Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3

[478] if, alarmed by the national movements, Pickett attempted to withdraw, Warren could strike him in flank and in motion, while Sheridan assaulted from Dinwiddie. This scheme had the advantage that Warren was already in possession of the Crump road, as far as Gravelly run, with Bartlett's brigade.

Accordingly, at 9.45 P. M., Meade enquired of Grant: ‘Would it not be well for Warren to go down with his whole corps and smash up the force in front of Sheridan? Humphreys can hold the line to the Boydton plank road, and the refusal along it. Bartlett's brigade is now on the [Crump] road from G. Boisseau running north, where it crosses Gravelly run. Warren could at once move that way and take the force threatening Sheridan in rear, or he could send one division to support Sheridan at Dinwiddie, and move on the enemy's rear with the other two.’ This was in reality to carry out Grant's plan of the day before of sending a corps to Sheridan; and the general-in-chief instantly replied: ‘Let Warren move in the way you propose, and urge him not to stop for any thing. Let Griffin go on as he was first directed.’

At 10.15, therefore, Meade sent explicit and urgent orders to Warren: ‘Send Griffin promptly, as ordered, by the Boydton plank road, but move the balance of your command by the road Bartlett is on, and strike the enemy in rear, or between him and Dinwiddie. General Sheridan reported his last position as north of Dinwiddie court-house, near Dr. Smith's, the enemy holding the cross-roads at that point. Should the enemy turn on you, your line of retreat will be by J. M. Brooks and R. Boisseau on Boydton plank road. You must be very prompt in ’