburg, the ever-watchful Stuart promptly reported his movements to Lee, who ordered Longstreet from Culpeper and placed him at Fredericksburg, across Burnside's track in a strong position on the south bank of the Rappahannock.


Jackson's movements.

Jackson, who had been busy in the Valley destroying the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and keeping the Federals in a state of uncertainty as to his whereabouts, with his usual promptness obeyed an order given him by Lee, and followed Longstreet to Fredericksburg. Making demonstrations at Chester and Thornton gaps, he misled those who were watching his movements by marching up the Valley to New Market, thence by Madison Courthouse to the vicinity of Orange Courthouse, and then by road to Fredericksburg.

Both Lee and Jackson would have much preferred to meet the new commander-in-chief of the Army of the Potomac near Richmond, possibly on the south side of the North Anna, where the topography of the country was more favorable for a complete victory; where Burnside would be further away from his stores, and be compelled to detach large bodies of men to protect his line of communication, but the Confederate authorities were wedded to a line of defensive operations, and were unwilling to permit the Federal army to approach so near to Richmond. Therefore, Lee, always obedient to superior orders, prepared to resist the further encroachment of the Federal forces upon Virginia soil. Wherefore, Lee immediately set to work and selected and hastily fortified a strong line of defence along the wooded terraces that overlooked the broad bottoms of the Rappahannock. Thousands of Lee's army were barefooted and destitute of clothing suitable for the rigors of early winter, and many were even without muskets; yet, Lee said, in a letter written at that time, that his army ‘was never in better health or better condition for battle than now.’ Having thus been prevented from carrying out his intentions, Burnside consumed much [234] time in mustering his 116,000 men and 350 pieces of artillery on the plateau north of the Rappahannock, and known as Stafford Heights, from which he could look down upon the historic town of Fredericksburg, which trembled in expectancy of destruction between these two powerful contending foes.


Burnside was confident.

While awaiting the development of Burnside's movements and watching the ways by which he might move to Richmond, Lee sent D. H. Hill's division of Jackson's corps to, watch the crossing of the Rappahannock at Port Royal. Ewell's division, now commanded by Early, was in camp next to D. H. Hill's division, while the divisions of A. P. Hill and Taliaferro were placed near the railroad leading from Richmond, where they could move either to the aid of D. H. Hill or Longstreet, as the exigences of the occasion might demand. Jackson established himself near Guiney's Station, on a road which led both to A. P. Hill's headquarters and to the headquarters of General R. E. Lee—the latter being established on the old Telegraph road leading to Fredericksburg. Burnside issued twelve days rations to his army, and confidently expected to make the next issue at Richmond. On the morning of the 11th of December, under the cover of a dense fog, Burnside attempted to throw a pontoon bridge across the Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg, in order to permit Franklin's corps to cross the Rappahannock.


Crossed in the night.

Barksdale's brigade of Mississippians was assigned the duty of defending the crossing of the Rappahannock in front of Fredericksburg. These brave and daring fighters well performed their duty, and shot down many of the Federal pontoon-builders, and frustrated nine successive attempts to lay the bridges. Burnside, becoming irritated and exasperated by the delay, turned loose his heavy guns, and soon the city of Fredericksburg was in flames and one body of infantry crossed the Rappahannock. But Barksdale's division of riflemen had snatched one day of anticipated victory from the overconfident Burnside. Under cover of the darkness of the night of the 11th of December, and assisted by the heavy winter fog of the next morning, about 45,000 infantrymen and 116 guns, under Franklin, crossed the pontoon bridges below Fredericksburg, and were spread a few miles along the line of the railroad towards Richmond, [235] while Sumner led 31,000 into Fredericksburg by the upper pontoon bridges.

As the fog lifted on the 12th of December and Lee looked out from the high hill in the centre of his position chosen by him for his headquarters, and saw this great host stretched for miles to his front and to his right in ‘brave battle array,’ he knew that the Federal commander had chosen the perilous plan of a direct attack. Lee had already made preparations to meet such an assault, and he promptly directed Jackson to concentrate his men on the right of the army and take command of the right wing. Our own gallant and beloved fellow-citizen; that brave soldier and patriot whom we all know and admire; that saintly man of God whom we see among us every day, the Rev. James P. Smith, D. D., of Jackson's staff, late in the evening rode eighteen miles to D. H. Hill's headquarters down the river. That able commander, by marching eighteen miles over the same rugged road that night, placed his men in position on Jackson's right by the dawn of the 13th; and, by doing this, Lee was ready to receive the assault before Burnside was ready to commence it.


The Confederates concealed.

