Aristotle, Rhetoric
W. D. Ross, Ed.

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Ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῆ is translated by Cicero, ex altera parte respondere dialecticae, Orat. XXXII 114. ‘Vox a scena ducta videtur. Chori antistrophe strophae ad assem respondet, eiusque motus ita fit, ut posterior in prioris locum succedat...Significat ex altera parte respondere et quasi ex adverso oppositum esse; id quod etiam in antistrophen cadit.’ Trendel. El. Log. Arist. § 14 p. 74: and to the same effect, Comment. ad Arist. de Anima, II 11 5 p. 408. ‘ἀντίστροφον dicitur quod alius rei quasi partes agit eamque repraesentat;’ Waitz, Comm. ad Anal. Pr. I 2, 25 a 6.

The term is borrowed from the manoeuvres of the chorus in the recitation of the choral odes. Στροφή denotes its movement in one direction, to which the ἀντιστροφή, the counter-movement, the wheeling in the opposite direction, exactly corresponds, the same movements being repeated. Müller, Diss. Eumen. p. 41. Hist. Gr. Lit. c. XIV § 4. Mure, Hist. Gk. Lit. Bk. III. c. 1 § 15. Hence it is extended to the words sung by the chorus during the latter of these evolutions, and signifies a set of verses precisely parallel or answering in all their details to the verses of the στροφή. And thus, when applied in its strict and proper sense, it denotes an exact correspondence in detail, as a fac-simile or counterpart.

Hence in Logic ἀντιστρέφειν is used to express terms and propositions which are convertible, and therefore identical in meaning, precisely similar in all respects. On the various senses of ἀντιστρέφειν and its derivatives in Logic, see Waitz, u. s. In this signification, however, ἀντίστροφος does not properly represent the relation actually subsisting between the two arts, the differences between them being too numerous to admit of its being described as an exact correspondence in detail; as I have already pointed out in the paraphrase (Introd. p. 134).

It also represents Rhetoric as an art, independent of, though analogous to, Dialectics, but not growing out of it, nor included under it. The word is of very frequent occurrence in Plato (Gorgias, Republic, Philebus, Timaeus, Theaetetus, Leges), who joins it indifferently with the genitive and dative; and he employs it in this latter sense; as likewise Isocrates, περὶ ἀντιδ. § 182; and Aristotle himself in several places; Polit. VI (IV) 5, 1292 b 7, καὶ ἔστιν ἀντίστροφος (corresponding) αὕτη ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὥσπερ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις. c. 6 ult. 1293 a 33. c. 10, 1295 a 18. de part. anim. II 17 ult. ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτοις τοῖς ζῴοις ἡ γλῶττα τοιαύτη τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἀντιστρόφως ἔχουσα τῷ μυκτῆρι τῶν ἐλεφάντων.

Lastly, Waitz, u. s., points out a peculiar signification of it, ‘res contraria alteri quam potestate aequiparat,’ in de Gen. Anim. II 6, 743 b 28. τὸ ψυχρὸν συνίστησιν ἀντίστροφον (as a balance) τῇ θερμότητι τῇ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τὸν ἐγκέφαλον. Trendelenburg, Comm. ad de Anima u. s., after defining ἀντιστρέφειν as above, adds, ἀντίστροφος ex eadem chori similitudine significat ex altera parte respondere (this is from Cicero, u. s.) Arist. Rhet. I 1; quod non significat, rhetoricam in dialecticae locum succedere (i.e. can be substituted for it, step into its place, as a convertible term), sed quasi ex adverso esse oppositam (stands over against it, as a corresponding opposite in a συστοιχία, two parallel rows of coordinate opposites, like the partners in a country dance). Quintilian, Inst. Orat. II 17, 42, specie magis quam genere differunt.

The term ἀντίστροφος therefore applied to the two arts, seems to represent them as two coordinate opposites, or opposites in the same row (see Spengel on the study of Rhetoric, Munich 1842, p. 21). They are sister arts, with general resemblances and specific differences; two species under one genus, proof: both modes of proof, both dealing with probable materials, but distinguished by the difference of the two instruments of proof employed: the one concluding by the formal svllogism, and by the regular induction, assumed complete; the other drawing its inferences by the abbreviated, imperfect, conversational enthymeme, never complete in form, and by the single example in the place of the general induction.

Rhetoric is afterwards described as παραφυές, μόριον and ὁμοίωμα (infra c. II § 7). παραφυές and μόριον both express in different ways the relation that Rhetoric bears to Dialectics as the off-shoot, branch, or part; a species or variety of the general art of probable reasoning: παραφυές as a subordinate shoot, growing out of the same root with the larger plant or tree,—a term so far corresponding with ἀντίστροφος, but differing from it in making Rhetoric subordinate. μόριον reduces it to a still lower level in comparison with the other. ὁμοίωμα implies no more than a mere general resemblance.

In Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII 6, occurs an explanation of ἀντίστροφος, quite in character with the ordinary Greek etymologies, ῥητορικήν, ἧς ἀντίστροφον εἶναι τὴν διαλεκτικήν, (not referring apparently to this passage, but most probably to the συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν) τουτέστιν ἰσόστροφον, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὕλην στρέφεσθαι (versari circa), as Homer called Ulysses ἀντίθεον instead of ἰσόθεον. Alexander (infr.) gives the same explanation.

