John G. Nicolay, The Outbreak of Rebellion

[173] and more decisive movement. Beauregard was receiving large reinforcements; nevertheless, the strength of the Union army at Washington was such that it seemed entirely possible to provide every chance of success. McDowell, raised in rank from the grade of major to that of brigadiergeneral, and placed in command at Arlington Heights, submitted a formal plan, at the request of the General-in-Chief, about June 24th. His plan assumed that the secession forces at Manassas and its dependencies would number twenty-five thousand; that they would unavoidably become apprised of the movement, and every effort would be made to increase Beauregard's strength; but that “if General J. E. Johnston's force is kept engaged by Major-General Patterson, and Major-General Butler occupies the force now in his vicinity (Fortress Monroe), I think they will not be able to bring up more than ten thousand men.” Against such an array he proposed to move with a force of thirty thousand of all arms, and a reserve of ten thousand.

The project was elaborately discussed, and finally agreed upon, at a council of war at the Executive Mansion, on June 29th, in which President Lincoln, his Cabinet, and the principal military officers took part. As already mentioned, General Scott was opposed to the undertaking; but, after it was once resolved upon, he joined with hearty good — will in every effort to make it a success. McDowell was emphatic in his protest that he could not hope to beat the combined armies of Johnston and Beauregard; uponwhich Scott gave him the distinct assurance: “If Johnston joins Beauregard, he shall have Patterson on his heels.” With this understanding, the movement was ordered to begin a week from that day.

The enterprise did not escape the usual fate of unforeseen delay; it marks great energy in McDowell that his expedition