Retrospect of the campaign-sherman's movements-proposed movement upon Mobile-a painful accident-ordered to report at Cairo
The capture of Vicksburg
, with its garrison, ordnance and ordnance stores, and the successful battles fought in reaching them, gave new spirit to the loyal people of the North
New hopes for the final success of the cause of the Union
The victory gained at Gettysburg
, upon the same day, added to their hopes.
Now the Mississippi river
was entirely in the possession of the National
troops; for the fall of Vicksburg
gave us Port Hudson
The army of northern Virginia was driven out of Pennsylvania
and forced back to about the same ground it occupied in 1861.
The Army of the Tennessee united with the Army of the Gulf, dividing the Confederate States
The first dispatch I received from the government after the fall of Vicksburg
was in these words:
I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg without actual delivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh article of the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy.
Such has been the case elsewhere.
If these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you will detain them until further orders.
did not know that they had already been delivered into the hands of Major
[N. G.] Watts
, Confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners.
31,600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannon, about 60,000 muskets and a large amount of ammunition.
The small-arms of the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours.
Up to this time our troops at the West
had been limited to the old United
States flint-lock muskets changed into percussion, or the Belgian musket imported early in the war-almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimed at-and a few new and improved arms.
These were of many different calibers, a fact that caused much trouble in distributing ammunition during an engagement.
The enemy had generally new arms which had run the blockade and were of uniform caliber.
After the surrender I authorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferior muskets, to place them in the stack of captured arms and replace them with the latter.
A large number of arms turned in to the Ordnance Department as captured, were thus arms that had really been used by the Union
army in the capture of Vicksburg
In this narrative I have not made the mention I should like of officers, dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special mention.
Neither have I made that mention of the navy which its services deserve.
Suffice it to say, the close of the siege of Vicksburg
found us with an army unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole of officers and men. A military education was acquired which no other school could have given.
Men who thought a company was quite enough for them to command properly at the beginning, would have made good regimental or brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders were equal to the command of a division, and one, Ransom
, would have been equal to the command of a corps at least.
ended the campaign fitted to command independent armies.
General F. P. Blair
joined me at Milliken's Bend
a full-fledged general, without having served in a lower grade.
He commanded a division in the campaign.
I had known Blair
, where I had voted against him in 1858 when he ran for Congress.
I knew him as a frank, positive and generous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader.
I dreaded his coming; I knew from experience that it was more difficult to command two generals desiring to be leaders than it was to command one army officered intelligently and with subordination.
It affords me the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment in respect to his character.
There was no man braver than he, nor was there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with more unquestioning alacrity.
He was one man as a soldier, another as a politician.
The navy under Porter
was all it could be, during the entire campaign.
Without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged.
It could not
have been made at all, in the way it was, with any number of men without such assistance.
The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the service.
There never was a request made, that I am aware of, either of the flag-officer
or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly complied with.
The campaign of Vicksburg
was suggested and developed by circumstances.
The elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war. Voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft had been resorted to; this was resisted, and a defeat or backward movement would have made its execution impossible.
A forward movement to a decisive victory was necessary.
Accordingly I resolved to get below Vicksburg
, unite with Banks
against Port Hudson
, make New Orleans a base and, with that base and Grand Gulf
as a starting point, move our combined forces against Vicksburg
Upon reaching Grand Gulf
, after running its batteries and fighting a battle, I received a letter from Banks
informing me that he could not be at Port Hudson
under ten days, and then with only fifteen thousand men. The time was worth more than the reinforcements; I therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country.
With a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid movements were essential to success.
was captured the day after a new commander had arrived, and only a few days before large reinforcements were expected.
A rapid movement west was made; the garrison of Vicksburg
was met in two engagements and badly defeated, and driven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged.
It looks now as though Providence
had directed the course of the campaign while the Army of the Tennessee executed the decree.
Upon the surrender of the garrison of Vicksburg
there were three things that required immediate attention.
The first was to send a force to drive the enemy from our rear, and out of the State
The second was to send reinforcements to Banks
near Port Hudson
, if necessary, to complete the triumph of opening the Mississippi
from its source to its mouth to the free navigation of vessels bearing the Stars and Stripes.