Bacon Adv. of learning Bk. II IX 3, has antistrophe for ‘correspondence’, “and it hath the same relation or antistrophe that the former hath.”

The points of correspondence and difference between the two arts have been already fully explained in the Introduction, p. 90 foll.: I will here give a summary of them from Alexander's Commentary on the Topics, p. 4. They are 1. that both of them are μὴ περὶ ἕν τι γένος ἀφωρισμένον; that is, that neither of them has any special subject-matter, like the sciences, but argues or perorates upon any thesis or subject whatsoever that can be presented to it. 2. τὸ δἰ ἐνδόξων καὶ πιθανῶν, no proof or conclusion, or principle, that they employ is more than probable; exact demonstration and necessary conclusions are excluded from both alike; πίστις, belief, the result of mere persuasion, and not ἐπιστήμη, the infallible result of scientific demonstration, being the object aimed at. 3. μὴ δἰ οἰκείων ἀρχῶν, they have no ‘special, appropriate’ first principles, such as those from which the special sciences are deduced; though they likewise appeal to the τὰ κοινά, the κοιναὶ ἀρχαί, the ultimate axioms and principles common to all reasoning, which are above those of the special sciences, and from which the latter must be deduced. And, 4. they are ὁμοίως περὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις; they argue indifferently the opposite sides of the same question, and conclude the positive or negative of any proposition or problem; unlike science and demonstration, which can only arrive at one conclusion. Where the materials and the method are alike only probable, every question has, or may be made to appear to have, two sides, either of which may be maintained on probable principles; in Dialectics and Rhetoric no certainty is either attained or attainable. The chief points of difference between them are, that Dialectics deals practically as well as theoretically with every kind of problem or question that can be submitted to it; proceeds by question and answer, in the way of debate, and its discussions are of a more general or universal character; whereas the subjects of Rhetoric are practically, though not theoretically, almost absolutely limited to Politics; it follows a method of continuous narration or explanation (διεξοδικῶς), and deals in its conclusions rather with individual cases than with general principles or universal rules, maxims and axioms.

Alexander, in a preceding passage, gives the following very extraordinary account of the derivation and original meaning of ἀντίστροφος: τὸ γὰρ ἀντ. ἀντὶ τοῦ ἰσόστροφόν τε καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ στρεφομένην καὶ καταγινομένην λέγει.

κοινὰ ἁπάντων] See Introd., p. 87, and the Paraphrase, pp. 134—5.

ἀφωρισμένης] ‘marked off, separated by a limit’, from every thing else about it; and so ‘definite, special’ (§ 7). 1, 2, 1 περί τι γένος ἴδιον ἀφωρισμένον, opposed to περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος. Polit. I 13, 1260 b 1 ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ δουλείαν (a definite, limited, kind of slavery). Ib. IV (VI) 4, 1290 b 25 ἀποδιορίζειν. ἀφορίζεται (ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις) πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις τῷ ἔργῳ τούτῳ, “this capacity of the soul is marked off, separated, distinguished, from all the rest by this function,” de Anima II 4, 9, 416 a 20. The preposition is similarly used in the compound ἀποβλέπειν, which is ‘to look away, or off’, from all surrounding objects, so as to fix the attention on one particular thing, or turn it in one particular direction. Comp. Lat. definire, determinare.

Parallel passages, in which this same characteristic of Rhetoric and Dialectics is noticed, are cited in the Introd. p. 75. See also Quintilian, II 21, 16—19, on the province of the orator.

ἐξετάζειν...λόγον] Note 1, Introd. p. 135. ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἐξεταστική, Top. A 2, 101 b 3.

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συνήθειαν] ‘habituation, familiarity, practice’, acquired by association (prop. that of living or herding together). Top. A 14, 105 b 27 τῇ διὰ τῆς ἀπαγωγῆς συνηθείᾳ πειρατέον γνωρίζειν ἑκάστην αὐτῶν (τῶν προτάσεων). See also on I 10, 18. This συνήθεια is derived from the constant operation or activity, the ἐνέργειαι, of the developed and acquired and settled ἕξις, or mental state (ἕξις from ἔχειν, ‘to be in such and such a state or condition’, τὸ πῶς ἔχειν): by the constant exercise of the ἕξις, or established confirmed habit, and its ἐνέργειαι, is produced by association that familiarity, or habituation, or practice, which secures success even to the empirical unartistic use of Dialectics or Rhetoric.

εἰκῇ ταῦτα δρᾷν is the use of them antecedent to practice, and without previously acquired familiarity: ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, by a mere spontaneous impulse, and therefore ‘at random.’

‘Est autem dialectica,’ says John of Salisbury, Metalogicus, II 4, ‘ut Augustino placet, bene disputandi scientia: quod quidem ita accipiendum est ut vis habeatur in verbis; ne scilicet dialectici credantur, quos casus iuvat artis beneficio destitutos.’

αὐτά] Rhetoric and its processes.

