Enemy deceived by Strategy.
Now, as to the battle.
I have always thought and contended that the manoeuvres made by
Early on October 18th (the day before) should be considered a part of the battle of
Cedar Creek—that our movement out of our camp around against their extreme right flank, on the
Back of
Little Mountain—going there by the more open roads, when their outpost could see us now and then—making the demonstration of force, and then withdrawing by the more curved roads, and through the woods back to our camp, was purely a feint, or maneuvre, made solely to deceive them into the belief that we were going to turn or attack their right flank, whilst in reality
Early's actual purpose was to make a surprise attack against their left and rear, as was actually made that night, and that it did actually deceive them, as intended results show.
And I think that when all this, and their overwhelming numbers, etc., is considered, in conjunction with our subsequent movements and attack that night and next morning, it constituted one of the most brilliant strategical movements of the whole war—probably only surpassed by some of
Stonewall Jackson's—as at
Chancellorsville—[see a the first article in this volume] and, in fact, this battle, taken as a whole, I have never been able to find a counterpart anywhere in history.
