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Chapter 11:
Progress of the war in
Europe.
1779.
Frederic of
Prussia had raised the hope that he
would follow
France in recognising the independence of the
United States; but the question of the Bavarian succession, of which the just solution also affected the cause of human progress, compelled him to stand forth as the protector of his own dominions against mortal danger, and as the champion of
Germany; so that in his late old age, broken as he was in everything but spirit, he joined with
Saxony to stay the aggressions of
Austria on
Bavarian territory. ‘At this moment,’ wrote he to his envoys, ‘the affairs of
England with her colonies disappear from my eyes.’
To
William Lee, who in March, 1778, im-
portuned his
minister Schulenburg for leave to reside at
Berlin as an American functionary, he minuted this answer: ‘We are so occupied with
Germany that we cannot think of the
Americans: we should be heartily glad to recognise them; but at this present
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moment it could do them no good, and to us
might be very detrimental.’
The unseasonable importunities of
Lee in the year of war continued till he was dismissed from office by congress.
Their effect was only to make Frederic more reserved.
From his camp he always put them aside, yet with gentleness and caution.
He could not receive the prizes of the
Americans at
Emden, because he had no means to protect the harbor against aggression: they might purchase in his dominions munitions of war; and their merchants would be received in his ports on the same terms as the merchants of all other countries.
Meantime the
British ministry, abandoning the scheme of destroying Prussian influence at
Petersburg, sought rather to propitiate Frederic, as the best means of gaining favor in
Russia; and authorized its minister at
Berlin to propose an alliance.
But Frederic saw that the influence which had ruled
England in 1762 was still paramount, and that the offers of friendship were insincere.
‘I have no wish to dissemble,’ so he answered in January, 1778; ‘whatever pains may be taken, I will never lend myself to an alliance with
England.
I am not like so many German princes, to be gained by money.
My unalterable principle is, not to contract relations with a power which, like
England in the last war, has once deceived me so unworthily.’
1
Nevertheless the
British cabinet persisted in seeking aid from
Russia and the friendship of the king
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of
Prussia.
2 But from
Petersburg Harris wrote:
‘They never will be brought to subscribe to any stipulations in favor of our contest with the colonies.’
‘Our influence, never very high, has quite vanished.’
3 Frederic relented so far as to allow a few recruits for the
English army to pass through his dominions; and as a German prince he let it be known that he would save
Hanover from French aggression; but proposals for closer relations with
England were inflexibly declined.
‘He is hostile,’ wrote
Suffolk,
4 ‘to that kingdom to whose liberal support in the last war he owes his present existence amongst the powers of
Europe;’ and the
British ministry of that day looked upon the aid which he had received in the time of the elder
Pitt as a very grave mistake.
5 Prussia should have been left to perish.
Through his minister in
France, Frederic sent word to
Maurepas and
Vergennes: ‘All the pains which the king of
England may take to make an alliance with me will be entirely thrown away.
The interests of the state and my own views turn in another direction.’
6 ‘Peace is as dear and precious to me as to the ministry of
Versailles; but as nothing less is at stake than the liberty and constitutions of all the Germanic body, I, one of their principal bulwarks, should fail in duty as an elector if I were willing to acquiesce in the despotism of
Austria.
Rather than be guilty of such weakness, I should
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prefer eternal war to peace.’
7 ‘Now is the mo-
ment,’ he warned his minister, ‘to exert all your power: the deaf must hear; the blind see; the lethargic wake up.’
8 ‘Last year,’ he continued, ‘I saw that
France could not avoid war with
England; I offer my vows for the success of the
French;’
9 and he added in his own hand: ‘The
Austrians wish openly to subjugate the empire, abolish the constitutions, tyrannize the liberty of voices, and establish their own absolute and unlimited power on the ruins of the ancient government.
Let him who will, bear such violences: I shall oppose them till death closes my eyes.’
10 Since
France would not fulfil her guarantee of the peace of
Westphalia, Frederic desired at least a formal and positive assurance of her neutrality.
‘As to the
French ministers,’ said he, ‘I admire their apathy; but if I were to imitate it, I should surely be lost.’
11 The queen of
France besought her husband even with tears to favor the designs of the court of Vienna, and bitterly complained that neutrality had been promised by his cabinet; but the king turned aside her entreaties, remarking that these affairs ought never to become the subject of their conversation.
The interference made the ministry more dissembling and more inflexible.
For himself, Louis the Sixteenth had no partiality for
Austria, and
Maurepas retained the old traditions of the
French monarchy.