ὁδοποιεῖν] ‘to make a way’; to trace a path to be followed, which will lead you without unnecessary deviations to the place at which you wish to arrive. ὁδός therefore, in this metaphorical usage, is not merely a way, but the way, the best way; the way which will lead you most surely and expeditiously to the end proposed. Hence it denotes a regular, systematic, or scientific method; the best and easiest way of attaining the end desired in any intellectual pursuit or branch of study. And thus it is that the simple ὁδός, as well as the compound μέθοδος, come to denote a scientific or systematic procedure in the pursuit of truth as a philosophical ‘method’, or in any art or study. Hence we find ὁδῷ διῃρῆσθαι, Plat. Phaedr. 263 B, of a systematic methodical scientific division; and Rep. VII 533 D: καθ᾽ ὁδόν, in the same sense, Rep. IV 435 A, and Crat. 425 B. In Aristotle, de gen. et corr. I 8, 2 ὁδῷ δὲ μάλιστα περὶ πάντων...διωρίκασι Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος. de part. Anim. 14, 9 πῶς μὲν οὖν ἀποδέχεσθαι δεῖ τὴν περὶ φύσεως μέθοδον, καὶ τίνα τρόπον γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἡ θεωρία περὶ αὐτῶν ὁδῷ καὶ ῥᾷστα... Anal. Pr. I 30 init., ἡ μὲν οὖν ὁδὸς κατὰ πάντων ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ περὶ τέχνην ὁποιανοῦν καὶ μάθημα. Top. B 2, 109 b 14 ὁδῷ γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐν ἐλάττοσιν ἡ σκέψις. Eth. Nic. I, 2 ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ ὁδός. Dionysius, de Comp. Verb. c. 25, has ἡ ῥητορικὴ ὁδός for the more usual μέθοδος: and again ὁδῷ, de Comp. Verb. c. 4 sub fin. From this usage of the Greek word the Latins seem to have borrowed their via or via et ratione, which frequently occurs in precisely the same sense. See Cicero de Fin. III 5, 18, IV 4, 10; Orat. III 10, XXXIII 116; de Orat. I 25, 113. Quint. II 17, 41 esse certe viam atque ordinem in bene dicendo nemo dubitaverit; and x 7, 6 via dicere.

The verb ὁδοποιεῖν is found in the same sense, Met. A 3, 984 a 18. προϊόντων δ᾽ οὕτως, αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὡδοποίησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνηνάγκασε ζητεῖν, and Rhet. III 12, 3 (according to MS A^{c} and some others); and the substantive ὁδοποίησις, III 14, 1.

προοδοποιεῖν, which occurs several times in Aristotle (as Rhet. II 2, 10, II 13, 7, III 12, 3, Prob. XXX 1, 954 b 12, de part. Anim. II 4, §§ 4, 5, 6, III 9, 8, de gen. anim. IV 4, 9, περὶ Μαντικῆς, I 11. Polit. II 9, 1270 a 4, IV (VII) 17, 1336 a 32, and V (VIII) 3, 1338 a 35 πρὸ ὁδοῦ), has a meaning slightly differing from the preceding. The metaphor is now taken from the office of pioneers, who precede an advancing army, and prepare, clear, or ‘pave the way’ for them.

δἰ ὅ...τὴν αἰτίαν] τὴν αἰτίαν is here grammatically the antecedent to ὅ, the cause, αἰτία, being in the relative pronoun expressed as an abstract notion (‘the cause, which thing’) in the neuter. A similar change from feminine to neuter, in antecedent and relative, occurs in de Anima 1 3, 407 a 4 τὴν γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς (ψυχὴν) τοιαύτην εἶναι βούλεται οἷόν ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς, Pol. II 2 init. καὶ δἰ ἣν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νενομοθετῆσθαι... οὐ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων, and in Eur. Iph. T. 900 (Herm.) ἡ δ᾽ αἰτία τίς ἀν? ὅτου κτείνει πόσιν; where ὅτου must be understood as neuter: see Hermann on v. 1038.

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seq. To the same effect III 14, 8 δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι πάντα ἔξω τοῦ λόγου τὰ τοιαῦτα: πρὸς φαῦλον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ἀκούοντα, ἐπεὶ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτος ᾖ, οὐθὲν δεῖ προοιμίου—as the vehicle for appeals to the feelings and other indirect proofs addressed to the judges personally, which were usually introduced into the προοίμιον.

πίστεις] rhetorical, not demonstrative, proofs; modes of belief, of things probable; all the materials and arguments of Rhetoric being probable merely, none of them certain. See Introd. p. 136 note.

προσθῆκαι...σῶμα τῆς πίστεως] All kinds of indirect proof are secondary, subordinate, non-essential, mere ‘adjuncts’ or ‘appendages’, like dress or ornaments to the body: ‘the body’ being the actual, logical, direct and substantial proof of the case. What is here called ‘the body’, meaning the substance as opposed to accidents, we usually represent by ‘the soul’ in this same relation; the body in its turn now standing for the accidents and non-essentials of a thing. So the Scholiast on Hermogenes, Proleg. (quoted by Ernesti, Lexicon Technologiae Graecae p. 110, Art. ἐνθύμημα) οἱ παλαιοὶ ὥσπερ τι ζῷον τὸν λόγον ὑπέθεντο ἐκ σώματός τε συνεστηκότα καὶ ψυχῆς: ψυχὴν μὲν καλοῦντες τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν διὰ τῶν κεφαλαίων συνισταμένην: σῶμα δὲ τὴν φράσιν καὶ τὸ ἔξωθεν κάλλος, ὃ ποιεῖν εἰώθασιν αἱ ἰδέαι. And Cicero, Orat. XIV 44 nam et invenire et iudicare quid dicas magna illa quidem sunt et tamquam animi instar in corpore.

