J. Adam, A. M. Adam, Commentary on Plato, Protagoras
J. Adam & A. M. Adam, Ed.

58. βούλεσθαι—ἐπιθυμεῖν. βούλεσθαι is of will, ἐπιθυμεῖν of desire. The distinction is generally well marked in Plato: see note on Apol. 25C and cf. Cope on Ar. Rhet. II. 19. 9. Prodicus does not touch on this example in his speech in 337, but it is quite in Plato's way to select a fresh example (cf. Theaet. 147A-B, 166E by the side of 159C, 169A-B), which may in this case be supposed to come from Prodicus' lectures (cf. 341A. We should expect the article to be repeated with ἐπιθυμεῖν, as the two words are to be distinguished (cf. below in l. 63 τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι); but the article is sometimes dropped with the second of two words even when the words are contrasted, e.g. Euthyphr. 9C τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μή. Here the effect of its omission is perhaps to suggest that the two notions are after all more like than different.

63. γενέσθαι—εἶναι. The distinction though long ago recognised by the philosophers was not always present in ordinary speech: otherwise (as Kroschel points out) Protagoras' censure of Simonides would be too absurd, and Socrates' pretended bewilderment out of place. But that Simonides in this poem drew a distinction between γενέσθαι and εἶναι is certain: whether it was the same distinction as Socrates himself draws later is another question; see on γενόμενον δὲ—ἀδύνατον in 344B