Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3

[484] in his effort to break through the right of Lee. He had little rest that night in his camp bed at Dabney's saw-mill. His double anxiety was extreme. At no time since the army of the Potomac left the Rapidan had an entire wing of his command been so endangered; at no time had the opportunity for attacking the rebels outside of their works appeared so favorable: and the interminable delays of Warren, lasting from 7.40 P. M. on the 31st of March to long past dawn on the following day—on the White Oak, the Crump, and the Boydton roads; on Gravelly run and in front of Lee—became at last almost unendurable. More than once in that long night Grant thought of relieving him from command. Every plan was confused, every manoeuvre complicated, every object endangered, by his failure to move. The situation which Sheridan described at three A. M. did not exist, solely because Warren had not obeyed his orders; there would be opportunity for the rebels to escape, or there might be danger of the destruction of the cavalry, solely because Warren was not at the appointed place at the appointed time.

At daylight on the 1st of April, hearing as yet nothing from Warren, but strong in the knowledge of reinforcements on the way, Sheridan moved out against the enemy. But Pickett also had learned the approach of the national infantry, and the rebels in Sheridan's front gave way rapidly, moving by the right flank, and crossing Chamberlain's bed.¹ They