Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3

[480] by the orders he received; he proposed modifications, and made changes in them without authority; he was as cautious as ever, and in the middle of this anxious night, when everything depended on his promptness in reinforcing Sheridan, he actually caused Crawford's division to form and retire in line of battle, so as to meet the enemy should he pursue from his breastworks, as Warren ‘confidently expected he would.’ ¹. If Warren had sometimes been as confident that his superiors had energy and ability as he was that these traits were possessed by Lee, he would have oftener contributed to victory. An undue appreciation of the enemy is quite as fatal to success as the opposite fault.

He was directed, as we have seen, to march Griffin by the Boydton road, and the other two divisions by the Crump road. He sent Ayres, instead of Griffin, by the Boydton road, and moved himself with Griffin and Crawford by the other and parallel road.² The first orders for Griffin were sent out by Grant at 7.40 P. M., and those for the combined operation at 10.15; the first were received by Warren at 9.17, and the last named at 10.50 P. M. They were thereafter renewed and reiterated; he was