John G. Nicolay, The Outbreak of Rebellion

[166] would lead to a heavy battle between McDowell and Beauregard, Patterson had moved from Martinsburg on July 15th, directly toward Johnston at Winchester, as far as Bunker Hill, within nine miles of the enemy. On the following day he ordered a slight reconnoissance. Until the night of the 16th it was believed by his officers that the advance meant fight. Every one understood that the critical moment had come, or was at hand. The time for elaborate strategy or new combinations had passed. Confronting the enemy there were but three alternatives admissible under his imperative duty: to hold him, to fight him, or to follow him.

It is sad to relate that, with the complete advantage of numbers and position, he did neither. In justice to him, however, it should always be remembered that his personal instinct was right, and that he was led into his fatal error mainly by the influence of his chief-of-staff, Fitz John Porter. His senior aid-de-camp, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, relates the circumstances under which he took his final decision:

At one time, General Patterson had given an order to move from Bunker Hill to Winchester. He was very unwilling to leave Johnston, even at Winchester, without attacking him; and on the afternoon before we left Bunker Hill he decided to attack him, notwithstanding his strong force.

Question. Behind his intrenchments?

Answer. Yes, sir; it went so far that his order was written by his assistant adjutant-general, Colonel Porter. It was very much against the wishes of Colonel Porter, and he asked General Patterson if he would send for Colonel Abercrombie and Colonel Thomas, and consult them on the movement. General Patterson replied: “ No, sir; for I know they will attempt to dissuade me from it, and I have made up my mind to fight Johnston under all circumstances.”