The third was to inform the authorities at Washington
and the North
of the good news, to relieve their long suspense and strengthen their confidence in the ultimate success of the cause they had so much at heart.
Soon after negotiations were opened with General Pemberton
for the surrender of the city, I notified Sherman
, whose troops extended from Haines' Bluff on the left to the crossing of the Vicksburg
Jackson road over the Big Black on the right, and directed him to hold his command in readiness to advance and drive the enemy from the State
as soon as Vicksburg
were directed to be in readiness to join Sherman
in his move against General Johnston
, and Sherman
was advised of this also.
moved promptly, crossing the Big Black at three different points with as many columns, all concentrating at Bolton
, twenty miles west of Jackson
heard of the surrender of Vicksburg
almost as soon as it occurred, and immediately fell back on Jackson
On the 8th of July Sherman
was within ten miles of Jackson
and on the 11th was close up to the defences of the city and shelling the town.
The siege was kept up until the morning of the 17th, when it was found that the enemy had evacuated during the night.
The weather was very hot, the roads dusty and the water bad. Johnston
destroyed the roads as he passed and had so much the start that pursuit was useless; but Sherman
sent one division, Steele
's, to Brandon
, fourteen miles east of Jackson
The National loss in the second capture of Jackson
was less than one thousand men, killed, wounded and missing.
The Confederate loss was probably less, except in captured.
More than this number fell into our hands as prisoners.
Medicines and food were left for the Confederate
wounded and sick who had to be left behind.
A large amount of rations was issued to the families that remained in Jackson
Medicine and food were also sent to Raymond
for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as I thought it only fair that we should return to these people some of the articles we had taken while marching through the country.
I wrote to Sherman
: “Impress upon the men the importance of going through the State
in an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutely necessary for their subsistence while travelling.
They should try to create as favorable an impression as possible upon the people.”
Provisions and forage, when called for by them, were issued to all the people, from Bruinsburg
and back to Vicksburg
, whose resources had been taken for the supply of our army.
Very large quantities of groceries and provisions were so issued.
was ordered back to Vicksburg
, and his troops took much the same position they had occupied before — from the Big Black to Haines' Bluff.
Having cleaned up about Vicksburg
and captured or routed all regular Confederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all
directions, I felt that the troops that had done so much should be allowed to do more before the enemy could recover from the blow he had received, and while important points might be captured without bloodshed.
I suggested to the General-in-chief
the idea of a campaign against Mobile
, starting from Lake Pontchartrain
preferred another course.
The possession of the trans-Mississippi
by the Union
forces seemed to possess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign east of the Mississippi
I am well aware that the President
was very anxious to have a foothold in Texas
, to stop the clamor of some of the foreign governments which seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in the war, at least so far as to recognize belligerent rights to the Confederate States
This, however, could have been easily done without wasting troops in western Louisiana
and eastern Texas
, by sending a garrison at once to Brownsville
on the Rio Grande
disapproved of my proposition to go against Mobile
, so that I was obliged to settle down and see myself put again on the defensive as I had been a year before in west Tennessee
It would have been an easy thing to capture Mobile
at the time I proposed to go there.
Having that as a base of operations, troops could have been thrown into the interior to operate against General Bragg
This would necessarily have compelled Bragg
to detach in order to meet this fire in his rear.
If he had not done this the troops from Mobile
could have inflicted inestimable damage upon much of the country from which his army and Lee
's were yet receiving their supplies.
I was so much impressed with this idea that I renewed my request later in July and again about the 1st of August, and proposed sending all the troops necessary, asking only the assistance of the navy to protect the debarkation of troops at or near Mobile
I also asked for a leave of absence to visit New Orleans, particularly if my suggestion to move against Mobile
should be approved.
Both requests were refused.
So far as my experience with General Halleck
went it was very much easier for him to refuse a favor than to grant one.
But I did not regard this as a favor.
It was simply in line of duty, though out of my department.
having decided against me, the depletion of an army, which had won a succession of great victories, commenced, as had been the case the year before after the fall of Corinth
when the army was sent where it would do the least good.
By orders, I sent to Banks
a force of 4,000 men; returned the 9th corps to Kentucky
and, when transportation had been collected, started a division of
5,000 men to Schofield
was raiding the State
I also detached a brigade under Ransom
, to garrison that place permanently.