Quintilian describes the views of some of those who thus rigorously limit the province of Rhetoric as an art—αἱ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον— to the employment of the ‘enthymeme’, the rhetorical representative of the logical and demonstrative ‘syllogism’; with the exclusion of all that is, strictly speaking, ‘beside the subject or real issue’, all that is beside the facts of the case and the direct proof of them; all indirect proof, namely, from the assumed character of the speaker himself, or appeals to the feelings of the judges or audience, and also all ornaments and graces of style and delivery. Aristotle here assumes this to be theoretically the only true and proper method, though he by no means consistently adheres to it in his actual treatment of the subject. Quintilian's description is as follows, though, as the reasons for the exclusion of these indirect proofs are somewhat different from those assigned by Aristotle, he probably does not refer immediately to him: Fuerunt et clari quidem oratores quibus solum videretur oratoris officium docere. Namque et affectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant: primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio; deinde quia iudicem a veritate depelli misericordia vel ira similibusque non oporteret: et voluptatem audientium pctere, quum vincendi tantum gratia diceretur, non modo agenti supervacuum sed vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur. Inst. Orat. V. Prooem. I.

On the general question of appeals to the feelings, Quint. II 17, 26 seq.: and on the prevailing practice, Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδ. § 321.

πραγματεύεσθαι is well explained by Bonitz on Metaph. A 6, 987 a 30. ‘πραγματεύεσθαι περί τι, vel περί τινος is dicitur ab Aristotele, qui in investiganda et cognoscenda aliqua re via ac ratione procedit; itaque coniunctum legitur cum verbis διαλέγεσθαι, ζητεῖν, θεωρεῖν’. The primary sense of doing business, or occupying oneself about anything, passes into the more limited or special signification of an intellectual pursuit, and thence of ‘a special study’, ‘a systematic treatment of a particular subject of investigation, or practice’ (as in this present case, of Rhetoric, comp. § 10). πραγματεία, like μέθοδος, τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, φιλοσοφία, and many other words, is used to express not only the intellectual process of investigation, but also the resulting science, art, treatise, or written work, or part of such work. See on this point, Introd. p. 17, note 2. Also, on the general meaning of the term, Waitz on Anal. Post. II 13, 96 b 15. Trendel. de Anima p. 199. Elem. Log. Arist. § 58, p. 135.

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διαβολή from διαβάλλειν ‘to sunder or set at variance’, and so ‘to make hostile, to engender a mutual dislike between two parties’, in its technical application to Rhetoric, of which it is a potent instrument; and with its opposite ἀπολύεσθαι ‘to absolve oneself, clear away from oneself ill-feeling and suspicion’, forms one of the principal topics of the προοίμιον (see Introd. pp. 343, 4). It denotes the exciting of suspicion and ill-will in the minds of the judges or audience, in order to prejudice them against the opponent with whom you are in controversy: and is therefore improperly classed with the πάθη or emotions such as ἔλεος and ὀργή. This has been already noticed by Victorius and Muretus: the latter says, ‘διαβολὴ non est πάθος, sed pertinet ad iudicem ponendum ἐν πάθει.’

Top. Δ 5, 126 a 31. [διάβολον] τὸν δυνάμενον διαβάλλειν καὶ ἐχθροὺς ποιεῖν τοὺς φίλους. These words, which seem to be a mere gloss upon διάβολον in the text of the Topics, occur apparently in one MS only, marked u by Waitz, and inserted by him in the critical notes of his edition, Vol. II p. 144. Bekker altogether omits to notice them. Though of no authority they will equally well answer the purpose for which they are here employed, of helping, namely, to define the meaning of διαβολή.

On πάθος and πάθη, see Introd. pp. 113—118.

οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος δικαστήν] Appeals to the feelings are ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος: they are ‘beside the proper subject, the real question, the direct issue’, which is the fact and the proof of it; and ‘directed to the judge’, intended to bias and pervert his judgment, to incline him to our side in the contest, and so to have the effect of a secondary or indirect kind of proof of the justice of our case.

ὥστ᾽ εἰ περὶ πάσας—λέγωσιν] Similarly in Rhet. III 1, 4, it is said of the ornaments of style, and declamation in general, as of appeals to the feelings here, that they are only allowed to be employed διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν πολιτειῶν; in well-governed states they would not be permitted at all.

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οἳ μέν...οἳ δέ] ‘either...or’. The one only think that the laws ought to be so framed, hold the opinion as a theory; the others, as the Court of Areopagus, actually (καί, also, besides the mere theory) carry it into practice, καὶ χρῶνται.

ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ] Heindorf ad Theaet. § 76. Lycurgus c. Leocr. §§ 12, 13, quoted by Gaisford, καὶ ταῦτα κάλλιστον ἔχοντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων παράδειγμα τὸ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ συνέδριον, ὃ τοσοῦτον διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων δικαστηρίων, ὥστε καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὁμολογεῖσθαι τοῖς ἁλισκομένοις δικαίαν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κρίσιν, πρὸς ὃ δεῖ καὶ ὑμᾶς ἀποβλέποντας μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τοῖς ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγουσιν: κ.τ.λ.