Moreover, he was willing to see
Prussia and
Austria enfeeble each other, and
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exhibit to the world
France in the proud position of
arbiter between them.
The promptness with which Frederic interposed for the rescue of
Bavaria, his disinterestedness, the fact that he had justice as well as the laws of the empire on his side, and his right by treaty to call upon his ally,
Russia, for aid, enabled him under the mediation of
France and
Russia to bring his war with
Austria to an end, almost before
France and
Spain had come to an understanding.
Joseph of
Austria, like Frederic, had liberal aspirations, but with unequal results.
The one was sovereign over men substantially of one nationality.
The other was a monarch not only over Germans, but over men of many languages and races.
Frederic acted for and with his people; and what he accomplished was sure to live, for it had its root in them.
The reforms of Joseph were acts of power which had their root only in his own mind, were never identified with his subject nations, and therefore, for the most part, had not a life even as long as his own. Frederic bounded his efforts by his means; Joseph, by his desires.
Frederic attempted but one thing at once, and for that awaited the favoring moment: the unrest of Joseph stirred up every power to ill wishes by seeking to acquire territory alike from German princes, in
Italy, on the coast of the
Adriatic, and on the
Danube; and he never could abide his opportunity, and never confine himself to one enterprise long enough for success.
He kept up, at least in name, his alliance with
France; while he inclined to the ancient connection of the Hapsburgs with
England, and was pleased at the insignificance
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of the successes of the Bourbons.
Ver-
gennes, on the other side, aware of his insincerity, pronounced
Austria to be in name an ally, in fact a rival.
12 Austria and
Prussia resumed their places among
European powers, each to have an influence on American affairs: the former to embarrass the independence of the
United States; the latter to adopt the system of neutrality, just when that system could benefit them most.
The benefit, however, came not from any intention of Frederic to subordinate the interests of his own dominions to those of a republic in another hemisphere, but from the coincidence of the interests of the two new powers.
With the restoration of peace,
Austria and
Russia contested the honor of becoming mediators between the Bourbons and
England.
Their interference was desired by neither party; yet both
France and
England were unwilling to wound the self-love of either of them.
Austria, though the nominal ally of
France, excluded the question of American independence; on the contrary, Catharine, in whose esteem
Fox and the
English liberal party stood higher than the king and the ministry, inclined to propositions friendly to
America.
Maria Theresa, who truly loved peace, was the first to declare herself.
On the fifteenth of May she wrote in her own hand to Charles the Third of
Spain, in the hope still to be able to hold him back from war; and she sent a like letter to her soninlaw at
Versailles.
Kaunitz followed with formal proposals of mediation to
France and
England.
In an autograph letter the king of
Spain put aside the interference
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of the empress under the plea, that the
Chap. XI.} 1779. June 16. |
conduct of
England had made his acceptance of it inconsistent with his honor; and on the sixteenth of June, between twelve and one o'clock, his ambassador in
London delivered to Lord Weymouth a declaration of war; but neither there nor in his manifesto was there one word relating to the war in
America.
Now that
Great Britain, without a single ally, was to confront
Spain and
France and the
United States, no man showed more resoluteness than its king.
He was impatient at the ‘over-caution’ of his admirals, and sought to breathe his own courage into his ministers.
Spain stood self-condemned; for an offer of mediation implies impartiality, and her declaration of war showed the malice of a pre-determined enemy.
In reply to that declaration,
Burke,
Fox, and their friends joined in pledging the house of commons and the nation to the support of the crown.
Fifty thousand troops defended the coasts, and as many more of the militia were enrolled to repel invasion.
The oscillation of the funds did not exceed one per cent. But opinion more and more condemned the war of
England with her children, denied to parliament the right of taxing unrepresented colonies, and prepared to accept the necessity of recognising their independence.
In the commons,
Lord John Cavendish, true to the idea of
Chatham, moved for orders to withdraw the
British forces employed in
America; to the lords, the
Duke of
Richmond proposed a total change of measures in
America and
Ireland; and both were supported by increasing numbers.
The great landowners were grown sick of taxing America.
Lord
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North was frequently dropping hints to the king, that
the advantage to be gained by continuing the contest would never repay the expenses; and the king, though unrelenting in his purpose of reducing the colonies to obedience, owned that the man who should approve the taxing of them in connection with all its consequences was more fit for a madhouse than for a seat in parliament.
