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[506] he then proffered his troops to General Smith, that officer had determined to suspend operations for the night, judging it wiser to hold securely what had been won, than, by attempting to reach the bridges, to risk the loss of all the gain.1 Whether General Smith, in thus acting, did ill or well, may be a question; but there can be no question as to who is really responsible for the failure to take Petersburg. This is no other than the lieutenant-general himself.2 Yet, as the event proved, it was fortunate it was not taken. The resolution on the part of the Confederates to try out the issue of the war there, gave the Union army an excellent line of operations on an easy base; whereas, had Petersburg fallen, Lee would have retired from Richmond to the interior, thus greatly complicating matters. During the night of the 15th, the van of Lee's army reached the town, and men of a very different mettle from the crude soldiers to whom its defence had been intrusted silently deployed in line of battle. In the morning it was found that a new line of works had been thrown up around the town, defended by a large force already present, which was constantly re-enforced by the rapidly arriving Confederate corps. It was soon manifest that the ‘Cockade City,’ which the day before was the open prize of the first captor, would demand for its possession a battle or a siege. As the event
1 It will probably always remain one of those questions respecting which men's opinions will differ, whether General Smith did well or ill in not pushing into Petersburg, and seizing the bridges of the Appomattox. His conduct was shaped by considerations thus stated in his official report: ‘We had thus broken through the strong line of rebel works, but heavy darkness was upon us, and I had heard some hours before that Lee's army was rapidly crossing at Drury's Bluff. I deemed it wiser to hold what we had, than, by attempting to reach the bridges, to lose what we had gained and have the troops meet with a disaster. I knew, also, that some portion of the Army of the Potomac was coming to aid us, and therefore the troops were placed so as to occupy the commanding positions and wait for daylight.’—Smith: Report of Operations before Petersburg.
2 There is on file in the archives of the army a paper bearing this indorsement, by General Meade: ‘Had General Hancock or myself known that Petersburg was to be attacked, Petersburg would have fallen.’
1866.
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