Lucian, Hermotimus, c. 64, has something similar about the practice of this court, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ἀρεοπαγίτας αὐτὸ ποιοῦντα: οἳ ἐν νυκτὶ καὶ σκότῳ δικάζουσιν, ὡς μὴ εἰς τοὺς λέγοντας ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὰ λεγόμενα ἀποβλέποιεν. (Lucian ed. Hemsterh. I p. 805), and again, Anacharsis s. de Gymn. c. 10, (Vol. II p. 898) οἱ δὲ (δικαζόμενοι) ἔς τ᾽ ἂν μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος λέγωσιν ἀνέχεται ἡ βουλὴ κα? ἡσυχίαν ἀκούουσα: ἢν δέ τις ἢ φροίμιον εἴπῃ πρὸ τοῦ λόγου, ὡς εὐνουστέρους ἀπεργάσαιτο αὐτούς, ἢ οἶκτον ἢ δείνωσιν ἔξωθεν ἐπάγοι τῷ πράγματι, οἷα πολλὰ ῥητόρων παῖδες ἐπὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς μηχανῶνται, παρελθὼν ὁ κῆρυξ κατεσιώπησεν εὐθύς, οὐκ ἐῶν ληρεῖν πρὸς τὴν βουλήν κ.τ.λ. There are several allusions to the same in Quintilian, II 16, 4, VI 1, 7, X I, 107, XII 10, 26. Spalding in his note on the first of these passages calls attention to—what indeed is sufficiently apparent on the face of the statements—Quintilian's carelessness in extending to all the lawcourts of Athens, a practice actually prevailing at the most only in one of them; in spite of the direct evidence to the contrary in the extant orations of the Athenian orators, and the story of Hyperides and Phryne which he himself tells in II 15, 9.

διαστρέφειν] to warp, or distort to wrest out of the straight (‘right’) line or proper direction, to pervert or ‘deprave’ the judgment. The same metaphor is repeated in στρεβλόν. The metaphor which compares wrong, the deviation from the ‘right’ line or path, to the crooked or twisted, the divergence from the straight, and represents wrong judgment as the warping of the moral rule, occurs in various languages; σκολιός, and ὀρθός, εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς, Solon ap. Dem. de F. L. p. 423, σκολιαῖς ὁδοῖς πατῶν, Pind. Pyth. II 156, Pl. Theaet. 173 A &c. &c. So ἑλικτός, Eur. Androm. 448 ἑλικτὰ κοὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ἀλλὰ πᾶν πέριξ φρονοῦντες. So Plato of the good and bad horse in the human chariot, Phaedr. 253 D, ὁ μὲν...τό τε εἰδος ὀρθός...ὁ δ᾽ αὖ σκολιός κ.τ.λ.

So also rectum and pravum or varum or curvum, right and wrong (wrung or twisted out of shape, distorted, similarly intortus) tort, Fr. (tortum), torto, Ital. Compare Lucretius, IV 516, denique ut in fabrica, si prava est fabrica prima Normaque si fallax rectis regionibus exit,—Omnia mendose fieri, &c. Cic. Acad. Pr. II 11, 33, interesse oportet, ut inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Hor. Ep. II 2, 44, curvo dignoscere rectum, (‘virtutem distinguere a vitio’. Orelli). Pers. Sat. III 52, haud tibi inexpertum curvos deprendere mores. IV 11, rectum discernis ubi inter curva subit, vel cum fallit pede regula varo. V 38, apposita intortos extendit regula mores.

‘Crooked’ for perverse, immoral, wrong, is very common in the earlier writers of our own language. Deut. xxxii 5, a perverse and crooked generation. Ps. cxxv 5, Prov. ii 15, whose ways are crooked, and they froward in their paths. Ep. ad Phil. ii 15, and in many other places and authors. For examples of the latter, see Richardson's Dict. Art. ‘crooked’.

Very different to this are the principles laid down by the author of the ?ητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον as a guide to the practice of the rhetorician, c. 36 (37) § 4. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς ἐπαίνῳ θεραπεῦσαι, ὡς δικασταὶ δίκαιοι καὶ δεινοί εἰσιν. συμπαραληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐλαττώσεις, εἴ που τῶν ἀντιδίκων καταδεεστέρως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τὸν ἀγῶνα. The judges are to be flattered, and the opponent represented in the darkest colours, whether his alleged defects have or have not any bearing upon the matter at issue. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐμβλητέον τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἀκόλουθα; which is the exact contradictory of the course prescribed by Aristotle in § 6 as alike fair and in accordance with the true principles of the art.

προάγοντας εἰς] Comp. III 14, 7, and note.