On the twenty-first of June he summoned his min-
isters to his library,
13 and, at a table at which all were seated, he expressed to them in a speech of an hour and a half ‘the dictates of his frequent and severe self-examination.’
Inviting the friends of
Grenville to the support of the administration, he declared his unchanging resolution to carry on the war against
America,
France, and
Spain.
Before he would hear of any man's readiness to come into office, he would expect to see it signed under his hand, that he was resolved to keep the empire entire, and that consequently no troops should be withdrawn from
America nor its independence ever be allowed.
‘If his ministers would act with vigor and firmness, he would support them against wind and tide.’
Yet the ministry was not united; and, far from obtaining recruits from the friends of
Grenville, it was about to lose its members of the
Bedford connection.
And his chief minister, cowering before the storm, and incapable of forming a plan for the conduct of the war, repeatedly offered his resignation, as an excuse
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for remaining in office without assuming the proper
responsibility of his station.
Confiding in the ruin of the
American finances and in recruiting successfully within the states, the king was certain that, but for the intervention of
Spain, the colonies would have sued to the mother country for pardon; and ‘he did not despair that, with the activity of
Clinton and the Indians in their rear, the provinces would even now submit.’
But his demands for an unconditional compliance with his American policy riveted every able statesman in a united opposition.
He had no choice of ministers but among weak men. So the office made vacant by the death of Lord Suffolk, the representative of the Grenville party, was reserved for
Hillsborough.
‘His American sentiments,’ said the king, ‘make him acceptable to me.’
Yet it would have been hard to find a public man more ignorant or more narrow; more confused in judgment or faltering in action; nor was he allowed to take his seat till
Weymouth had withdrawn.
To unite the house of
Bourbon in the war,
France had bound herself to the invasion of
England.
True to her covenant, she moved troops to the coasts of
Normandy and
Brittany, and engaged more than sixty transport vessels of sixteen thousand tons' burden.
The king of
Spain would not listen to a whisper on the hazard of the undertaking, for which he was to furnish no contingent, and only the temporary use of twenty ships to help in crossing the channel.
Florida Blanca, who dared not dispute his unreasoning impatience, insisted on an immediate descent on
England without regard to risk.
Vergennes, on the other hand, held the landing of a
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French army in
England to be rash, until a naval
victory over the
British should have won the dominion of the water.
The fitting out of the expedition had been intrusted to Sartine, the marine minister, and to d'orvilliers, its commander.
Early in June the French fleet of thirty-one ships of the line yielded to Spanish importunities; and, before they could be ready with men or provisions, put to sea from
Brest; and yet they were obliged to wait off the coast of
Spain for the Spaniards.
After a great loss of time in the best season of the year, a junction was effected with more than twenty ships of war under the separate command of
Count Gaston; and the combined fleet sailed for the
British channel.
Never before had so large a force been seen afloat; and in construction the Spanish ships were equal or superior to the
English.
14 Charles of
Spain pictured to himself the
British escaping in terror from their houses before the invaders.
King George longed to hear that
Sir Charles Hardy, who had under his command more than forty ships of the line, had dared with inferior numbers to bring the new Armada to battle.
‘Everything,’ wrote
Marie Antoinette, ‘depends on the present moment.
Our fleets being united, we have a great superiority.
They are in the channel, and I cannot think without a shudder that, from one moment to the next, our destiny will be decided.’
15
The united fleet rode unmolested by the
British:
Sir Charles Hardy either did not, or would not see
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them.
On the sixteenth of August they appeared
Chap. XI.} 1779. Aug. 18. |
off
Plymouth, but did not attack the town.
After two idle days, a strong wind drove them to the west.
Montmorin had written to
Vergennes: ‘I hope the
Spanish marine will fight well; but I should like it better if the
English, frightened at their number, would retreat to their own harbors without fighting.’
16 When the gale had abated, the allies rallied, returned up the channel, and the
British retreated before them.
No harmony existed between the
French and
Spanish officers.
A deadly malady ravaged the French ships and infected the Spaniards.
17 The combined fleet never had one chief.
The
French returned to port, where they remained; the Spaniards, under their independent commander, sailed for
Cadiz, execrating their allies.
The wrath of their admiral was so great, that he was ready to give his parole of honor never to serve against
England, while he would with pleasure serve against
France.
It was the sentiment of them all.
18
The immense preparations of the two powers had not even harmed British merchant vessels on their homeward voyages.
The troops that were to have embarked for
England were wasted by dysentery in their camps in
Normandy and
Brittany.
