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ourselves of the weakness resulting from the exchange of new and less reliable forces of the enemy for those heretofore in service, as well as of the moral effect produced by the late defeat.
I am, as ever, your friend,
From the correspondence which occurred after the conference at Fairfax Courthouse, I select a reply made to General Smith, who had written to me in advocacy of the views he had then expressed about large reinforcements to the Army of the Potomac, for an advance into Maryland. Nothing is more common than that a general, realizing the wants of the army with which he is serving, and the ends that might be achieved if those wants were supplied, should overlook the necessities of others, or accept rumors of large forces which do not exist, and assume the absence of danger elsewhere than in his own front.
* * * Your remarks about the moral effect of repressing the hope of the volunteers for an advance are in accordance with the painful impression made on me when, in our council, it was revealed to me that the Army of the Potomac had been reduced to about one-half the legalized strength, and that the arms to restore the numbers were not in depot.
As I then suggested, though you may not be able to advance into Maryland and expel the enemy, it may be possible to keep up the spirits of your troops by expectation, such as that particularly spoken of against Sickle's brigade on the lower Potomac, or Banks' above.
By destroying the canal and making other rapid movements, to beat detachments or destroy lines of communication. * * *
Very truly your friend,
The joyous exultation of the people over the victory at Manassas, on the 21st of July, 1861 (was followed by murmurs of dissatisfaction at what was termed a failure to reap the fruits
