[1237a]
[1]
and the two ought to come into agreement.
This is effected by goodness; and the purpose of political science is
to bring it about in cases where it does not yet exist. And one who is
a human being is well adapted to this and on the way to it (for by
nature things that are absolutely good are good to him), and similarly a man rather
than a woman and a gifted man rather than a dull one; but the road is
through pleasure—it is necessary that fine things shall be
pleasant. When there is discord between them, a man is not yet
perfectly good; for it is possible for unrestraint to be engendered in
him, as unrestraint is caused by discord between the good and the
pleasant in the emotions.Therefore since the primary
sort of friendship is in accordance with goodness, friends of this
sort will be absolutely good in themselves also, and this not because
of being useful, but in another manner. For good for a given person and good
absolutely are twofold; and the same is the case with states of
character as with profitableness—what is profitable
absolutely and what is profitable for given persons are different
things (just as taking exercise is a different thing from taking
drugs). So the state of character called human goodness is of two
kinds—
for let us assume that man is one of the things that are excellent by
nature: consequently the goodness of a thing excellent by nature is
good absolutely, but that of a thing not excellent by nature is only
good for that thing.The case of the pleasant also,
therefore, is similar. For here we must pause and consider whether
there is any friendship without pleasure,
[20]
and how such a friendship differs from other
friendship, and on which exactly of the two things1 the affection
depends—do we love a man because he is good even if he is
not pleasant, but not because he is pleasant?2 Then, affection having
two meanings,3 does actual affection seem to involve pleasure
because activity is good? It is clear that as in science recent studies and acquirements are
most fully apprehended, because of their pleasantness,4 so with
the recognition of familiar things, and the principle is the same in
both cases. By nature at all events the absolutely good is absolutely
pleasant, and the relatively good is pleasant to those for whom it is
good.5 Hence ipso facto like takes pleasure in like, and man
is the thing most pleasant to man; so that as this is so even with
imperfect things, it is clearly so with things when perfected, and a
good man is a perfect man. And if active affection is the reciprocal
choice, accompanied by pleasure, of one another's acquaintance, it is
clear that friendship of the primary kind is in general the reciprocal
choice of things absolutely good and pleasant because they are good
and pleasant; and
friendship itself is a state from which such choice arises. For its
function is an activity, but this not external but within the lover
himself; whereas the function of every faculty is external, for it is
either in another or in oneself qua other.
Hence to love is
to feel pleasure but to be loved is not; for being loved is not an
activity of the thing loved, whereas loving is an
activity—the activity of friendship; and loving occurs only
in an animate thing, whereas being loved occurs with an inanimate
thing also, for even inanimate things are loved. And since to love actively is
to treat the loved object qua loved,
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