Struck by a bullet-precipitate retreat of the Confederates--intrenchments at Shiloh--General Buell-General Johnston--remarks on Shiloh
During this second day of the battle I had been moving from right to left and back, to see for myself the progress made.
In the early part of the afternoon, while riding with Colonel McPherson
and Major Hawkins
, then my chief commissary, we got beyond the left of our troops.
We were moving along the northern edge of a clearing, very leisurely, toward the river above the landing.
There did not appear to be an enemy to our right, until suddenly a battery with musketry opened upon us from the edge of the woods on the other side of the clearing.
The shells and balls whistled about our ears very fast for about a minute.
I do not think it took us longer than that to get out of range and out of sight.
In the sudden start we made, Major Hawkins
lost his hat. He did not stop to pick it up. When we arrived at a perfectly safe position we halted to take an account of damages.
's horse was panting as if ready to drop.
On examination it was found that a ball had struck him forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone entirely through.
In a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead; he had given no sign of injury until we came to a stop.
A ball had struck the metal scabbard of my sword, just below the hilt, and broken it nearly off; before the battle was over it had broken off entirely.
There were three of us: one had lost a horse, killed; one a hat and one a sword-scabbard.
All were thankful that it was no worse.
After the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy rains for some days previous, the roads were almost impassable.
The enemy carrying his artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat, made them still worse for troops following.
I wanted to pursue, but had not the heart to order the men who had fought desperately for two days, lying in the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and I did not feel disposed to positively order Buell
, or any part of his command, to pursue.
Although the senior in rank at the time I had been so only a few weeks.
was, and had been for some time past, a department commander, while I commanded only a district.
I did not meet Buell
in person until too late to get troops ready and pursue with effect; but had I seen him at the moment of the last charge I should have at least requested him to follow.1
I rode forward several miles the day after the battle, and found that the enemy had dropped much, if not all, of their provisions, some ammunition and the extra wheels of their caissons, lightening their loads to enable them to get off their guns.
About five miles out we
found their field hospital abandoned.
An immediate pursuit must have resulted in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners and probably some guns.
was the severest battle fought at the West
during the war, and but few in the East
equalled it for hard, determined fighting.
I saw an open field, in our possession on the second day, over which the Confederates
had made repeated charges the day before, so covered with dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground.
On our side National and Confederate troops were mingled together in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the field nearly all were Confederates.
On one part, which had evidently not been ploughed for several years, probably because the land was poor, bushes had grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. There was not one of these left standing unpierced by bullets.
The smaller ones were all cut down.
Contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the experience of the Army I was then commanding, we were on the defensive.
We were without intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort, and more than half the army engaged the first day was without experience or even drill as soldiers.
The officers with them, except the division commanders and possibly two or three of the brigade commanders, were equally inexperienced in war. The result was a Union victory that gave the men who achieved it great confidence in themselves ever after.
The enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroy an army and capture a position.
They failed in both, with very heavy loss in killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged and convinced that the “Yankee” was not an enemy to be despised.
After the battle I gave verbal instructions to division commanders to let the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detail parties, under commissioned officers from each division, to bury the Confederate
dead in their respective fronts and to report the numbers so buried.
The latter part of these instructions was not carried out by all; but they were by those sent from Sherman
's division, and by some of the parties sent out by McClernand
The heaviest loss sustained by the enemy was in front of these two divisions.
The criticism has often been made that the Union
troops should have been intrenched at Shiloh
Up to that time the pick and spade had been but little resorted to at the West
I had, however, taken this
subject under consideration soon after re-assuming command in the field, and, as already stated, my only military engineer reported unfavorably.
Besides this, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drill more than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe. Reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops that had been hastily thrown together into companies and regiments-fragments of incomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each other.
Under all these circumstances I concluded that drill and discipline were worth more to our men than fortifications.
was a brave, intelligent officer, with as much professional pride and ambition of a commendable sort as I ever knew.
I had been two years at West Point
with him, and had served with him afterwards, in garrison and in the Mexican
war, several years more.
He was not given in early life or in mature years to forming intimate acquaintances.