κἂν εἴ τις...ποιήσειε] The process by which ἄν in this and similar forms of expression—ὡς ἂν εἰ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ, καθάπερ ἂν εἰ, οἱόνπερ ἂν εἰ, and the like—has lost its force, become inactive, (consopitum, ‘gone to sleep’, Buttm.,) in the sentence, is explained by Buttmann in his note on Dem. Mid. § 15, p. 530. The conditional ἄν belongs to some verb in the apodosis, originally expressed, afterwards left to be understood, as in the clause before us. The expression at full length would be, κἂν, εἴ τις ποιήσειε, ποιήσειε, ‘as one would do, if he were to do’. Still, though the particle has lost its direct and active force in this sentence, some latent notion of conditionality always remains, even when the verb which ἂν supposes cannot actually be supplied. This is the case in such phrases as φοβούμενος ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ παῖς, Pl. Gorg. 479 A ‘fearing as a child would’: Ar. parva naturalia περὶ μαντικῆς I 2, 2 ὅσων ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ λάλος ἡ φύσις ἐστιν, ‘whose natural habit is, as it might be (ἄν), talkative’; de Anima I 5, 5, 409 b 27, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ πράγματα τιθέντες. In such cases the ἄν is retained by habit and association, when the sense no longer requires it. The phrase accordingly is not found in the earlier forms of the language, and does not become common till the time of Plato and Aristotle, with whom, the latter especially, it is very frequent. The association required time before it was established as a fixed habit. I believe that it does not occur in Thucydides, and that it makes its first appearance in Xenophon; that is, in the forms above given; for as an unnecessary appendage to a participle, or in cases analogous, ἄν is thus used by earlier writers. See Hermann on Soph. Phil. 491, and Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 430, I, for some instances [Kühner's Ausführliche Grammatik § 398 p. 209 sq. S.].

Aristotle seems to be the earliest writer who assumed the license of joining κἂν εἰ with the subjunctive mood, as in Pol. II 1 init. κἂν εἰ τυγχάνωσιν, c. 2, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σταθμῆς πλεῖον ἑλκύσῃ, and III 8 κἂν εἰ συμβαίνῃ, also Poet. I 5, κἂν εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τυγχάνωσιν. Κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκῇ is the MSS reading in Plat. Rep. IX 579 D, and defended by Schneider (not. ad loc.); but rejected by Ast, Bek., Stallb. and the Zurich Editors who substitute δοκεῖ. I subjoin a few examples of the usage in its various forms. Soph. Aj. 1078 δοκεῖν πεσεῖν ἂν κἂν (it might be even) ἀπὸ σμικροῦ κακοῦ. Xenophon, Symp. II 20, IX 4, Cyrop. I 3, 1, Memor. III 6, 4 and 10, 12. Plato, Apol. 23 B, Phaed. 72 C, 109 C, and elsewhere, Men. 97 B, Gorg. 479 A, Rep. VI 493 A, Isocr. Paneg. §§ 69, 148, Aristotle in addition to those already quoted, Rhet. II 20, 4, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις, Eth. N. v 7, 1132, II. Ib. V 12, 1137, 2; VI 13 sub. fin., 1145, 2 and 10; VII 8, 1150, 16, κἂν εἰ ῥέπουσι, Pol. III 6 (sub init.) κἂν εἰ πλείους, and several more: Hist. Anim. IV 2, 16, IV 11, 11, VIII 2, 10, de part. Anim. IV 5, 26, de Gen. Anim. III 9, 7. In Aristotle it has become habitual. The analogous use of ἂν with the participle is exemplified by Pol. II 2, 1261 b 4 ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι; and Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. I 5, 1, ὡς ἄν καθόλου λέγοντας, and I 6, 6, ὡς ἂν κατὰ λόγον, where ἄν may be considered as redundant. [Vahlen, Beiträge zu Ar. Poet. I p. 35—37; Eucken, de Ar. dicendi ratione I p. 61—64. S.]

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On the ‘legal issues’, στάσεις, ἀμφισβητήσεις, which, as Victorius remarks, are here tacitly referred to, see Introd. p. 397, Appendix E to Bk. III.

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κειμένους νόμους] κεῖσθαι and some of its compounds are often convertible with the passive of τιθέναι. κεῖσθαι itself ‘to be placed, fixed, established’=τίθεσθαι; συγκεῖσθαι ‘to be put together or composed’=συντίθεσθαι; διακεῖσθαι ‘to be disposed’=διατίθεσθαι; ποκεῖσθαι (as I 2 13) ‘to be assumed’=ὑποτίθεσθαι or ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι.

[κεῖμαι is constantly borrowed as a perfect passive to τίθημι, while τέθειμαι is almost invariably used as a deponent perfect. Thus the usage of the perfect in the best writers would be: ὁ νομοθέτης τέθεικε τὸν νόμον. ἡ πόλις τέθειται τὸν νόμον: ὁ νόμος κεῖται (Dem. Or. 46 § 12 note). infra chap. 15 § 23 τοῖς νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ὦσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, Plato Leg. p. 793 B (νόμων) τῶν ἐν γράμμασι τεθέντων τε καὶ κειμένων καὶ τῶν ἔτι τεθησομένων. See also Cobet's variae lectiones p. 311. S.]

τοῖς κρίνουσι, κρίσεις, τοὺς κρίνοντας] On the different senses of κρίνειν and κριτής as applied to the different branches of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 137 note I: and on the necessary imperfections of laws in their application to particular cases, the consequent introduction of ἐπιείκεια to modify them and adapt them to the circumstances of the case, and Plato's opinion, on the authority of laws, see p. 138 note I.

ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι] ἐπί resting, and so depending, upon; hence penes, in the power of, at the discretion of. § 8 ἐπὶ τοῖς κριταῖς καταλείπειν.

This primary, literal, and physical sense of ἐπί, (in this application of it, which represents the object of the preposition as the basis on which something stands or rests, and therefore depends upon), of the half dozen Grammars and Lexicons, which, after forming my own opinion, I have consulted on the point, is to be found distinctly stated only in that of Rost and Palm, where it lurks hardly discoverable, amidst the enormous mass of illustrations of the various usages of ἐπί accumulated in Vol. I pp. 1032 —1045, in p. 1038, col. 2.

