A secret Chapter of the Northern history of the War — a speech from Gen. Patterson--his campaign Defended.
At
Philadelphia, on the 20th inst., members of the
First City Troop met in commemoration of the formation of the company in 1774.
After assembling at the armory, the Troop proceeded to the
Continental Hotel, where hey partook of the anniversary dinner.
After these had been ably discussed,
Gen. Patterson, in response to a toast and three cheers, made a forcible speech, explaining his reasons for not intercepting
Gen. Johnston, previous to the
battle of Manassas Junction:
The gentlemen of the Troop were witnesses of what was done, and he asserted what they knew to be true; that the column was well conducted.
There was not a false steep made nor a blunder committed.
The skirmishers were always in front, and the flanks well protected.
They were caught in no trap and fell into no ambuscade.
They repeatedly offered the enemy battle, and when they accepted it they beat them.
There was defeat and no retreat with his column.
A full Investigation Demanded.
It might be asked, ‘"Why have you not made this statement sooner?"’ Because the publication of the documents sooner would have been most detrimental to the public interests.
He preferred bearing the odium so liberally bestowed on him, rather than clear himself at the expense of the cause in which we are all engaged.
The time has arrived when the matter could, without injury to the service, be inquired into, and he was determined that it should be done, and that before long all the documents referred to should be published, and spread before the
American people, unless those whose duty it was to do so should, in the meantime, do him justice.
He would state a few of the facts.
On the third of June he took command at
Chambersburg.
On the fourth he was informed by the
General in-Chief that he considered the addition to his force of a battery of artillery and some regular infantry indispensable.
On the eighth of June, a letter of instructions was sent to him, in which he was told that here must be no reverse; a check or a drawn battle would be a victory to the enemy, filling his heart with joy, his ranks with men, and his magazines with voluntary contributions; and, therefore, to take his measures circumspectly, and attempt nothing without a clear prospect of success.
This was good instruction and most sensible advice.
Good or bad, he was to obey; and he did.
On Friday, the 13th, he was informed that, on the supposition that he would cross the river on the next Monday or Tuesday,
General McDowell would be instructed to make a demonstration on
Manassas Junction.
He was surprised at the order, but promptly obeyed.
On the 15th, he reached
Hagerstown, and, on the 16th, two-thirds of his forces had crossed the
Potomac.
The promised demonstration by
General McDowell, in the direction of
Manassas Junction, was not made; and on the 16th, just three days after he had been told he was expected to cross, he was telegraphed by the
General-in-Chief to send him ‘"at once all the regular troops, horse and foot, and the Rhode Island regiment and battery,"’ and said that he was strong enough without the regulars, and to keep within limits until he could satisfy him that he ought to go beyond them.
On the 17th, he was again telegraphed, ‘"We are pressed here.
Send the troops I have twice called for without delay."’ This was imperative, and the troops were sent, leaving him without a single piece of artillery, and, for the time, a single troop of cavalry.
It was a gloomy night, but they were all brought over the river again without loss.
On the 20th of June he was asked by the
General-in-Chief to propose, without delay, a plan of operations.
On the 21st he submitted to the
General-in-Chief his plan, which was to abandon the present line of operations, move all supplies to
Frederick, occupy
Maryland Heights with
Major Doubleday's heavy guns, and a brigade of infantry to support them, and everything else — horse, foot, and artillery — to cross the
Potomac at
Point of Rocks, and unite with
Col. Stone's forces at
Leesburg, from which point he could operate as circumstances should demand and the
General's orders should require.
No reply was received; but on the 27th the
General telegraphed to him that he supposed he was that day crossing the river in pursuit of the enemy.
On that day the enemy was in condition to cross the river in his pursuit.
He had over 15,000 men, and from twenty to twenty-four guns.
Gen. Patterson had 10,000 men and six guns, the latter immovable for want of harness.
On the 28th he informed the
General of the strength of the enemy, and of his own force; that he would not, on his own responsibility, attack without artillery, but would do so cheerfully and promptly, if he would give him an explicit order to that effect.
No order was gives.
On the 20th he received the harness for his single battery of six smooth bore guns, and on the 30th gave the order to cross.
On the 2d of July he crossed, met the enemy, and whipped them.
On July 9 a council was held, at which all the commanders of divisions and brigades and chiefs of staff, were present.
Col. Stone, the junior line officer, spoke twice and decidedly against an advance, advocating a direct movement to
Shepherdstown and
Charlestown.--All who spoke opposed an advance, and all voted against one.
On the same day he informed the
General-in-Chief of the condition of affairs in the valley, and proposed that he should go to
Charlestown and occupy
Harper's Ferry, and asked to be informed when he would attack
Manassas.
On the 12th he was directed to go where he had proposed, and was informed that
Manassas would be attacked on Tuesday, the 16th.
On the 13th he was telegraphed: ‘"If not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, make demonstrations so as to detain him in the valley of
Winchester."’ He made the demonstration, and on the 16th, the day
General Scott said he would attack
Manassas, he drove the enemy's pickets into his entrenchments at
Winchester, and on the 17th marched to
Charlestown.
On the 13th he telegraphed the
General-in-Chief that
Johnston was in position to have his strong h doubled just as he could reach him, and that he would rather lose the chance of accomplishing something brilliant than, by hazarding his column, to destroy the fruits of the campaign by defeat, closing his telegram thus: ‘"If wrong, let me be instructed."’ But no instructions came.
On the 17th,
Gen. Scott telegraphed: ‘"
McDowell's first day's work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court-House.
To morrow the
Junction will probably be carried."’ With this information he was happy.
Johnston had been detained the appointed time, and the work of
General Patterson's column had been done.
On the 18th, at half-past 1 in the morning, he telegraphed
Gen. Scott the condition of the enemy's force and his own, referring to the letter of the 10 h formula information, and closed the dispatch by asking.
‘"Shall I attack?"’ This was plain
English, and could not be misunderstood, but he received no reply.
He expected to be attacked where he was, and if
Manassas was not to be attacked on that day, as stated in
Gen. Scott's dispatches of the day previous, he ought to have been ordered down forth with to join in the battle, and the attack delayed until he came.
He could have been there on the day that the battle was fought, and his assistance might have produced a different result.
On the 20th he heard that
Johnston had marched with $5,000 Confederate troops, and a large or iller force, in a southeasterly