19 There was a general desolation.
The French public complained relentlessly of d'orvilliers.
‘The doing of nothing at all will have cost us a great deal of money,’ wrote
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Marie Antoinette to her mother.
20 There was nothing
but the capture of the little island of
Grenada for which a
Te Deum could be chanted in
Paris.
Maria Theresa continued to offer her mediation, whenever it should best suit the king.
‘We shall feel it very sensibly if any other offer of mediation should be preferred to ours.’
So she wrote to her daughter, who could only answer: ‘The nothingness of the campaign removes every idea of peace.’
21
During the attempt at an invasion of
England, the allied belligerents considered the condition of
Ireland.
‘To separate
Ireland from
England and form it into an independent government like that of
America,’ wrote
Vergennes, ‘I would not count upon the Catholics, although they form the largest and the most oppressed part of the nation.
But the principle of their religion attaches them specially to the monarchical system.
It is otherwise with the numerous presbyterians who inhabit the north of
Ireland.
Their fanaticism makes them enemies of all civil or religious authority concentrated in a chief.
They aspire to nothing but to give themselves a form of government like that of the United Provinces of
America.’
22 ‘It is not easy to find a suitable emissary.
Irishmen enough press around me; but, being all
Catholics, they have no connection except among their countrymen of their own communion, who have not energy enough to attempt a revolution.
The presbyterians, being by their principles and by their characters more enterprising, more daring, more inimical to royal authority, and even more opposed to us,
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it is to them that I ought to address myself; for if
they determine to rise, our hand will not be recognised in the work.’
23 An American was selected as the agent of
France, and instructed to form close relations with the principal presbyterians, especially with the ministers.
After gaining their confidence, he might offer to become their mediator with
France.
The extreme and universal discontent in
Ireland might imply a disposition to revolt.
The French ambassador at
Madrid advised
Florida Blanca to send an agent to the
Irish Catholics.
At the same time he reported to his government wisely: ‘The troubles in
Ireland can be regarded only as a diversion, useful by dividing the attention of
England.
An insurrection in
Ireland cannot have success as in
America.’
24 The emissary selected in
Spain was a Catholic priest, who was promised a bishopric if he should succeed in his undertaking.
He could have no success.
After the first shedding of American blood in 1775, one hundred and twenty-one Irish Catholics, having indeed no formal representative authority, yet professing to speak not for themselves only, but ‘for all their fellow Roman Catholic Irish subjects,’ had addressed the
English secretary in
Ireland, ‘in proof of their grateful attachment to the best of kings, and their just abhorrence of the unnatural American rebellion,’ and had ‘made a tender of two millions of faithful and affectionate hearts and hands in defence of his person and government in any part of the world.’
25
Vergennes learned from his agent as well as from
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other sources, that the Irish association aimed only
to extort the concession of free trade, and was combined with readiness to oppose foreign invasion.
‘The movements of the Irish,’ wrote
Vergennes towards the close of the year, ‘are those of a people who wish to profit by circumstances to redeem themselves from oppressions; but there is no design of separating from the crown of
England.’
‘The Irish nation seems to wish to depend on the royal prerogative alone, and to throw off the yoke of the British parliament.
This is aiming at independence, not by breaking all bonds as
America has done, but by making them so weak that they become precarious.
The irreconcilable interests of the two peoples can but keep them in a continual state of rivalry and even of quarrel.
It will be difficult for a king of
Great Britain to hold the balance even; and, as the scale of
England will be the best taken care of, the less-favored people will naturally tend to a complete secession.
We have nothing better to do than tranquilly to watch the movement.’
26
Greater energy was displayed by
Spain in her separate acts.
As soon as the existence of war between that power and
Great Britain was known at New Orleans,
Galvez, the governor of
Louisiana, drew together all the troops under his command to drive the
British from the
Mississippi.
Their posts were protected by less than five hundred men;
Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, abandoning
Manchac as untenable, sustained a siege of nine days at
Baton Rouge,
27
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and on the twenty-first of September made an honor-
able capitulation.
The
Spaniards planned the recovery of
East Florida, prepared to take the posts of
Pensacola and
Mobile, and captured or expelled from
Honduras the
British logwood cutters.
In
Europe their first act was the siege of
Gibraltar.
Still more important were the consequences of the imperious manner in which
Great Britain violated the maritime rights of neutrals, substituting its own will alike for its treaties and the law of nations.
But these events, which for half a century scattered the seeds of war, need to be explained at large.
