General Scott had less than twelve thousand men at
Vera Cruz.
He had been promised by the administration a very much larger force,
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or claimed that he had, and he was a man of veracity.
Twelve thousand was a very small army with which to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into an enemy's country, and to besiege the capital; a city, at that time, of largely over one hundred thousand inhabitants.
Then, too, any line of march that could be selected led through mountain passes easily defended.
In fact, there were at that time but two roads from
Vera Cruz to the
City of Mexico that could be taken by an army; one by
Jalapa and
Perote, the other by
Cordova and
Orizaba, the two coming together on the great plain which extends to the
City of Mexico after the range of mountains is passed.
It was very important to get the army away from
Vera Cruz as soon as possible, in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito, which usually visits that city early in the year, and is very fatal to persons not acclimated; but transportation, which was expected from the
North, was arriving very slowly.
It was absolutely necessary to have enough to supply the army to
Jalapa, sixty-five miles in the interior and above the fevers of the coast.
At that point the country is fertile, and an army of the size of
General Scott's could subsist there for an indefinite period.
Not counting the sick, the weak and the garrisons for the captured city and fort, the moving column was now less than ten thousand strong.
This force was composed of three divisions, under
Generals Twiggs,
Patterson, and
Worth.
The importance of escaping the vomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could be got together to move a division the advance was commenced.
On the 8th of April,
Twiggs's division started for
Jalapa.
He was followed very soon by
Patterson, with his division.
General Worth was to bring up the rear with his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carry six days rations for his troops with the necessary ammunition and camp and garrison equipage.
It was the 13th of April before this division left
Vera Cruz.
The leading division ran against the enemy at
Cerro Gordo, some fifty miles west, on the road to
Jalapa, and went into camp at Plan del
Rio [Rio del Plan], about three miles from the fortifications.
General Patterson reached Plan del
Rio with his division soon after
Twiggs arrived.
The two were then secure against an attack from
Santa Anna, who commanded the
Mexican forces.
At all events they confronted the enemy without reinforcements and without molestation, until the 18th of April.
General Scott had remained at
Vera Cruz to hasten preparations for the field; but on the 12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on to take personal supervision.
He
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at once commenced his preparations for the capture of the position held by
Santa Anna and of the troops holding it.
Cerro Gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve to fifteen miles east of
Jalapa, and
Santa Anna had selected this point as the easiest to defend against an invading army.
The road, said to have been built by
Cortez, zigzags around the mountainside and was defended at every turn by artillery.
On either side were deep chasms or mountain walls.
A direct attack along the road was an impossibility.
A flank movement seemed equally impossible.
After the arrival of the
commanding-general upon the scene, reconnaissances were sent out to find, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might be reached without a front attack.
These reconnaissances were made under the supervision of
Captain Robert E. Lee, assisted by
Lieutenants P. G. T. Beauregard,
Isaac I. Stevens,
Z. B. Tower,
G. W. Smith,
George B. McClellan, and
J. G. Foster, of the corps of engineers, all officers who attained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great conflict for the preservation of the unity of the nation.
The reconnaissance was completed, and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank of the enemy was effected by the 17th of the month.
This was accomplished without the knowledge of
Santa Anna or his army, and over ground where he supposed it impossible.
On the same day
General Scott issued his order for the attack on the 18th.
The attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a battle of the
Mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before an engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took place.
Under the supervision of the engineers, roadways had been opened over chasms to the right where the walls were so steep that men could barely climb them.
Animals could not. These had been opened under cover of night, without attracting the notice of the enemy.
The engineers, who had directed the opening, led the way and the troops followed.
Artillery was let down the steep slopes by hand, the men engaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the guns down, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their ground on top, paying out gradually, while a few at the front directed the course of the piece.
In like manner the guns were drawn by hand up the opposite slopes.
In this way
Scott's troops reached their assigned position in rear of most of the intrenchments of the enemy, unobserved.
The attack was made, the
Mexican reserves behind the works beat a hasty retreat, and those occupying
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them surrendered.
On the left
General Pillow's command made h formidable demonstration, which doubtless held a part of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory.
I am not pretending to give full details of all the battles fought, but of the portion that I saw. There were troops engaged on both sides at other points in which both sustained losses; but the battle was won as here narrated.
The surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory overwhelming; some three thousand prisoners fell into
Scott's hands, also a large amount of ordnance and ordnance stores.
The prisoners were paroled, the artillery parked and the small arms and ammunition destroyed.
The
battle of Buena Vista was probably very important to the success of
General Scott at
Cerro Gordo and in his entire campaign from
Vera Cruz to the great plains, reaching to the
City of Mexico.
The only Army
Santa Anna had to protect his capital and the mountain passes west of
Vera Cruz, was the one he had with him confronting
General Taylor.
It is not likely that he would have gone as far north as
Monterey to attack the United States troops when he knew his country was threatened with invasion further south.
When
Taylor moved to
Saltillo and then advanced on to
Buena Vista,
Santa Anna crossed the desert confronting the invading army, hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet
General Scott in the mountain passes west of
Vera Cruz.
His attack on
Taylor was disastrous to the
Mexican army, but, notwithstanding this, he marched his army to
Cerro Gordo, a distance not much short of one thousand miles by the line he had to travel, in time to intrench himself well before
Scott got there.