He was studious by habit, and commanded the confidence and respect of all who knew him. He was a strict disciplinarian, and perhaps did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who “enlisted for the war” and the soldier who serves in time of peace.
One system embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men of social standing, competence, or wealth and independence of character.
The other includes, as a rule, only men who could not do as well in any other occupation.
became an object of harsh criticism later, some going so far as to challenge his loyalty.
No one who knew him ever believed him capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing could be more dishonorable than to accept high rank and command in war and then betray the trust.
When I came into command of the army in 1864, I requested the Secretary of War
to restore General Buell
After the war, during the summer of 1865, I travelled considerably through the North
, and was everywhere met by large numbers of people.
Every one had his opinion about the manner in which the war had been conducted: who among the generals had failed, how, and why. Correspondents of the press were ever on hand to hear every word dropped, and were not always disposed to report correctly what did not confirm their preconceived notions, either about the conduct of the war or the individuals concerned in it. The opportunity frequently occurred for me to defend General Buell
against what I believed to be most unjust charges.
On one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the very charge I had so often refuted — of disloyalty.
This brought from General Buell
a very severe retort,
which I saw in the New York World
some time before I received the letter itself.
I could very well understand his grievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful charges apparently sustained by an officer who, at the time, was at the head of the army.
I replied to him, but not through the press.
I kept no copy of my letter, nor did I ever see it in print; neither did I receive an answer.
General Albert Sidney Johnston
, who commanded the Confederate forces at the beginning of the battle, was disabled by a wound on the afternoon of the first day. This wound, as I understood afterwards, was not necessarily fatal, or even dangerous.
But he was a man who would not abandon what he deemed an important trust in the face of danger and consequently continued in the saddle, commanding, until so exhausted by the loss of blood that he had to be taken from his horse, and soon after died.
The news was not long in reaching our side and I suppose was quite an encouragement to the National
I had known Johnston
slightly in the Mexican
war and later as an officer in the regular army.
He was a man of high character and ability.
His contemporaries at West Point
, and officers generally who came to know him personally later and who remained on our side, expected him to prove the most formidable man to meet that the Confederacy
I once wrote that nothing occurred in his brief command of an army to prove or disprove the high estimate that had been placed upon his military ability; but after studying the orders and dispatches of Johnston
I am compelled to materially modify my views of that officer's qualifications as a soldier.
My judgment now is that he was vacillating and undecided in his actions.
All the disasters in Kentucky
were so discouraging to the authorities in Richmond
that Jefferson Davis
wrote an unofficial letter to Johnston
expressing his own anxiety and that of the public, and saying that he had made such defence as was dictated by long friendship, but that in the absence of a report he needed facts.
The letter was not a reprimand in direct terms, but it was evidently as much felt as though it had been one. General Johnston
raised another army as rapidly as he could, and fortified or strongly intrenched at Corinth
He knew the National
troops were preparing to attack him in his chosen position.
But he had evidently become so disturbed at the results of his operations that he resolved to strike out in an offensive campaign which would restore all that was lost, and if successful accomplish still more.
We have the authority of his son and
biographer for saying that his plan was to attack the forces at Shiloh
and crush them; then to cross the Tennessee
and destroy the army of Buell
, and push the war across the Ohio River
The design was a bold one; but we have the same authority for saying that in the execution Johnston
showed vacillation and indecision.
He left Corinth
on the 2d of April and was not ready to attack until the 6th.
The distance his army had to march was less than twenty miles. Beauregard
, his second in command, was opposed to the attack for two reasons: first, he thought, if let alone the National
troops would attack the Confederates
in their intrenchments; second, we were in ground of our own choosing and would necessarily be intrenched.
not only listened to the objection of Beauregard
to an attack, but held a council of war on the subject on the morning of the 5th.
On the evening of the same day he was in consultation with some of his generals on the same subject, and still again on the morning of the 6th.
During this last consultation, and before a decision had been reached, the battle began by the National
troops opening fire on the enemy.
This seemed to settle the question as to whether there was to be any battle of Shiloh
It also seems to me to settle the question as to whether there was a surprise.
I do not question the personal courage of General Johnston
, or his ability.
But he did not win the distinction predicted for him by many of his friends.
