31. ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμά τί ἐστιν. Cf. below 332Aἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς; 332C 358D Plato frequently begins a train of
reasoning in this way.
32. καὶ ἐμοί: so T: B has καί μοι. καὶ ἐμοί seems slightly
better than κἀμοί, as forming a more effective balance to ἐμοὶ μέν
in the same line.
33. ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες: but ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ as
Greek usage requires. Protagoras is addressed first on the
principle seniores priores and honoris causa; contrast 311D and
cf. 353A(Kroschel).
34. εἴπετον: contrast 311Dεἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Ἱππόκρατες, where see note. The dual gives prominence to the notion
in κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα (l. 29). The connection of this part of the
argument with the rest is this: in 330A330Bit is said that no
one part of virtue is οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, e.g. that δικαιοσύνη is not
οἷον ὁσιότης (major premise); here it is said that δικαιοσύνη is
δίκαιον, ὁσιότης ὅσιον (minor premise): from which the conclusion (in the next chapter) is drawn that δικαιοσύνη is not ὅσιον,
nor ὁσιότης δίκαιον. This stage of the argument is therefore
neither ‘tautological nor unmeaning’, as Grote (quoted by
Turner) asserts.
Plato. Protagoras. J. Adam & A. M. Adam. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1893.
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