Not informed as to the movements of Jackson's men, and supposing from the information he had gathered from the balloons sent up, that the greater portion of Lee's army was down the Rappahannock, Burnside attempted to turn Lee's right and secure the highway to Richmond and defeat him by a flank and rear attack. But a large forest concealed the Confederate right, and the Federal commander was greatly surprised, when he began the execution of his flanking movement with Franklin's Corps, to find Jackson in position at Hamilton's Crossing, and that A. P. Hill's 10,000 veterans were drawn up in double line, with fourteen pieces of field artillery on his right and thirty-three on his left; while Early's and Taliaferro's divisions were in order of battle in A. P. Hill's rear and D. H. Hill's division was in reserve. Stuart's cavalry were in advance of Jackson's right and played havoc on the Federal lines as they advanced.

Marye's Heights were crowded with batteries, while under them, in front, there was a thick fence. Franklin was ordered to begin the attack, on the Confederate right. Under cover of a dense fog, he deployed 55,000 men on the plain in front of Jackson, and when the fog lifted, that chill December day, the Federal lines, infantry and artillery, were revealed ‘in battle's magnificently stern array.’ In [236] anticipation of the coming fray, Lee joined Jackson to witness the opening. Meade's division led Franklin's advance with nearly 5,000 men, forcing back Jackson's skirmishers. Stuart, watching Meade's forward movement, gave the onward marching host a raking enfilade with shot and shell from the gallant Pelham's guns. Recovering from this, however, Meade again charged, only to have his line shattered by Jackson's batteries, under Lindsay Walker, and his entire advance driven back before the Confederate infantry could fire a gun.


Attacked Marye's Heights.

Sumner, about the same time, had begun his attack with 400 big guns upon the Confederate batteries on Marye's Hill. Simultaneously, Burnside had hastened Hooker with two divisions down the river for the purpose of making an assault on Jackson at 1 o'clock. At the same time, also, he was ordering Sumner's troops to advance from the cover of the streets of Fredericksburg in the vain attempt to capture Marye's Hill. French's division of Sumner's corps led the advance towards Marye's Heights, and the head of these columns came into the Confederate view about 11 o'clock. The cannon from Marye's Hill gashed them in front; those from Stansbury's Hill raked them on their right, while those on Lee's Hill raked them on their left. But the brave Federal soldiers pressed forward towards the foot of Marye's Heights, only to be met by an enfilade of shot and shell from 2,000 riflemen of Georgia and North Carolina, under General Cobb, hidden from view by the stone fence. In this fierce assault 1,200 of these brave men fell dead. Hancock's men again made this assault in gallant style, but were met with a Confederate yell and by a sheet of infantry fire, which was reserved until they were within about 150 yards of the stone fence, when again 2,000 of Hancock's men were shot down. At 1 o'clock Howard's division attempted a third assault. Kershaw was now in command of the stone fence, and another gallant and heroic assault was made by the Federals. ‘On they came, determination written upon their faces; with double quick step they rushed towards the stone fence, bayonets drawn, ready to do or die;’ but that stone wall was impregnable, and when within about 200 yards of the same, a withering sheet of musketry fire from the gallant Georgians and Carolinians caused a halt; they quivered, broke, and 700 more fell dead and dying. Sumner's corps of veteran soldiers had ‘dared and done all that brave men could do;’ but they attempted that which no human [237] power could have accomplished. Thus, nine Confederate regiments not only unflinchingly held their position, but had piled the very front of it with heaps of Federal dead.


The grand assault.

At the same hour of 1 in the afternoon, Burnside had ordered a grand assault of 60,000 men upon Jackson's right, thus hoping by a simultaneous right-hand and left-hand assault to break through Lee's right, and gain one of the two highways that led to Richmond. A. P. Hill's first line of battle was broken, but Jackson, promptly informed of this assault, rode headlong to his right, and hurling Early and Taliaferro upon the now forward-rushing Federals, drove back their division in great disorder.

Near the middle of the afternoon a fourth assault was made upon Marye's Heights. This met the same fate as the previous three, and 1,000 were soon added to the dead and dying already covering the foot of these heights.

Stung almost to madness, and chafing under his almost total defeat, Burnside, against the advice of Hooker, ordered a fifth assault upon Marye's Heights, but a fiery sheet of shot, shell, and musketry met them as they approached the stone fence, and another thousand fell in the same undertaking in which their predecessors had so significantly failed. The task imposed upon them was beyond the reach of human accomplishment; but we can only admire the bravery exhibited by these Federal soldiers in their heroic attempt to capture these Heights.

From three different army corps 30,000 men had been hurled against 7,000 Georgians and Carolinians, but had been successfully driven back, and their front strewn with nearly 9,000 dead and wounded, while not a Federal soldier had touched the wall, so bravely held.


Future conflict abandoned.