He did prove that as a general he was over-estimated.
was next in rank to Johnston
and succeeded to the command, which he retained to the close of the battle and during the subsequent retreat on Corinth
, as well as in the siege of that place.
His tactics have been severely criticised by Confederate writers, but I do not believe his fallen chief could have done any better under the circumstances.
Some of these critics claim that Shiloh
was won when Johnston
fell, and that if he had not fallen the army under me would have been annihilated or captured.
defeated the Confederates
There is little doubt that we would have been
disgracefully beaten if
all the shells and bullets fired by us had passed harmlessly over the enemy and if
all of theirs had taken effect.
are liable to be killed during engagements; and the fact that when he was shot Johnston
was leading a brigade to induce it to make a charge which had been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there was neither the universal demoralization on our side nor the unbounded confidence on theirs which has been claimed.
There was, in fact, no hour during the day when I doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy, although I was disappointed that reinforcements so near at hand did not arrive at an earlier hour.
The description of the battle of Shiloh
given by Colonel Wm. Preston Johnston
is very graphic and well told.
The reader will imagine that he can see each blow struck, a demoralized and broken mob of Union soldiers, each blow sending the enemy more demoralized than ever towards the Tennessee River
, which was a little more than two miles away at the beginning of the onset.
If the reader does not stop to inquire why, with such Confederate success for more than twelve hours of hard fighting, the National
troops were not all killed, captured or driven into the river, he will regard the pen picture as perfect.
But I witnessed the fight from the National
side from eight o'clock in the morning until night closed the contest.
I see but little in the description that I can recognize.
The Confederate troops fought well and deserve commendation enough for their bravery and endurance on the 6th of April, without detracting from their antagonists or claiming anything more than their just dues.
The reports of the enemy show that their condition at the end of the first day was deplorable; their losses in killed and wounded had been very heavy, and their stragglers had been quite as numerous as on the National
side, with the difference that those of the enemy left the field entirely and were not brought back to their respective commands for many days.
On the Union
side but few of the stragglers fell back further than the landing on the river, and many of these were in line for duty on the second day. The admissions of the highest Confederate officers engaged at Shiloh
make the claim of a victory for them absurd.
The victory was not to either party until the battle was over.
It was then a Union victory, in which the Armies of the Tennessee
and the Ohio
But the Army of the Tennessee fought the entire rebel army on the 6th and held it at bay until near night; and night alone closed the conflict and not the three regiments of Nelson
The Confederates fought with courage at Shiloh
, but the particular
skill claimed I could not and still cannot see; though there is nothing to criticise except the claims put forward for it since.
But the Confederate
claimants for superiority in strategy, superiority in generalship and superiority in dash and prowess are not so unjust to the Union
troops engaged at Shiloh
as are many Northern writers.
The troops on both sides were American, and united they need not fear any foreign foe. It is possible that the Southern
man started in with a little more dash than his Northern brother; but he was correspondingly less enduring.
The endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl their men against ours-first at one point, then at another, sometimes at several points at once.
This they did with daring and energy, until at night the rebel troops were worn out. Our effort during the same time was to be prepared to resist assaults wherever made.
The object of the Confederates
on the second day was to get away with as much of their army and material as possible.
Ours then was to drive them from our front, and to capture or destroy as great a part as possible of their men and material.
We were successful in driving them back, but not so successful in captures as if farther pursuit could have been made.
As it was, we captured or recaptured on the second day about as much artillery as we lost on the first; and, leaving out the one great capture of Prentiss
, we took more prisoners on Monday than the enemy gained from us on Sunday.
On the 6th Sherman
lost seven pieces of artillery, McClernand
eight, and Hurlbut
On the 7th Sherman
captured seven guns, McClernand
three and the Army of the Ohio twenty.
the effective strength of the Union
forces on the morning of the 6th was 33,000 men. Lew. Wallace
brought 5,000 more after nightfall.
reported the enemy's strength at 40,955.
According to the custom of enumeration in the South
, this number probably excluded every man enlisted as musician or detailed as guard or nurse, and all commissioned officers-everybody who did not carry a musket or serve a cannon.
With us everybody in the field receiving pay from the government is counted.