If he had been successful at
Buena Vista his troops would no doubt have made a more stubborn resistance at
Cerro Gordo.
Had the
battle of Buena Vista not been fought
Santa Anna would have had time to move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an army not demoralized nor depleted by defeat.
After the battle the victorious army moved on to
Jalapa, where it was in a beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above the fevers of the coast.
Jalapa, however, is still in the mountains, and between there and the great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defence.
It was important, therefore, to get possession of the great highway between the sea-coast and the capital up to the point where it leaves the mountains, before the enemy could have time to reorganize and fortify in our front.
Worth's division was selected to go forward to secure this result.
The division marched to
Perote on the great plain, not far from where the road debouches from the mountains.
There is a low, strong fort on the plain in front of the town,
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known as the
Castle of Perote.
This, however, offered no resistance and fell into our hands, with its armament.
General Scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of
Vera Cruz, and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire, a long delay was the consequence.
The troops were in a healthy climate, and where they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their line back to
Vera Cruz should be cut off. It being ascertained that the men whose time would expire before the
City of Mexico could possibly fall into the hands of the
American army, would not remain beyond the term for which they had volunteered, the commanding-general determined to discharge them at once, for a delay until the expiration of their time would have compelled them to pass through
Vera Cruz during the season of the vomito.
This reduced
Scott's force in the field to about five thousand men.
Early in May [May 8], Worth, with his division, left
Perote and marched on to
Puebla.
The roads were wide and the country open except through one pass in a spur of mountains coming up from the south, through which the road runs.
Notwithstanding this the small column was divided into two bodies, moving a day apart.
Nothing occurred on the march of special note, except that while lying at the town of Amozoque — an easy day's march east of
Puebla — a body of the enemy's cavalry, two or three thousand strong, was seen to our right, not more than a mile away.
A battery or two, with two or three infantry regiments, was sent against them and they soon disappeared.
On the 15th of May we entered the city of
Puebla.
General Worth was in command at
Puebla until the latter end of May, when
General Scott arrived.
Here, as well as on the march up, his restlessness, particularly under responsibilities, showed itself.
During his brief command he had the enemy hovering around near the city, in vastly superior numbers to his own. The brigade to which I was attached changed quarters three different times in about a week, occupying at first quarters near the plaza, in the heart of the city; then at the western entrance; then at the extreme east.
On one occasion
General Worth had the troops in line, under arms, all day, with three days cooked rations in their haversacks.
He galloped from one command to another proclaiming the near proximity of
Santa Anna with an army vastly superior to his own.
General Scott arrived upon the scene the latter part of the month, and nothing more was heard of
Santa Anna and his myriads.
There were, of course, bodies of mounted Mexicans hovering around to watch our movements and to pick up stragglers, or small bodies of troops, if they ventured too
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far out. These always withdrew on the approach of any considerable number of our soldiers.
After the arrival of
General Scott I was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train of wagons, back two days march at least, to procure forage.
We had less than a thousand men as escort, and never thought of danger.
We procured full loads for our entire train at two plantations, which could easily have furnished as much more.
There had been great delay in obtaining the authority of Congress for the raising of the troops asked for by the administration.
A bill was before the National Legislature from early in the session of 1846-7, authorizing the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to be attached to the regular army, but it was the middle of February before it became a law. Appointments of commissioned officers had then to be made; men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped and the whole transported to
Mexico.
It was August before
General Scott received reinforcement sufficient to warrant an advance.
His moving column, not even now more than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions, commanded by
Generals Twiggs,
Worth,
Pillow and
Quitman.
There was also a cavalry corps under General [William S.]
Harney, composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and 3d dragoons.
The advance commenced on the 7th of August with
Twiggs's division in front.
The remaining three divisions followed, with an interval of a day between.
The marches were short, to make concentration easier in case of attack.
I had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conducting armies in a foreign land.
The contrast between the two was very marked.
General Taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely for comfort.
He moved about the field in which he was operating to see through his own eyes the situation.
Often he would be without staff officers, and when he was accompanied by them there was no prescribed order in which they followed.
He was very much given to sit his horse side-ways — with both feet on one side-particularly on the battlefield.
General Scott was the reverse in all these particulars.
He always wore all the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected his lines; word would be sent to all divisions and brigade commanders in advance, notifying them of the hour when the
commanding general might be expected.
This was done so that all the army might be under arms to salute their chief as he passed.
On these occasions he wore his dress uniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs.
His staff proper, besides all officers constructively on his staff-engineers, inspectors, quartermasters, etc.,
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that could be spared-followed, also in uniform and in prescribed order.
Orders were prepared with great care and evidently with the view that they should be a history of what followed.
In their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrasted quite as strongly as in their other characteristics.
General Scott was precise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud of his rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the third person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking about without the least embarrassment.
Taylor was not a conversationalist, but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly that there could be no mistaking it. He knew how to express what he wanted to say in the fewest well-chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to the construction of high-sounding sentences.
But with their opposite characteristics both were great and successful soldiers; both were true, patriotic, and upright in all their dealings.
Both were pleasant to serve under-Taylor was pleasant to serve with.
Scott saw more through the eyes of his staff officers than through his own. His plans were deliberately prepared, and fully expressed in orders.
Taylor saw for himself, and gave orders to meet the emergency without reference to how they would read in history.