On the 15th, Burnside desired to renew his attack upon Lee's right, but he found all his subordinates bitterly opposed, and he abandoned the future conflict, and at the first opportunity, during a storm on that night, he recrossed the Rappahannock, leaving behind him nearly 13,000 dead and wounded. Lee's loss was about 5,000, mainly on his right, where Jackson had fought outside of his slight breastworks. Fifty thousand Federals had been actively engaged in opposition to 20,000 Confederates. [238]

Lee had expected Burnside to renew the battle on the 14th, but this he did not do, and Jackson secured permission to attack the Federal left on the evening of the 14th. He and Stuart opened a fierce artillery fire on Franklin along the Richmond road, but Franklin's hundred field-cannon and heavy guns compelled an abandonment of the movement. Not satisfied with this, Jackson desired to make an assult with the bayonet after nightfall, but Lee would not permit this to be done. In a letter to President Davis on the 16th of December, Lee declared that he supposed Burnside was just commencing his attack and that he was saving his men for the conflict.


In Winter quarters.

The Federal army went into winter quarters along the line of the railway from Fredericksburg to Aquia creek, with a base of supplies at that Potomac landing. Jackson established his headquarters at Moss Neck, near Fredericksburg, and Longstreet's corps occupied the vicinity of Banks's Ford, and the Second corps went into winter quarters in Caroline county.

Thus these two powerful contending armies, with their camp-fires in sight of each other, went into winter quarters and commenced the work of preparing for another trial of strength during the coming year.

Let us examine their respective conditions, opportunities, and advantages, as they lie inactive in their camps. One was fairly rioting in the luxuries of life, with the entire world from which they could gather their stores; with ample means to go into the markets of the world and purchase that which they needed, while the same money could, and did, purchase them new recruits, and caused the other not only to fight against the men of the North, but to meet face to face upon the battle-field an army composed of nearly every nationality under the sun; hunger to them was unknown; privations of any kind to them were rare, and there stood at their back a strong government ready, willing, and able to supply every demand made upon it.


The other picture.

Examine the other picture. Want, in its most cruel shape, marched through and pervaded every tent upon that bivouac; hunger clustered around nearly every form; unshod, unclothed, and without cover, the Confederate soldiers faced the chilly blasts of that winter, while their only strength lay in their patriotic courage and [239] devotion to duty, love of country, thought of home, and a sincere belief in the righteousness of their cause—trusting in a Divine Providence, and daily renewing their strength by offering upon the wing of prayer to the throne of God, an humble supplication for the success of the cause and the protection of the dear ones they had left behind.

But the Confederate soldier was ever willing and ready to sacrifice his all for the sake of the land he loved; ever willing to face the dangers of the battlefield, or to suffer the privations of a soldier's life. Whether those dangers and privations appeared upon the lonely picket, or along the batteries' iron rain, or o'er the tiresome march, or across the front of the enemy's withering fire, he faltered not, but accepted them as his humble share and part in that mighty conflict, and faced every danger and bore each hardship with a heroism that can never be excelled, and a devotion to duty which should inspire all mankind.


They fear to be forgotten.

Such self-sacrifice should never be forgotten; such love of country should live forevermore, and such loyalty to principle should implant in us a deeper love and reverence for the cause said to be ‘lost,’ but in the losing of which we gave the world the highest example of true manhood; made heroism more than a name, and added new lustre and meaning to glory. But, my friends, the saddest thought in the life of every soldier, martyr, or patriot, is the fear that some day he shall be forgotten; that some day those who will follow after him will forget his name, and remember not his deeds.

We are told that this fear hastened the death of Napoleon Bonaparte, and caused him more mental anguish and suffering than his incarceration upon the island of St. Helena. The soldier of every army has feared it; the martyr in every noble cause has dreaded it; the Confederate soldier shivers at the thought to-day, and looks appealingly to the Sons of Veterans for aid and comfort.

Sad, indeed, is the thought, ‘some day I shall be forgotten.’ Beautiful, yet pathetic, is the description of this given us by the poet, Wilde:

My life is like the summer rose,
     That opens to the morning sky,
But ere the shades of evening close,
     Is scattered on the ground to die: [240] Yet on the rose's humble bed The sweetest dews of night are shed, As if she wept the waste to see; But none shall weep a tear for me.

My life is like the autumn leaf,
     That trembles in the moon's pale ray,
Its hold is frail—its date is brief,
     Restless and soon to pass away.
Yet ere that leaf shall fall and fade,
     The parent tree will mourn its shade,
The winds bewail the leafless tree,
     But none shall breathe a sigh for me.

My life is like prints which feet
     Have left on Tampa's desert strand—
Soon as the rising tide shall beat,
     His track will vanish from the sand;
Yet, as if grieving to efface
     All vestige of the human race,
On that lone shore loud mourns the sea,
     But none shall ere lament for me.

God forbid that such should ever be true of even one of the soldiers of the Confederate army! [241] [From the Richmond, Va., Dispatch, April 2, 1899 ]

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