Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 36
Cyrus Evans, Ed.

7. Although the present debate turned chiefly on these points, Hannibal, being called on by name to give his opinion, led the king, and those who were present, into the consideration of the general conduct of the war, by a speech to this effect: [2] —“If I had been employed in your councils since we came first into Greece, when you were consulting about [p. 1614]Eubœa, the Achaeans, and Bœotians, I would have offered the same advice which I shall offer you this day, when your thoughts are employed about the Thessalians. [3] My opinion is, that, above all things, Philip and the Macedonians should by some means or other be brought into a participation in this war. [4] For, as to Eubœa, as well as the Bœotians and Thessalians, who can doubt that, having no strength of their own, they will ever court the power that is present; and will make use of the same fear, which governs their councils, as an argument for obtaining pardon? [5] That, as soon as they shall see a Roman army in Greece, they will turn away to that government to which they have been accustomed? Nor are they to blame, if, when the Romans were at so great a distance, they did not choose to try your force, and that of your army, who were on the spot. [6] How much more advisable, therefore, and more advantageous would it be, to unite Philip to us, than these; as, if he once embarks in the cause, he will have no room for retreat, and as he will bring with him such a force, as will not only be an accession to a power at war with Rome, but was able, lately, of itself, to withstand the Romans! [7] With such an ally, (I wish to speak without offence,) how could I harbour a doubt about the issue; when I should see the very persons through whom the Romans prevailed against Philip, now ready to act against them? The Aetolians, who, as all agree, conquered Philip, will fight in conjunction with Philip against the Romans. [8] Amynander and the Athamanian nation, who, next to the Aetolians, performed the greatest services in that war, will stand on our side. [9] Philip, at the time when you remained inactive, sustained the whole burden of the war. [10] Now, you and he, two of the greatest kings, will, with the force of Asia and Europe, wage war against one state; which, to say nothing of my own fortune with them, either prosperous or adverse, was certainly, in the memory of our fathers, unequal to a dispute with a single king of Epirus; what then, I say, must it be in competition with you two? But it may be asked, What circumstances induce me to believe that Philip may be brought to a union with us? [11] First, common utility, which is the strongest cement of union; and next, you, Aetolians, are yourselves my informants. [12] For Thoas, your ambassador, among the other arguments which he used to urge, for the purpose of drawing Antiochus into [p. 1615]Greece, always above all things insisted upon this, —that Philip expressed extreme indignation that the conditions of servitude had been imposed on him under the appearance of conditions of peace: comparing the king's anger to that of a wild beast chained, or shut up, and wishing to break the bars that confined it. [13] Now, if his temper of mind is such, let us loose his chains; let us break these bars, that he may vent, upon the common foe, this anger so long pent up. But should our embassy fail of producing any effect on him, let us then take care, that if we cannot unite him to ourselves, he may not be united to our enemies. [14] Your son, Seleucus, is at Lysimachia; and if, with the army which he has there, he shall pass through Thrace, and once begin to make depredations on the nearest parts of Macedonia, he will effectually divert Philip from carrying aid to the Romans, to the protection, in the first place, of his own dominions. [15] Such is my opinion respecting Philip. With regard to the general plan of the war, you have, from the beginning, been acquainted with my sentiments: [16] and if my advice had been listened to, the Romans would not now hear that Chalcis in Eubœa was taken, and a fort on the Euripus reduced, but that Etruria, and the whole coast of Liguria and Cisalpine Gaul, were in a blaze of war; and, what is to them the greatest cause of alarm, that Hannibal was in Italy. Even as matters stand at present, I recommend it to you, to call home all your land and sea forces; let storeships with provisions follow the fleet; for, as we are here too few for the exigencies of the war, so are we too many for the scanty supplies of necessaries. [17] When you shall have collected together the whole of your force, you will divide the fleet, and keep one division stationed at Corcyra, that the Romans may not have a clear and safe passage; [18] and the other you will send to that part of the coast of Italy which is opposite Sardinia and Africa; while you yourselves, with all the land forces, will proceed to the territory of Bullium. [19] In this position you will hold the command of all Greece; you will give the Romans reason to think, that you intend to sail over to Italy; and you will be in readiness so to do, if occasion require. [20] This is my advice; and though I may not be the most skilful in every kind of warfare, yet surely I must have learned, in a long series of both good and bad fortune, how to wage war against the Romans. For the execution of [p. 1616]the measures which I have advised, I promise you my most faithful and zealous endeavours. [21] Whatever plan you shall consider the best, may the gods grant it their approbation.”