αἱ νομοθεσίαι ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σκεψαμένων γίνονται] ‘legislation arises from (is the work of men after) long previous consideration’. Thuc. I 58, ἐκ πολλοῦ πράσσοντες οὐδὲν εὕροντο ἐπιτήδειον.

ἐξ ὑπογυίου] (retained by Bekker; Gaisford not. var. prefers ὑπογύου, and so L. Dindorf, on Xen. Cyr. VI 1, 43.) ὑπόγυιον: πρὸ μικροῦ γεγονός, Hesychius. ἐξ ὑπογύου: παρ᾽ αὐτά, ἀπερισκέπτως, ἐκ τῶν σύνεγγυς, Suidas. By the Scholiast on Arist. Nub. 145, in Suidas v. ἀρτί (Gaisf.), ἐξ ὑπογυίου λέγειν is interpreted by αὐτοσχεδιάζειν; and in Eustath. (ap. eund.) it is said to be derived from γυῖον in the sense of χείρ, (compare Theocr. Idyl. XXII 81 and 121; the ‘hand’ is the member, par excellence), from which likewise he deduces ἐγγύη, ἐγγυᾷν, and ἐγγυαλίζειν; and ὑπόγυον, ὃ καὶ ἐξ ὑπογύου λέγεται, τὸ ἐγγύς φασι προσδόκιμον, ἢ παραυτίκα γεγονός, καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν πρόχειρον, ἢ μᾶλλον ὑποχείριον. Examples may be found, all bearing much the same sense, in Koch's note on Moeris Lex. p. 343, and a still larger list in Rost and Palm's Lex. s.v., to which add Rhet. II 22, 11; Pol. VII (VI) 8, 1321 b 17. ὑπογυιότατον (the readiest way or means) πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν. Isocr. Paneg. § 13. Menand. ap. Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 391. In Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδ. § 4, and Epist. 6. 2, p. 418 B, it stands for ‘close at hand’, ἤδη ὑπογυίου μοι τῆς τοῦ βίου τελευτῆς οὔσης, and similarly Ar. Eth. Nic. III 9 (Bekk.) sub fin., ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπογυῖα ὄντα.

It appears from all this that ὑπογυῖον means ‘under the hand’, as an unfinished or just finished work, fresh and recent, πρόσφατον (so Rhet. II 3, 12) as Moeris explains it: and ἐξ ὑπογυίου, ‘from under the hand’, corresponds to our ‘off-hand’, or ‘out of hand’, and is used to express anything ‘sudden and unexpected’ or ‘unpremeditated’, ‘extemporaneous’ a signification which appears in all the examples. Similarly ἐκ χειρός, ἀπὸ χειρο<*>ς, ‘off-hand’.

ἀποδιδόναι] a word of very frequent use in Aristotle, has for one of its elementary senses that of ‘to give back’, reddere; ἀπό as in ἀπονέμειν, ἀπολαμβάνειν, ἀπαιτεῖν, ἀπόπλους, ἀποπλεῖν (see Sturz. Lex. Xenoph.), from which all the other senses in which at least Aristotle employs it may be deduced. Another of the original senses of the word is ‘to give forth’, or ‘produce’, as the earth produces her fruits, and this also might be applied to the interpretation of it in several of its various uses. But as this signification is likewise deducible from the other—for production, as when the earth produces her fruits, may be regarded as a payment or restoration, or ‘return’ of something as due—it may perhaps be better to refer them all to the one original signification, reddere. So in Eth. N. II 1, 1103, a 27, b 22, τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδιδόναι is not simply ‘to produce’, but to produce energies that are due to the system, energies corresponding to the faculties from which they spring. So Trendelenburg, El. Log. Arist. § 55, p. 132, ‘ἀποδιδόναι proprie est reddere, unde ex suum cuique tribuendi significatione facile orta est declarandi vis (declarare is the sense which the word bears in the passage specially referred to, Top. A 5, 102 a 3) nihil enim est aliud quam logice suam cuique naturam reddere.’

ἀποδιδόναι is therefore (1) to give back, restore, repay, render, always implying some kind of obligation, (2) to render as a due, ‘assign’ (which best represents it in the majority of cases in Aristotle); of due distribution, suum cuique; hence (3) of the due fulfilment of any office or duty, as ἀποδιδόναι λόγον, ‘to render an account’, to explain, or set forth, any statement or doctrine, ἀποφαίνεσθαι, declarare. To one or the other of these I believe all the multifarious uses of the word may be referred.

