Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3

‘ [2] can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. We want to keep the enemy constantly pressed till the close of the war.’ To Sheridan Grant said: ‘If this war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste;’ and to Meade: ‘I do not want to give up the Weldon road, if it can be avoided, until we get Richmond. That may be months yet.’ Accordingly he ordered a railroad to be built, to bring supplies from City Point to the national front at Petersburg, and the entire line of entrenchments to be strengthened from the James river on the right to Warren's left beyond the Weldon road.

The system of field-works which at this time encircled both Richmond and Petersburg, and covered the surrounding country, was complicated in the extreme, and in some respects unprecedented in war. Both cities were embraced in what may be termed besieging operations; both were the object of incessant menace and attack for nearly a year; both were defended with vigor, skill, and gallantry; yet neither was completely invested, nor was either regularly approached by parallels, and only one important sortie was ever made against the assailants' works by the beleaguered garrison. The siege of Richmond was conducted at a distance of twenty miles by an army which retrenched itself, while owing to the intervening rivers, and forests, and swamps, as well as to the complexity of the manoeuvres—the extensions and retractions, the advances and withdrawals, on the right and left—the hostile works stretched out hundreds of miles.

On the north side of the James, Richmond was