John G. Nicolay, The Outbreak of Rebellion

[171] to the objection, noted thereon by Jefferson Davis, that “the plan was based on the improbable and inadmissible supposition that the enemy was to await everywhere, isolated and motionless, until our forces could effect junctions to attack them in detail.” Meanwhile he rendered his superiors a real service in pointing out that the defence of his position should be made, not with earthworks at Manassas, but with troops on the line of Bull Run, and for this he was urgent in demanding large reinforcements.

As has been already mentioned, it was General Scott's opinion that the Government ought not to engage in any military undertakings with the three months volunteers, beyond those to which these forces had been already assigned and distributed, namely: to protect Washington and fortify Arlington Heights; to garrison Fort Monroe and, if chance should offer, recapture the Gosport Navy Yard at Norfolk; to hold Baltimore and Maryland; to prosecute Patterson's campaign against Harper's Ferry; to recover West Virginia through McClellan's campaign; to guard the Ohio line, and control Kentucky and Missouri. Larger and more distant operations, he believed, ought to be undertaken only with new armies formed of the three years volunteers, giving the summer to drill and preparation, and entering on combined movements in the favorable autumn weather.

Important reasons, partly military, partly political, conflicted with so deliberate a programme. As events had shaped themselves, it seemed necessary to aid Patterson. The possibility that Beauregard and Johnston might unite their armies was clearly enough perceived; hence, a column to threaten Manassas was proposed. Indications were also manifesting themselves that rebel batteries at narrow places might soon seriously embarrass the navigation of the Potomac. Chiefly, however, the highly excited patriotism of the