This latter move was quite fortunate as to the time when Ransom
The enemy happened to have a large number, about 5,000 head, of beef cattle there on the way from Texas
to feed the Eastern
armies, and also a large amount of munitions of war which had probably come through Texas
from the Rio Grande
and which were on the way to Lee
's and other armies in the East
The troops that were left with me around Vicksburg
were very busily and unpleasantly employed in making expeditions against guerilla bands and small detachments of cavalry which infested the interior, and in destroying mills, bridges and rolling stock on the railroads.
The guerillas and cavalry were not there to fight but to annoy, and therefore disappeared on the first approach of our troops.
The country back of Vicksburg
was filled with deserters from Pemberton
's army and, it was reported, many from Johnston
The men determined not to fight again while the war lasted.
Those who lived beyond the reach of the Confederate army wanted to get to their homes.
Those who did not, wanted to get North where they could work for their support till the war was over.
Besides all this there was quite a peace feeling, for the time being, among the citizens of that part of Mississippi
, but this feeling soon subsided.
It is not probable that Pemberton
got off with over 4,000 of his army to the camp where he proposed taking them, and these were in a demoralized condition.
On the 7th of August I further depleted my army by sending the 13th corps, General Ord
commanding, to Banks
Besides this I received orders to co-operate with the latter general in movements west of the Mississippi
Having received this order I went to New Orleans to confer with Banks
about the proposed movement.
All these movements came to naught.
During this visit I reviewed Banks
' army a short distance above Carrollton
The horse I rode was vicious and but little used, and on my return to New Orleans ran away and, shying at a locomotive in the street, fell, probably on me. I was rendered insensible, and when I regained consciousness I found myself in a hotel near by with several doctors attending me. My leg was swollen from the knee to the thigh, and the swelling, almost to the point of bursting, extended along the body up to the arm-pit.
The pain was almost beyond endurance.
I lay at the hotel something over a week without being able to turn myself in bed. I had a steamer stop at the nearest point
The civil war 1861-1865|
possible, and was carried to it on a litter.
I was then taken to Vicksburg
, where I remained unable to move for some time afterwards.
While I was absent General Sherman
declined to assume command because, he said, it would confuse the records; but he let all the orders be made in my name, and was glad to render any assistance he could.
No orders were issued by my staff, certainly no important orders, except upon consultation with and approval of Sherman
On the 13th of September, while I was still in New Orleans, Halleck
telegraphed to me to send all available forces to Memphis
and thence to Tuscumbia
, to co-operate with Rosecrans
for the relief of Chattanooga
On the 15th [17th] he telegraphed again for all available forces to go to Rosecrans
This was received on the 27th.
I was still confined to my bed, unable to rise from it without assistance; but I at once ordered Sherman
to send one division to Memphis
as fast as transports could be provided.
The division of McPherson
's corps, which had got off and was on the way to join Steele
, was recalled and sent, likewise, to report to Hurlbut
was directed to forward these two divisions with two others from his own corps at once, and also to send any other troops that might be returning there.
suggested that some good man, like Sherman
, should be sent to Memphis
to take charge of the troops going east.
On this I sent Sherman
, as being, I thought, the most suitable person for an independent command, and besides he was entitled to it if it had to be given to any one.
He was directed to take with him another division of his corps.
This left one back, but having one of McPherson
's divisions he had still the equivalent.
Before the receipt by me of these orders the battle of Chickamauga
had been fought and Rosecrans
forced back into Chattanooga
The administration as well as the General-in-chief
was nearly frantic at the situation of affairs there.
Mr. Charles A. Dana
, an officer of the War Department, was sent to Rosecrans
I do not know what his instructions were, but he was still in Chattanooga
when I arrived there at a later period.
It seems that Halleck
suggested that I should go to Nashville
as soon as able to move and take general direction of the troops moving from the west.
I received the following dispatch dated October 3d: “It is the wish of the Secretary of War
that as soon as General Grant
is able he will come to Cairo
and report by telegraph.”
I was still very lame, but started without delay.
Arriving at Columbus
on the 16th I reported by telegraph: “Your dispatch from Cairo
of the 3d directing me to report from Cairo
was received at 11.30 on the 10th.
the same day with staff and headquarters and am here en route for Cairo