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[1234b]
[1]
because the mean does not occur in
combination with either extreme, whereas the extremes often do occur
in combination with one another, and sometimes the same men are
venturesome cowards, or extravagant in some things and illiberal in
others, and in general not uniform in a bad way— for when men lack uniformity
in a good way, this results in men of the middle characters, since the
mean contains both extremes.The
opposition existing between the mean and the extremes does not seem to
be the same in the case of both the extremes, but sometimes the
greater opposition is by way of excess, sometimes by way of
deficiency. The causes
of this are partly the two first mentioned,1 rarity (for example, the rarity of people
insensitive to pleasant things) and the fact that the error to which
we are more prone seems more opposite to the mean, and thirdly the fact that the
extreme that more resembles the mean seems less opposite to it, as is
the case with daring in relation to boldness2 and extravagance in relation
to liberality. We have therefore sufficiently discussed the other
praiseworthy virtues, and must now speak about Justice.3
1 Cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1222a 22-b 4.
2 Or, 'confidence'; but perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'courage.'
3 Books 4, 5, and 6 are omitted, as they are identical with Books 5, 6, and 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics.
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