Excluding the troops who fled, panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was not a time during the 6th when we had more than 25,000 men in line.
On the 7th Buell
brought 20,000 more.
Of his remaining two divisions, Thomas
's did not reach the field during the engagement; Wood
's arrived before firing had ceased, but not in time to be of much service.
Our loss in the two days fight was 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded
and 2,885 missing. Of these, 2,103 were in the Army of the Ohio.
reported a total loss of 10,699, of whom 1,728 were killed, 8,012 wounded and 957 missing. This estimate must be incorrect.
We buried, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of the divisions of McClernand
alone than here reported, and 4,000 was the estimate of the burial parties for the whole field.
reports the Confederate
force on the 6th at over 40,000, and their total loss during the two days at 10,699; and at the same time declares that he could put only 20,000 men in battle on the morning of the 7th.
The navy gave a hearty support to the army at Shiloh
, as indeed it always did both before and subsequently when I was in command.
The nature of the ground was such, however, that on this occasion it could do nothing in aid of the troops until sundown on the first day. The country was broken and heavily timbered, cutting off all view of the battle from the river, so that friends would as much in danger from fire from the gunboats as the foe. But about sundown, when the National
troops were back in their last position, the right of the enemy was near the river and exposed to the fire of the two gunboats, which was delivered with vigor and effect.
After nightfall, when firing had entirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet informed himself, approximately, of the position of our troops and suggested the idea of dropping a shell within the lines of the enemy every fifteen minutes during the night.
This was done with effect, as is proved by the Confederate
Up to the battle of Shiloh
I, as well as thousands of other citizens, believed that the rebellion against the Government
would collapse suddenly and soon, if a decisive victory could be gained over any of its armies.
were such victories.
An army of more than 21,000 men was captured or destroyed.
and Hickman, Kentucky
, fell in consequence, and Clarksville
and Nashville, Tennessee
, the last two with an immense amount of stores, also fell into our hands.
and Cumberland rivers
, from their mouths to the head of navigation, were secured.
But when Confederate armies were collected which not only attempted to hold a line farther south, from Memphis
and on to the Atlantic
, but assumed the offensive and made such a gallant effort to regain what had been lost, then, indeed, I gave up all idea of saving the Union
except by complete conquest.
Up to that time it had been the policy of our army, certainly of that portion commanded by me, to protect the property of the citizens
whose territory was invaded, without regard to their sentiments, whether Union or Secession.
After this, however, I regarded it as humane to both sides to protect the persons of those found at their homes, but to consume everything that could be used to support or supply armies.
Protection was still continued over such supplies as were within lines held by us and which we expected to continue to hold; but such supplies within the reach of Confederate armies I regarded as much contraband as arms or ordnance stores.
Their destruction was accomplished without bloodshed and tended to the same result as the destruction of armies.
I continued this policy to the close of the war. Promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished.
Instructions were always given to take provisions and forage under the direction of commissioned officers who should give receipts to owners, if at home, and turn the property over to officers of the quartermaster or commissary departments to be issued as if furnished from our Northern depots.
But much was destroyed without receipts to owners, when it could not be brought within our lines and would otherwise have gone to the support of secession and rebellion.
This policy I believe exercised a material influence in hastening the end.
The battle of Shiloh
, or Pittsburg landing
, has been perhaps less understood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistently misunderstood, than any other engagement between National and Confederate troops during the entire rebellion.
Correct reports of the battle have been published, notably by Sherman
and, in a speech before a meeting of veterans, by General Prentiss
; but all of these appeared long subsequent to the close of the rebellion and after public opinion had been most erroneously formed.
I myself made no report to General Halleck
, further than was contained in a letter, written immediately after the battle informing him that an engagement had been fought and announcing the result.
A few days afterwards General Halleck
moved his headquarters to Pittsburg landing
and assumed command of the troops in the field.
Although next to him in rank, and nominally in command of my old district and army, I was ignored as much as if I had been at the most distant point of territory within my jurisdiction; and although I was in command of all the troops engaged at Shiloh
I was not permitted to see one of the reports of General Buell
or his subordinates in that battle, until they were published by the War Department long
after the event.
For this reason I never made a full official report of this engagement.