John G. Nicolay, The Outbreak of Rebellion

For the time being, however, the inner councils of the conspiracy seem to have frowned upon any rash or premature attempt upon Moultrie, and to have sagely relied on obtaining possession through intrigue and negotiation, since the latter method would not carry with it any danger of reprisal or punishment. A most important advantage in this direction had already been gained by Mr. Buchanan's adoption of the doctrine of non-coercion; the next essential step was to prevent any reinforcements from coming into Charleston Harbor.

Though not perhaps susceptible of historical proof, strong inference warrants the belief that Floyd, Secretary of War, inspired by the Washington cabal of traitors, procured the appointment of Anderson to the command with the hope that as a Southern man he would lend himself to an easy surrender of the forts. To Floyd, also, seems to have been committed the further supervision of the intrigues respecting them. He still avowed himself a unionist; but he disproved his public declarations by a steady series of services and favors to the rebellion, of whose design he could not have remained in ignorance.

Congress had met, the message had been delivered, the fatal doctrine of non-coercion conceded by the President and adopted as an administration policy. Under its protecting promises treason not only proceeded with accelerated organization in the Cotton States, but made its avowals, its boasts, and its threats in Congress. South Carolina and secession were the topics of the hour-Moultrie and Anderson the central and growing objects of anxiety; and at length the North, through its senators and representatives, and still more loudly through its newspaper press, began to bring its influence upon the President for reinforcement and preparation. At the same time the secessionists congregated at Washington were no less alert and active; they obtained