John G. Nicolay, The Outbreak of Rebellion

[205] orders to hold the position. Repairing again to Centreville, McDowell found still further discouragement in the loss of the thirteen guns at Cub Run and the increased disorder among the troops. When, toward nine o'clock-just about nightfall for that season — the last brigade reached Centreville, and the various commanders were called together, it was generally agreed that it was unwise to undertake to make a stand, as contemplated. “The condition of our artillery and its ammunition,” says McDowell's report, “and the want of food for the men, who had generally abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day before, and the utter disorganization and consequent demoralization of the mass of the army, seemed to all who were near enough to be consulted-division and brigade commanders and staff — to admit of no alternative but to fall back.” If these reasons might be questioned, there was still another absolutely conclusive. The enlistment of the three months men was expiring. The Pennsylvania Fourth, which had insisted upon and received its discharge that very morning, while the army was advancing to battle, “moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon.” “In the next few days,” continues McDowell, “day by day I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the army.” The practical logic of war is stern and swift. Even while the officers were deliberating, the disorganized fugitives, in a contagious and increasing panic, were already on the march. Toward ten o'clock Mc-Dowell began to distribute his orders to retire from Centreville; and a little after midnight Richardson's and Blenker's brigades marched away from that village in a deliberate and orderly retreat, maintaining their organization as a steady and effective rear-guard till they once more reached the Potomac camps.