Lxi.
Early in the progress of affairs,
Mr. Sumner foresaw the danger that would arise from Military Rule in the
South.
The appointment of
Military Governors, which had then already been done for
Tennessee,
South Carolina,
North Carolina, and
Louisiana, and as was subsequently done over other subjugated States, was a necessity at the time, in which all men of sense concurred.
But he anticipates the possible danger that this
impera-
[
448]
torial dominion, indefinite in extent, might also be indefinite in duration; for, if under the
Constitution and laws it be proper to constitute such Governors, it is clear that they may be continued without regard to time—for years, if you please, as well as for weeks; and the whole region which they are called to sway might become a military empire, with all powers, executive, legislative, and even judicial, derived from one man in
Washington.
Could any prophet have foreseen clearer what actually followed in so atrociously unrepublican a form, and in violation of all the
Republican souvenirs of our country in the case of
Louisiana?
It would have been well enough if this tremendous power at
Washington had limited itself, as it had done in the appointment of
Military Governors in
Mexico and
California after their conquest, and before peace.
But to appoint
Military Governors, and prolong their power in a conquered country, beyond all civil jurisdiction, beyond an undoubted necessity, and their appointment for temporary purposes by the urgent necessity of suppressing a Rebellion—the distinction must be very clearly drawn, and the civil power must come in the first moment the opportunity occurred, and the military power be withdrawn.
Then comes in the power of Congress to establish Provisional Governments; and even these provisional governments must hold sway no longer than the voice of the people who are to be governed, shall be heard in the appointment of their own Governors.
On this point the opinion of
Chancellor Kent is quoted:
Though the Constitution vests the executive power in the President, and declares him Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States, these powers must necessarily be subordinate to the legislative power in Congress. It would appear to me to be the policy
[449]
or true construction of this simple and general grant of power to the President, not to suffer it to interfere with those specific powers of Congress which are more safely deposited in the legislative department, and that the powers thus assumed by the President do not belong to him, but to Congress.
It has been in violation of this principle that so much harm has been done to the
South—that the
Executive Power at
Washington has been so severe in its repression as to carry a blight all through the
South, both to the
White man and the
Black man. This, of course, has been attended with executive favoritism, by which, under a
regime since known as Carpetbagism, robberies to the extent of many millions have been committed,—fortunes untold extorted from the helpless,—and insults, injuries, and wrongs without number inflicted upon a prostrate and ruined people.