I will add a few examples in the way of illustration:—Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 638 § 56, τοὺς ἐχθρὰ ποιοῦντας ἐν ἐχθροῦ μέρει κολάζειν ἀπέδωκεν (assigns as a due) ὁ νόμος; and elsewhere. Plat. Phaed. 71 E (a good example), οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν (pay back in return), ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χωλὴ (mutilated, defective, lopsided, single where all the rest are pairs) ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι κ.τ.λ. de Anima I 1, 403 b 1, τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, ‘assigns’ or ‘applies’, that is, to the definition, which is the thing in question, to which it assigns matter as the sole element: comp. c. 4, 408 a 3; and ἀπονέμειν, in precisely the same sense, ib. V 1, and Pl. Tim. 34 A. ἀποδιδῶσι make to correspond, bring into comparison, Rhet. III 11, 13. ἀποδ. λειτουργίαν de part. An. III 14, 9, ‘duly to fulfil certain functions (services)’. Ib. II 14, 5, (ἡ φύσις) πανταχοῦ ἀποδίδωσι (makes due compensation, duly assigns) λαβοῦσα ἑτέρωθεν πρὸς ἄλλο μόριον. Top. Δ 1, 121 a 15, et passim, τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος, ἀποδιδόναι γένος. Top. A 18, 108 b 9, τὴν ἀπόδοσιν τῶν ὁρισμῶν, the rendering, or due preparation, production, of definitions: and so elsewhere. de part. An. III 7, 18, ἀποδ. τὸ ἔργον of the due performance of the work. Ib. I 1, 43 ἀποδ. τὸ ὀστοῦν τί ἐστι, to state, give a sufficient account or explanation. Phys. I 6, 1, 189 a 16, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πάντα ἀποδιδόναι (to produce, effect everything) οἴεται ὅσαπερ Ἀναξ. ἐκ τῶν ἀπείρων. Eth. Nic. III 1, 110 b 8, ποῖα δὲ...οὐ ῥάδιον ἀποδοῦναι, to give an account, explain.

So here ἀποδιδόναι is ‘duly to assign, distribute, or apportion’ and again I 2, 5, ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις ‘we render our judgments’. These same applications of the word occur likewise in Plato, as Rep. 379 A, (to represent), Ib. 472 D, VI 508 E, Phaedr. 237 C, Theaet. 175 D, Polit. 295 A. The precise opposite, ἀπολαμβάνειν, occurs with the same sense of ἀπό, I 11, 3. ἀπονέμειν is used in exactly the same sense, ‘to assign as a due’; see for instance Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 b 18, ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, Ib. V 35, τιμὴ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, Ib. 1124 a 9.

ἤδη...κρίνουσιν] by this time, now that we have come to them, ‘they actually decide’ So in the next line, τὸ φιλεῖν ἤδη καὶ τὸ μισεῖν ‘this time’, in theircase, not in the former, of something new, special, and marked. ἤδη therefore in these cases is often translatable by a mere emphasis. The word is repeated so soon after, applied to the same persons, and expressing almost identically the same thing, that it is not improbable that Spengel may be right in his conjecture that the one or the other should be erased. Rhet. Gr. Vol. I. Pref. p. v. ‘paulo post alterutrum ἤδη abundat, puto prius.’ However there are two still closer together, II 25, 14.

It may be worth while to say a few words on this very common usage of ἤδη and analogous particles of time, in the way of illustration and exemplification. Ἤδη and its analogues ἔτι, οὐκέτι, οὔπω, are used emphatically to mark a critical point, climax, degree attained, as deserving of special and particular attention, at the moment, and in reference to something else which is not equally remarkable. They are all particles of time, and derive this their secondary sense from the metaphorical application of this notion of ‘already’, a definite time which we have just reached: ‘point’, or ‘stage’, or ‘degree’ attained being substituted by the metaphor for ‘time’ in the original sense of the word.

This will be best illustrated by a few examples. Arist. περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως c. 2. 16, ὥσπερ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος, ‘habit, already by this time, now that we have reached this point, has become a second nature’. Met. Δ 21, 1022 b 18, ἕνα δὲ [τρόπον πάθος λέγεται] τούτων ἐνέργειαι καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ἤδη, ‘one sense of πάθος is, the actual energies and changes of these’. ἤδη, by the time that they have reached this stage or state, and have actually become what they are. Categ. c. 8, 9, a 4, ἣν ἄν τις ἴσως ἕξιν ἤδη προσαγορεύσοι, ‘which may now (at this stage) be fairly called a ἕξις’. περὶ ἑρμηνείας c. 9, 19, a 39, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν ἑτέραν, οὐ μέντοι ἤδη (not yet actually, not quite, not yet arrived at the stage of,) ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ. Polit. II 8, 1268 b 20, ἐκεῖνος ἤδη ἐπιορκεῖ. III 7, 1279 a 40, πλείους δ᾽ ἤδη χαλεπὸν ἠκριβῶσθαι. VIII (v) 8, 1308 a 15, ἔστι γὰρ ὥσπερ δῆμος ἤδη οἱ ὅμοιοι, i.e. though this may not be strictly true of all oligarchies, when we come to the ὅμοιοι, at this stage, by this time, it is now quite true that they may be regarded as a δῆμος. Eth. Nic. V 3, 1132 a 2, πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων, ‘when a man has come to be a ruler, he must then...’ in the case of others this perhaps is not necessarily true, but the ruler must, actually, live or act in relation to others and in society’. Rhet. I 6, 24, πάντες ἤδη ὁμολογοῦσιν. I 10, 11, ἤδη διαφέρει ‘it does make a difference’. c. 11 § 3, τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται. Ib. § 26, ἔργον ἤδη γίγνεται. II 6 § 12, and 25 § 14, bis. I have confined myself in these illustrations to examples from Aristotle; from the ordinary language, in which this usage is at least equally common, I will content myself with citing Herod. III 5, ἀπὸ ταύτης ἤδη Αἴγυπτος: and Eur. Hippol. 1195 (Monk) πρὸ